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"Despite persistent barriers, intra-regional trade flows have increased. Long-distance trade 
flows, e.g. between Sahelian and coastal countries, have a long tradition and are often 
engrained in social and ethnic networks. Livestock, cereals and cowpeas are exported from 
the Sahel to the coast; some cereals also flow from coastal states northward; and tubers, 
fruits and vegetables of the Guinea savannah zone are brought into the cities in coastal 
areas and Sahelian countries. These trade flows have increased substantially over the last 
decades, driven by urbanization and migration. The real size of this trade is unknown, 
however, since official trade data only capture part of the actual trade flows. Major 
constraints to further expansion include poor road infrastructure, rules that restrict 
competition in the trucking industry, administrative barriers, difficulties and risks of 
transferring funds across countries with different monetary systems, growing insecurity and 
rent-seeking by police and border officials" 
 
source: Hollinger Frank & John M. Staatz: Agricultural Growth in West Africa. Market and Policy 
Drivers. FAO, AfDB and ECOWAS: Rome, 2015, p.13  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Increasing concern about instability, population pressure, migration and chronic food 
insecurity in West Africa and growing awareness of the potential of enhanced intraregional 
trade and investment to contribute to sustainable and inclusive economic development, has 
prompted a number of donors including The Netherlands to increase their efforts to support 
West African integration and cooperation. 
Notwithstanding the persisted challenges to regionalism in West Africa, the momentum for 
support seems to have been strengthened in recent years driven by key initiatives such as 
the African Union Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and 
Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihood and the Abuja Process, 
building on increasing political commitment within the region, which was followed by 
increased commitments through UEMOA and ECOWAS frameworks and in particular the 
recent conclusion of the ECOWAS Common External Tariff (CET). 
Support for regional integration and cooperation in West Africa by The Netherlands fits well 
within its policy framework for Aid, Trade and Investment and aligns with key Dutch policy 
objectives to promote sustainable and inclusive economic development and to enhance 
food security. Furthermore, there is increased interest of Dutch businesses to invest in and 
trade with West Africa and growing recognition of the opportunities for Dutch businesses, 
knowledge institutes and civil society to contribute to sustainable development in West 
Africa. 
 
Scoping study 
In order for support to regional integration and cooperation in West Africa to be effective 
and calibrated to the specific needs of the region, there is a need to build a more 
comprehensive understanding of the diverse and complex regional dynamics and to gain 
insight into the opportunities and challenges to regional integration in West Africa.  
Commissioned by the Food & Business Knowledge Platform, the overall objective of the 
study underlying this scoping report was to contribute a more contextualized 
comprehensive picture of The Netherlands’ government ongoing cooperation with West 
Africa and the perspective in terms of policy options for strengthening its effectiveness and 
coherence by giving more emphasis to the promotion of intraregional trade and investment.  
The study has been carried out by a consortium of knowledge institutes comprised of the 
African Studies Centre Leiden (ASCL), the Agro-Economic Research Institute of the 
Wageningen University and Research (LEI-WUR) and the European Centre for Development 
Policy Management (ECDPM).  
Apart from this report, the scoping study has so far resulted in three additional outputs: 1) 
Discussion Paper on trade and barriers to trade in West Africa, ‘Overview of trade and 
barriers to trade in West Africa. Insights into political economy dynamics, with particular 
focus on agricultural and food trade’ drawn up by ECDPM1; 2) Annotated Bibliography based 
on an inventory of literature on regional integration in West Africa prepared by the ASCL; 
                                                          
1
 C. Torres and J. van Seters (2016),  Overview of trade and barriers to trade in West Africa: insights in 
political economy dynamics, with particular focus on agricultural and food trade, ECDPM Discussion 
Paper No. 195: www.ecdpm.org/dp195 (forthcoming).  
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and 3) Scoping Conference Report, produced by the ASCL in cooperation with the other 
consortium members.2  
 
This scoping report primarily builds on the following inventories:  
1. Inventory of regional knowledge institutes on which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
can rely on for high quality input and at the same time qualify for institutional and 
other support, aimed at sustaining their potential for high level research and policy 
support in the future. 
 
2. Inventory of literature about trade relations (illegal and legal, agricultural and wider) 
useful for strengthening the knowledge base underpinning the regional policy with 
regard to West Africa, making use of library-, internet- and human resources.  
 
3. Inventory of statistics about trade relations (illegal and legal, agricultural and wider) 
useful for strengthening the knowledge base underpinning the regional policy with 
regard to West Africa, making use of library-, internet- and human resources.  
 
4. Inventory of Dutch bilateral (policy) initiatives in West Africa in the period 2005-
2015. 
 
5. Inventory of (policy) initiatives by regional institutions in West Africa, (policy) 
initiatives by other development partners and donor coordination efforts in the 
period 2010-2015.   
 
6. Inventory of policy options and an assessment of their possible effects, building on 
existing work streams and the new policy for aid, trade and entrepreneurship for 
development. 
The structure of the scoping report logically follows these deliverables. This is 
complemented with a set of conclusions and (policy) recommendations, drawn from the 
findings of the broader scoping exercise including the discussion paper drafted by ECDPM.   
 
Methodology 
This scoping report has largely drawn on an extensive review of existing literature and 
statistics. It further builds on consultations with The Netherlands’ Ministry of Foreign of 
Affairs, the network of Dutch Embassies in West Africa, the Netherlands-African Business 
Council (NABC) and other key organizations and experts. Furthermore, the scoping report 
has generously benefitted from the findings of the other outputs of the scoping study, as 
referred to above.  
 
  
                                                          
2
 Scoping Conference report: ‘Improving the perspective for regional trade and investment in West-
Africa: the key to food security, economic development and stability in the region?’, held on 27 
January 2016 at the African Studies Centre Leiden: http://www.ascleiden.nl/news/scoping-
conference-regional-integration-and-trade 
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SECTION 1: INVENTORY OF REGIONAL KNOWLEDGE INSTITUTES 
Paul Lange 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This section focuses on the pool of West African (‘regional’) institutes that could have a role 
as knowledge partner of The Netherlands’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Notwithstanding the 
lack of transparency and visibility that many of these institutes suffer from, it aims to discuss 
a selection of regional institutes in view of their role as knowledge institute. This selection is 
based on the author’s assessment of three main criteria: 1) geographical scope: multi-
country focus on West Africa; 2) thematic focus: regional integration/ cross-border 
challenges (with a particular emphasis on agriculture & food security); and 3) knowledge 
generation and dissemination activities: policy-relevant research. The matrix presented 
below attempts to capture these knowledge institutes’ main features according to a number 
of parameters that could further help to determine their potential for collaboration (See 
Table 1.1).  
This selection follows from a more broad-based institutional mapping of leading knowledge 
institutes in the West African region (See Appendix 1A for the list of the other regional 
knowledge institutes that came out of this mapping).3  
                                                          
3
 In order to guide the identification process given the large pool of knowledge institutes in West 
Africa and the limited time available for this mapping, the selection method applied for this 
institutional mapping builds on three starting points: 1) the West African knowledge institutes 
identified in the inventory of literature that was prepared by the ASCL within the framework of this 
scoping study (see section 2 of this scoping report); 2) the West African participants in the Think Tank 
Initiative (TTI); and 3) the West African partners that have been selected as part of the Leiden African 
Studies Assembly (Leiden ASA), a recent initiative by the African Studies Centre Leiden in 
Section conclusions: 
- Far from being exhaustive, this inventory of regional organizations already shows 
that there are several that are well recognized within the region and have a 
proven track record as knowledge institute, through a number of knowledge 
generation and dissemination activities and across a wide range of thematic 
areas, including agriculture & food security.  
- Furthermore, it also points at the possibility of considering collaboration with 
organizations that are traditionally not regarded as knowledge institutes, such as 
financial institutions like (development) banks. 
- The inventory further demonstrates that there is considerable potential added 
value of working with regional knowledge institutes, for example in terms of their 
expertise, networks and linkages to policy-processes.  
- It also indicates that there are a number of significant differences in comparative 
strengths between these institutes that need to take into consideration when 
assessing the potential for collaboration and identifying best placed partners, 
such as main geographical focus (regional versus more country/ continental-
based focus), core thematic foci and primary knowledge activities. Additional 
parameters could help to further determine their potential and suitability for 
collaboration.     
- The mapping however also reveals that desk research as method for assessing the 
potential for collaboration has limitations in terms of exposing the particular 
strengths and weaknesses of these knowledge institutes. 
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Box 1.1: African Development Bank (AfDB) (Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire) 
Although the African Development Bank (AfDB) is intrinsically a financial institution, it has 
placed knowledge generation and sharing at the heart of the Bank’s core activities in its 
mission to reduce poverty and foster development on the African continent.4 In 2015, the 
AfDB launched its Knowledge Management Strategy with the aim to become the premier 
knowledge institution in support of its mandate.5 As laid down in this strategy document, it 
increasingly seeks to complement its role as financier with the provision of knowledge 
products and services and therefore considers itself uniquely placed to “lead the 
development of innovative solutions for the complex challenges facing Africa”.6 The strategic 
objective is to enhance its development effectiveness through providing and disseminating 
innovative knowledge solutions for the priority areas as defined in the Bank’s Ten Year 
Strategy (2013-2022): infrastructure development, private sector development, regional 
economic integration, skills and technology, governance and accountability, with special 
attention for gender, fragile states, and agriculture and food security 
In order to institutionalize the role of knowledge throughout its operations, the Bank 
established in 2007 the Development Research Department (EDRE). The Department’s 
principal activities are to design and conduct research and analysis on priority social and 
economic development issues, with a particular emphasis on growth, poverty reduction and 
accelerating the process of regional integration. In this way the EDRE support the Bank’s 
policy and operations agenda and helps to further build the knowledge base of its regional 
member countries.  
More specifically, the Department’s mandate includes the following activities: 
- Managing the preparation of the Bank’s flagship publications (e.g. African Economic 
Outlook, African Development Report, Africa Competitiveness Report) and disseminate their 
findings to its regional member countries, development partners, universities and research 
bodies, and the media;  
- Identifying strategic priorities for Bank-led research on African economic and social 
development and regional integration issues; undertaking a selected programme of 
individual and collaborative research related to these strategic priorities, in close 
cooperation with international and regional research institutions and other  stakeholders;  
- Developing technical and financial cooperation arrangements with other agencies and 
institutions carrying out activities related to the Bank’s research and operations priorities; 
- Disseminating development research findings internally and externally through the 
Department’s website, a wide variety of publications and economic research papers, and in 
collaboration with the African Development Institute, through regional and international 
seminars and workshops, as well as through the annual African Economic Conference; 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Collaboration with Leiden University that aims to strengthen collaboration with key knowledge 
institutes in Africa. The author acknowledges that as a result this selection inevitably excludes a 
number of regional knowledge institutes that are worth considering for collaboration.  
4 
The African Development Bank is discussed for its role as donor in section 5 of this report. 
5
 The overall objective of the Bank is to promote sustainable economic development and social 
progress, and contribute to poverty reduction in its regional member countries, by mobilizing and 
allocating resources for investment and by providing policy advice and technical assistance to support 
development efforts. 
6 
AfDB, ‘AfDB Board of Directors approves the Bank’s Knowledge Management Strategy for 2015-
2020’: http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/afdb-board-of-directors-approves-the-
banks-knowledge-management-strategy-for-2015-2020-14476/ 
12 
 
- Assisting country and sector economists throughout the Bank in developing and employing 
standardized economic methodologies, utilizing appropriate economic indicators in their 
operational work, and accessing the results of relevant economic research undertaken 
within and outside the Bank; and  
- Undertaking economic intelligence, analysis and studies as requested by Senior 
Management, and preparing related papers, briefs, and statements. 
In addition to its Research Department, an important pillar of the Bank’s quest for putting 
knowledge at the center of its operations is its Statistics Department (ESTA). This 
department contributes to the availability of reliable data by being involved in the 
production and collection of statistical data itself. The Bank’s Data Portal provides data on 
socio-economic indicators throughout time and across the continent and allows for 
comprehensive cross-country/-regional analysis. The department is also engaged in the 
development of the statistical capacity and systems of its regional member countries. 
The Bank’s West Africa Regional Department (ORWA) covers the fifteen ECOWAS countries. 
Its mission is to represent the Bank towards these countries, the regional economic 
communities, donors and others, to lead the Bank’s programming in these countries and to 
allocate the country resources among sector activities, country and regional lending and 
work programmes. It also plays a key role in terms of conducting the Bank’s Knowledge 
Management Strategy for West Africa and is responsible for a wide range of (knowledge) 
deliverables in relation to West Africa including the region’s country strategy papers, the 
Bank’s Regional Integration Strategy Paper for West Africa, (the regional edition of) the 
African Economic Outlook, West Africa Policy Notes and the West African Monitor 
Quarterly.7  
Furthermore, as emphasized in the latest Regional Integration Strategy Paper for West 
Africa8, the African Development Bank believes it has a particular role to play in terms of 
providing support to regional knowledge institutes, as part of its efforts to strengthen the 
knowledge base on regional integration in West Africa in areas that are relevant for its 
operations and policy agenda. Although not further specified, the West Africa Regional 
Department has most likely a strategic position in this mission. 
 
                                                          
7 
African Development Bank – West Africa knowledge products: 
http://www.afdb.org/en/countries/west-africa/west-africa-knowledge-products/ 
8 
AfDB (2011), Regional Integration Strategy Paper for West Africa 2011-2015: 
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-
Documents/RISP%20for%20West%20Africa%20-%20REV%202.pdf 
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Table 1.1: Knowledge institutes matrix – main features 
Institute 
 
Knowledge activities 
 
Thematic focus areas 
Geographical 
focus 
Network/ 
partners 
Comparative strengths 
AfDB 
 
 Policy-relevant 
research 
 Knowledge sharing & 
dissemination 
 (statistical) data 
collection & 
production 
 policy dialogue & 
advocacy 
 capacity building & 
training 
 
1. infrastructure  development 
2. private sector development 
3. regional economic integration 
4. skills and technology 
5. governance and accountability 
Across the African 
continent, including 
a specific regional 
focus on West 
Africa through a 
dedicated 
department 
extensive 
partnership 
portfolio: wide 
range of 
organizations and 
institutions including 
bilateral/ 
multilateral donors, 
international 
organizations, 
regional bodies and 
others 
 (co-)responsible for a number of 
key publications on (West) Africa 
(e.g. African Economic Outlook, 
Africa Competiveness Report) 
 Lead financier of regional 
integration in Africa for a number 
of years 
 Well positioned to strengthen the 
broad knowledge base on regional 
(economic) integration 
AfriHeritage 
 
 policy-relevant 
research 
 Knowledge sharing & 
dissemination 
 (statistical) data 
collection & 
production 
 policy dialogue & 
advocacy 
 capacity building & 
training 
 
1. trade, regional integration 
and   competitiveness 
2. poverty, income distribution  
and the labour market 
3. public sector economics and  
 management 
4. macro-economic analysis,  
modeling and forecasting 
5. agricultural and rural  
development 
Particular focus on 
Nigeria but linked 
with a research 
emphasis on 
regional 
integration; seeks 
to realize its vision 
of greater pan-
African research 
and policy influence  
Extensive network in 
Nigeria, linked to a 
broad range of 
organizations and 
stakeholders 
 Part of Think Tank Initiative 
 Well connected in Nigeria, as 
economic powerhouse of the 
region 
 
UNECA 
 
 policy-relevant 
research 
 knowledge sharing & 
dissemination 
1. macro-economic policy 
2. regional integration & trade 
3. social development 
4. natural resources 
Across the African 
continent, including 
a specific regional 
focus on West 
Part of UN system 
 
Key component of 
African institutional 
 (co-)responsible for a number of 
key publications on (West) Africa 
 Well-placed in both the 
international development 
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(statistical) data 
collection & 
production 
 policy dialogue & 
advocacy 
 capacity building & 
training 
5. innovation & technology 
6. gender 
7. governance 
 
Africa through a 
dedicated 
department 
landscape 
 
Well-connected at 
the regional level 
through its regional 
office.  
community as well as the African 
institutional landscape 
 Well-positioned to strengthen the 
knowledge base on regional 
integration 
 
CRES 
 
 policy-relevant 
research 
 knowledge sharing & 
dissemination 
 policy dialogue & 
advocacy 
 capacity building & 
training 
1. growth, inequality & poverty 
2. information & innovation 
3. globalization, regional 
integration & local development 
4. human resources 
5. rural development 
6. law 
Strong emphasis on 
Senegal, combined 
with specific 
regional focus on 
West Africa  
Extensive and 
diversified network 
of partners 
 
Strongly developed 
linkages with both 
ECOWAS and 
UEMOA 
 Part of Think Tank Initiative 
 Well-connected at the regional 
level (ECOWAS, UEMOA) 
 (research) track record in trade 
liberalization, regional integration 
and rural development  
CODESRIA 
 
 (policy-relevant) 
research 
 Knowledge sharing & 
dissemination 
 (research) capacity 
building & training 
 
1. higher education, ICT & 
internationalization 
2. climate change, resources & 
development  
3 politics & governance;  
4. gender, youth, culture and 
transformative social policy 
5. regional and continental 
integration, mobility & the 
African diaspora 
6. contemporary forms of African 
engagements with the rest of the 
world 
7. thinking about the future 
Across the African 
continent 
Large network of 
(African) knowledge 
institutes 
 
Well-connected to 
international 
development 
community 
 
Well-established 
linkages with 
ECOWAS 
 
 leading African knowledge 
institute 
 continental hub for the African 
research community 
 widely recognized and supported 
within the international 
development community 
 eager to raise its profile among 
policy communities 
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ENDA/ 
CACID 
 
 Policy-relevant 
research 
 Knowledge sharing & 
dissemination 
 policy dialogue & 
advocacy 
 capacity building & 
training 
 
1. (bilateral/ multilateral) trade 
negotiations 
2. intraregional trade and 
integration in Africa 
3. globalization, emerging 
markets and South-South trade  
4. natural resource management 
in West Africa 
Across the African 
continent, with a 
particular focus on 
West Africa  
Extensive network of 
a wide range of 
partners, particularly 
in the West African 
region; well-
integrated in the 
African institutional 
landscape 
 Strong institutional foothold in 
West Africa 
 Well-established linkages with 
relevant (West) African 
institutional in the area of 
(regional) integration & trade 
 Recognized knowledge leader in 
the area of (regional) integration & 
trade 
Le Hub 
Rural 
 
 Technical assistance 
 Knowledge sharing & 
dissemination 
 policy dialogue & 
advocacy 
 capacity building & 
training 
1. agricultural policies 
2. land policies 
3. climate change 
4. bioenergy 
5. rural development funding 
 
Focus on Central 
and West Africa, 
both at country and 
regional level 
Extensive and broad 
network of partners 
in the area of 
agriculture & food 
security  
 Key and broad geographical focus 
on West Africa, both at country 
and regional level 
 Well-established linkages with 
both ECOWAS and UEMOA 
 Close involvement in regional 
integration processes in the area 
of agriculture & food security 
IPAR 
 
 policy-relevant 
research 
 knowledge sharing & 
dissemination 
 policy dialogue & 
advocacy 
 capacity building & 
training 
 
1. agriculture, regional 
integration & globalization 
2. demography, employment & 
migration 
3. education & training 
4. food policies  
5. fishery & aquaculture 
resources 
6. land security & development 
7. natural resources, energy & 
climate change 
8. decentralization, governance 
and local development 
 
Strong emphasis on 
Senegal, combined 
with a specific 
regional focus on 
West Africa 
Well-established and 
broad-based 
network in Senegal 
 Part of Think Tank Initiative 
 Recognized knowledge leadership 
in agriculture and rural 
development issues 
 Strong commitment to policy 
dialogue and advocacy  
 Committed to exploit the potential 
of regionalism in West Africa for 
agriculture and rural development 
 High degree of strategic thinking 
on major challenges (e.g. 
migration, demography climate 
change) for the region 
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Box.1.2: African Heritage Institution (Enugu, Nigeria) 
The African Heritage Institution (AfriHeritage) is a non-profit organization devoted to 
(applied) economic research, modelling & analysis and data production & management. 
It is also involved in training & capacity building, facilitation of (evidence-based) policy 
and stakeholder dialogue and in knowledge dissemination and communication.   
AfriHeritage produces a wide range of knowledge products including research papers, 
working papers, policy briefs and policy papers, Its working paper series, known as the 
Business Environment and Competitiveness Across Nigerian States (BECANS), is the 
institution’s flagship initiative. The objective of these publications is to promote 
evidence-based reforms of the business environment in Nigeria.  
Its principal areas of research include trade, regional integration, macroeconomic 
analysis and forecasting, public sector economics and management, poverty analysis, 
income distribution, the labour market, agriculture, and rural development.  
Although AfriHeritage particularly focuses on Nigeria, it aims to become a leading think 
tank involved in pan-African research and policy influence. It has been selected to 
benefit from the support provided through the Think Tank Initiative (TII). TTI is a multi-
donor programme dedicated to strengthening independent policy research institutions 
through enabling the institutions to attract, retain and build local talent, develop an 
independent research program, and invest in public outreach to ensure that research 
results inform and influence national and regional policy debates.  
AfriHeritage particularly emphasizes the use of research for policy impact. It has for 
example contributed to the development of Nigeria’s National Economic Empowerment 
and Development Strategy. In order to further enhance its impact on the national policy 
agenda, the institution established in 2010 the Policy Think Group. This serves as a 
vehicle to articulate and translate research outputs for broader use by a wide range of 
stakeholders, including policymakers, NGOs, the media and the private sector. 
The Institution is affiliated to several international (policy) research institutions and 
networks, such as the African Economics Research Consortium (AERC, Kenya), Initiative 
for Policy Dialogue (IPD, US) Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE, UK). Its 
network lies particularly in Nigeria, where it is connected to a wide variety of partners, 
including Nigeria’s National Planning Commission, the Central Bank and the Small and 
Medium Enterprises Development Agency.  
 
Box 1.3: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), (Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia/Niamey, Niger) 
Established by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) is one of the five UN’s regional 
commissions. Its mandate is to promote the economic and social development of its 54 
member states, foster intra-regional integration and enhance international cooperation 
for Africa’s development.  
As part of a strategic refocusing process initiated in recent years, UNECA has set itself to 
become a premier think tank on issues that are key to Africa’s development. UNECA 
issued therefore in 2014 its Knowledge Management Strategy to guide this process.9 
                                                          
9 
UNECA (2014), Knowledge Management Strategy: 
http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/The-ECA-Knowledge-Management-
Strategy_en.pdf  
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UNECA takes a number of roles to further give content to this ambition. It seeks to 
strengthen the evidence base of its policy research and advocacy, promotes policy 
dialogue and consensus, and to provide capacity development support and advisory 
services. Furthermore, through its Africa Centre for Statistics UNECA seeks to be the 
leading source on the continent for the production and analysis of original data to 
inform policy decisions. It is also involved in a large number of key publications on 
Africa, including from a regional integration perspective, such as the Assessing Regional 
integration in Africa editions.10 UNECA focuses on the following key thematic areas: 
macro-economic policy, regional integration & trade, social development, natural 
resources, innovation & technology, gender and governance. Within the area of regional 
integration & trade, through its Regional Integration & Trade Division (RITD) UNECA 
undertakes policy research on the interaction between different dimensions of 
economic transformation – industrialization, food security, agriculture, land, investment 
and trade – and the broader regional integration process. The RITD, through the 
Division’ African Trade Policy Centre11 is also (co-)responsible for drawing up the Africa 
Regional Integration Index.12 In addition to its headquarters located in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia, UNECA has five (sub-) regional offices, including one in Niamey, Niger for the 
West African region (ECA/SRO-WA) covering the fifteen ECOWAS members. ECA/SRO-
WA provides policy advisory services to the UNECA member states, regional economic 
communities and other actors in support of regional integration initiatives, serves as a 
facilitator of integration activities initiated by the UN system and takes part in the 
production of a wide range of publications on (regional integration in) West Africa.13 
Being part of the UN system, UNECA is well placed within the international development 
community and linked to a wide range of bilateral/ development donors and other 
development partners. Furthermore, in strong collaboration with the African Union and 
the African Development Bank through their Joint Secretariat Support Office, it is firmly 
settled in the African institutional landscape. At the regional level, its office in West 
Africa works in close collaboration with the regional economic communities ECOWAS 
and UEMOA and with a wide range of relevant actors and stakeholders including from 
the private sector, civil society and knowledge institutions.  
 
Box 1.4: Consortium pour la Recherche Économique et Sociale (CRES) (Dakar, Senegal)  
The Consortium pour la Recherche Économique et Sociale (CRES) is a research center 
linked to the Université Cheikh Anta Diop that aims to conduct and promote research 
                                                          
10
 The Assessing Regional Integration in Africa (ARIA) is a series of publications that are issued by 
UNECA in collaboration with the African Development Bank and the African Union: 
http://www.uneca.org/publications/serie/assessing-regional-integration-in-africa The latest (7th) 
edition came out in 2015: http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/uploaded-
documents/RITD/2015/CRCI-Oct2015/assessing_regional_integration_in_africa_vii_-
_key_messages.pdf 
11
 The main objective of the African Policy Trade Centre (APTC) to support African governments in 
formulating and implementing sound trade policies, and participating more effectively in trade 
negotiations.   
12
 Launched in 2014, the Africa Regional Integration Index is an effort by UNECA/ African Centre for 
Statistics in collaboration with the African Development Bank, the African Union to collect data 
across the continent on the impact of regional integration and to track the African countries’ 
progress towards meeting the integration goals as agreed upon in the Abuja Treaty. The first 
edition was to be published in 2015, but apart from some preliminary results this seems to be still 
largely work in progress.    
13
 UNECA: West Africa – publications: http://www.uneca.org/publications/west-africa 
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that helps policy makers, civil society and other actors in the formulation and 
implementation of policies for socio-economic development in the West African region. 
It is also involved in capacity building, including for public institutions both at the 
national level and regional level, such as UEMOA and ECOWAS. CRES conducts research 
in the following thematic areas: growth, inequality & poverty; information & innovation; 
globalization, regional integration & local development; human resources; rural 
development; and law. Amongst others topics, it is said to have a particular track record 
in the conduct of research on trade liberalization, regional integration and rural 
development. For example, in 2014 it has been notably engaged in research for policy 
change and advocacy at the regional level in the tobacco sector, in collaboration with 
ECOWAS and UEMOA. In addition, since a number of years CRES has been strongly 
involved in the operationalization and implementation of the Economic Partnership 
Agreement Development Programme (PAPED) for Senegal.14 Its (policy) research outputs 
include peer-reviewed publications, policy notes, working paper series and the CRES 
Information Bulletin.  
It has been selected to benefit from the support provided through the Think Tank 
Initiative (TII). TTI is a multi-donor programme dedicated to strengthening independent 
policy research institutions through enabling the institutions to attract, retain and build 
local talent, develop an independent research program, and invest in public outreach to 
ensure that research results inform and influence national and regional policy debates. 
CRES has an extensive and highly diversified network of (inter-)national partners. It is 
well-positioned within Senegal, with extensive ties with public institutions – including 
several ministries – and civil society. For example, it has been particularly engaged in 
(updating) the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategies Framework. In addition, it is linked 
to a number of development partners (e.g. World Bank, UN Agencies, WTO, EU) and 
other knowledge institutes in (West) Africa (e.g. ENDA, IPAR) and beyond (e.g. IFPRI). At 
the regional level, both UEMOA and ECOWAS are among its partners, with collaboration 
though different kinds of activities, including knowledge support, capacity building.  
 
Box 1.5: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa 
(CODESRIA)(Dakar, Senegal) 
The Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) is a pan-
African research organization with the aim to promote, facilitate and disseminate 
research within the social sciences throughout Africa and create platforms geared 
towards the exchange of views and information among African researchers. It seeks to be 
a leading knowledge producer and think tank of Africa, on African and global issues. It is 
the editor of a number of leading African journals (e.g. Africa Development, African 
Journal of International Affairs; African Sociological Review) and a major producer of a 
wide range of research outputs, including peer-reviewed publications, books, 
monographs, working and occasional papers and policy papers. It is further involved in 
research capacity building and training.  
Although CODESRIA has its roots in the conduct of basic research, policy-relevant research 
has become more and more important in its programming and increasingly seeks to 
engage with policy communities and civil society. Furthermore, it aims to ensure that its 
research outputs are widely distributed and find their way to decision makers in 
                                                          
14
 CRES (2014), Rapport d’Actvités 2014:  
http://www.cres-sn.org/sites/default/files/rapport_dactivites_2014_version_provisoire.pdf 
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government, civil society and international organizations, amongst others, through 
translating its outcomes in policy recommendations.   
CODESRIA has the following research programmes in place: 1) Gender Research 
Programme; 2) Child and Youth Studies Programme; 3) Economic Research Programme; 4) 
Academic Freedom Programme; and 5) African Humanities Programme. As indicated in its 
Strategic Plan 2012-201615, in order to link up with trends and changes in knowledge 
needs among African policy communities, CODESRIA identified the following research 
themes and issues for the upcoming period: higher education, ICT & internationalization; 
climate change, resources & development; politics & governance; gender, youth, culture 
and transformative social policy; regional and continental integration, mobility & the 
African diaspora; contemporary forms of African engagements with the rest of the world; 
and thinking about the future.  
CODESRIA has a wide network of partners, particularly to be found among other 
knowledge institutes across the African continent and beyond. In addition, it is linked to a 
broad range of multilateral and bilateral development partners that (financially) support 
its operations. As indicated in its Strategic Plan, it seeks to strengthen its relations with 
the African Union, Regional Economic Communities and individual African governments 
through launching strategic partnerships. Linkages with the African Union and ECOWAS 
were already well established. 
 
Box 1.6: ENDA/ Centre Africaine pour le Commerce l’Intégration et le Développement 
(CACID) (Dakar, Senegal) 
Part of the ENDA Third World network, the Centre Africaine pour le Commerce 
l’Intégration et le Développement (CACID) is a research and resource center  that aims to 
support African governments and regional institutions to promote trade and (regional) 
integration, with a particular regional focus on West Africa. It provides assistance through 
a wide range of activities targeted at a wide range of stakeholders at the regional and 
international level including facilitating policy dialogue & advocacy, building strategic 
alliances, supporting capacity building, conducting and promoting policy-relevant 
research, enhancing access to information and promoting stakeholder participation.  
ENDA/ CACID’s activities are structured around four programmes: 1) (bilateral/ 
multilateral) trade negotiations; 2) intraregional trade and integration in Africa; 3) 
globalization, emerging markets and South-South trade; and 4) natural resource 
management in West Africa. In the area of research, it focuses on issues related to trade 
and integration. It is particular in the two first areas that ENDA/CADID has built its 
reputation as recognized knowledge leader, by playing a key role in knowledge generation 
and dissemination activities and delivering and collecting a broad range of knowledge 
products 
Building on a strong institutional base within the ENDA Third World network, it has come 
to be seen as a recognized leader of West African civil society. For example, it holds the 
secretariat of the West African civil society Platform on the Cotonou Agreement (‘La 
Plateforme des Organisations de la Société Civile de l’Afrique de l’Ouest sur l’Accord de 
Cotonou’, POSCAO) and the Observatory on Regional Policy Coherence and Effectiveness 
and the Free Movement of Goods and People in the ECOWAS member states 
                                                          
15
 CODESRIA (2012), CODESRIA Strategic Plan 2012-2016. Extending the frontiers of social research 
and bringing social research to public issues: http://www.codesria.org/IMG/pdf/codesria_strategic-
plan_2012-2016.pdf?3469/467be9a2d4cf9673045a8f0656b0e0b9fff79670 
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(Observatoire Regional de la Coherence des Politiques et de l’Effectivité de la Libre 
Circulation des Marchandises et des Personnes dans  les Etats Membres de la CEDEAO’, 
OCPAL). 
In addition, ENDA/ CACID has an extensive network of a wide range of other partners, 
including knowledge institutes and development partners in (West) Africa and beyond. 
For example, through its Embassy in Dakar (Senegal) The Netherlands already collaborates 
with ENDA/ CACID and is also one of the funders of the organization. Furthermore, ENDA/ 
CACID is well-integrated within the African institutional landscape, with linkages to the 
African governments, African Union, the African Development Bank, the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa and a number of regional economic communities 
including ECOWAS and UEMOA. 
 
Box 1.7: Le Hub Rural (Dakar, Senegal) 
Le Hub Rural is a support platform for rural development and food security focusing on 
West and Central Africa, both at the country and the regional level. Its aim is to assist a 
broad range of stakeholders (public institutions, intergovernmental organizations, civil 
society, development partners etc.) to promote harmonization of rural development 
programmes through advisory support, facilitation in (policy) dialogue, capacity building & 
training and by serving as an information hub for rural development and food security, 
amongst other activities. Please note that most of its own publications are made possible 
by relying on external capacity.   
Its activities are centered around five thematic areas: 1) agricultural policies; 2) land 
policies; 3) climate change; 4) bioenergy; 5) rural development funding. More in 
particular, Le Hub Rural is very much engaged in the formulation and implementation of 
national and regional policies in West (and Central) Africa. In collaboration with ECOWAS, 
it plays for example a key role in facilitating the implementation of ECOWAP/ CAADP 
through fulfilling a wide range of roles including methodological assistance, support to 
stakeholder participation preparation for the implementation process, dissemination of 
good practices. It also very much involved in promoting regional cooperation and 
integration in the area of agricultural development and food security, also with regard to 
facilitating (policy) dialogue and coordination with external actors including development 
partners.  
Le Hub Rural maintains an extensive and broad network of partners in the area of 
agriculture and food security. It is financed by a number of donors, including the 
European Union, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD) and the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and 
linked to many other development partners. It has well-established linkages with 
organizations working at the regional level in West Africa, including civil society 
organizations (e.g. West African Network of Chambers of Agriculture, RECAO) and with 
both ECOWAS and UEMOA. It has partnership agreements in place with a number of 
other knowledge institutes, both in the region (e.g. West and Central African Council for 
Agriculture Research and Development, WECARD) as well as beyond (e.g. International 
Food Policy Research Institute, IFPRI). 
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Box 1.8: Initiative Prospective Agricole et Rurale (IPAR) (Dakar, Senegal) 
The Initiative Prospective Agricole et Rurale (IPAR) is an independent research 
organization with the main objective to inform and influence policymaking in Senegal and 
the broader West African region, particularly in the area of agriculture and rural 
development. Being a relatively young organization (2004), it seeks to further expand this 
role and aims to become a major actor in informing and shaping the debate on 
policymaking in agriculture and rural development in West Africa.   
In addition to its role as input provider, IPAR further aims to bring together stakeholders 
to take part in the design, implementation and evaluation of policies and to create an 
enabling environment for dialogue between policymakers and researchers. It is also 
involved in capacity building and training, focusing on economic actors in the rural and 
agricultural sector and policymakers to enable them to take part in analysis and strategic 
thinking. It is involved in a number of research outputs, including peer-reviewed 
publications, policy briefs and serves as hub for information on agriculture and rural 
development.  
IPAR’s research agenda builds on a strong strategic thinking on the challenges ahead for 
agriculture and rural development in Senegal and the broader region (e.g. migration, 
demography, climate change). It is centered around the following key areas: agriculture, 
regional integration & globalization; demography, employment & migration; education & 
training; food policies; land security & development; fishery; natural resources, energy 
and climate change; and decentralization, governance and local development. 
Regionalism is considered as to hold large potential to provide an answer to some of 
these challenges.   
It has been selected to benefit from the support provided through the Think Tank 
Initiative (TII). TTI is a multi-donor programme dedicated to strengthening independent 
policy research institutions through enabling the institutions to attract, retain and build 
local talent, develop an independent research program, and invest in public outreach to 
ensure that research results inform and influence national and regional policy debates. 
IPAR has a well-established and broad-based network in Senegal, with linkages to public 
institutions, private sector organizations and other knowledge institutes. Amongst some 
other sources, IPAD receives funding from the EU. 
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APPENDIX 1-A: LIST OF REGIONAL KNOWLEDGE INSTITUTES 
 African Regional Centre for Technology (ARCT) (Dakar, Senegal):  
http://www.crat-arct.org/en 
 Association of African Women for Research on Development (AAWORD) (Dakar, 
Senegal):  
http://www.afard.org/indexfr.php 
 Central Bank of West African States/ Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique Ouest 
(BCEAO) (Dakar, Senegal) – http://www.bceao.int/ 
 Centre d’Etudes, de Documentation, de Recherches Economiques et Sociales 
(CEDRES) (Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso):  http://www.cedres.bf/ 
 Centre Ivoirien de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (CIRES) (Abidjan, Côte 
d’Ivoire): http://www.cires-ci.org/ 
 Centre for Population and Environmental Development (CPED) (Benin City, 
Nigeria): http://www.cpedng.org/index.php 
 Center for the Study of the Economies of Africa (CSEA) (Abuja, Nigeria): 
http://www.cseaafrica.org/ 
 Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (GCDD) (Accra, Ghana): 
http://www.cddgh.org/ 
 Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) (Accra, Ghana): http://ieagh.org/ 
 Institute of Statistical, Social and Economics Research (ISSER) (Accra, Ghana): 
http://www.isser.edu.gh/ 
 Institut Sénégalais de Recherches Agricoles (ISRA) (Dakar, Senegal): 
http://www.isra.sn/ 
 Integrated Social Development Centre (ISDC) (Accra. Ghana):  
http://www.isodec.org.gh/index.php 
 Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA) (Nairobi, Kenya):  
http://www.kippra.org/ 
 Laboratoire d'Etudes et de Recherche sur les Dynamiques Sociales et le 
Développement Local (LASDEL) (Niamey, Niger): http://www.lasdel.net/ 
 Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) (Lagos, Nigeria): 
http://niianet.org/ 
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SECTION 2: INVENTORY OF LITERATURE ON REGIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
RELATIONS IN WEST AFRICA  
Ton Dietz, based on an annotated bibliography made by Edith de Roos and Ursula 
Oberst16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This section presents observations and conclusions following from an inventory of 
literature on regional trade and investment relations (published between 2000-2016), 
conducted by the ASCL Library with support of the network of Dutch embassies in West 
Africa, and with input from LEI-WUR, ECDPM, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and 
participants at the Scoping Conference that took place in Leiden on 27 January 2016.  
The inventory was mainly based on a selection from the catalogue of the ASCL library and 
of the University library of Leiden University, of illisAfrica, RePEc, Connecting Africa and 
Google Scholar. The sources can be found in the Bibliography itself. Relevant keywords 
were selected from the African Studies Thesaurus. When conducting an inventory of 
literature on trade and investment in a particular region one should look beyond the 
obvious keywords to identify key publications that would otherwise (easily) be 
overlooked. As was remarked during the scoping conference, if one realizes that trade is a 
spatial and social activity, with goods produced somewhere and by someone, transported 
                                                          
16
 Also based on input from the five Embassies of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in West Africa, 
and on comments by Lia van Wesenbeeck (SOW/VU), and other participants at the Scoping 
Conference on 27 January 2016 in Leiden. The bibliography is a separate product of the scoping 
project.  
Section conclusions: 
- The analysis of the relevant literature shows a growing dominance of 
English-language sources, and a limited involvement of African knowledge 
agencies. The literature shows four major domains, with twelve subdomains: 
- History, governance and policy options: studies about the history of West 
African integration; studies about legal and governance aspects of West 
African regional integration; and studies with policy options, about foreign 
(donor) support, and comparative studies.  
- Economics: studies about trade and actual analysis of trade statistics in the 
ECOWAS region, and about the economics and political economy of regional 
integration in West Africa, including methodological studies; and studies 
about investment analyses and monetary issues.  
- Geography and sociology: studies about migration and remittances; about 
geography and physical infrastructure; about the reality of cross-border 
relations, and borderland studies; and sociological studies of cross-border 
linkages and gender dimensions; and 
- Cross-border food trade, and food and nutrition security; regional trade in 
specific food products; and regional trade and food and nutrition security. 
- In an intermezzo it was suggested to position the Dutch involvement in 
regional integration in West Africa in a perspective of expected rapid overall 
population growth towards 2050, and even more rapid urbanization 
processes.  
- Based on the literature survey and the long-term analysis it was suggested to 
take the strengthening of regional food sovereignty very serious. 
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by someone and to markets where they are sold by someone and bought by someone, 
this will raise more interesting issues than an abstract approach.  
The literature search resulted in 354 relevant titles published between 2000 and 2016. 
The allocation over the years demonstrates a major increase in interest for the topic, with 
70% of the titles published in the period between 2010 - 2016.  
Almost half of the literature addresses West Africa as a whole, or provides evidence from 
various countries in the same publication. The country-specific literature shows a 
significant geographical/ country bias. Literature on Ghana (24% of the country-specific 
titles) and Nigeria (22%) account for a considerable share of the publications. Other 
countries for which there is some interest are Benin, Senegal (each 8%), Burkina Faso, 
Mali and Côte d’Ivoire (each 6%). In the country-specific studies there is more attention 
for the five English-speaking countries (52%), than for the eight French-speaking and for 
the two Portuguese speaking countries (41% resp. 7%). 
The overview of the relevant literature further shows that a large majority of the titles has 
been published in the English language (78%) followed at great distance by the French 
language (20%), with a few additional publications in Portuguese and German. Even the 
literature on French-speaking countries in the inventory is predominantly published in 
English. It is interesting to note that the English dominance increased between the 2000-
2009 period and the 2010-2016 period: from 65% to 84% of all titles.  
Other noteworthy literature observations include the few commercial book publishers 
compared to the number of publications by universities, the relatively large number of 
publications in journals with great thematic variety, the large share of authors with 
African-sounding names (but mostly published outside Africa), and the limited Dutch 
involvement.  
Based on the literature search, five major ‘domains’ can be seen, which we can further 
subdivide in thirteen ‘pockets of content’. Table 2.1 gives an overview, also showing the 
languages used in the publications.  
 
Table 2.1: Overview of topics in the recent literature about regional integration in West 
Africa, and the languages used 
 Topic English French Portuguese German Total 
I General 30    30 
IIA History 23 11 3  37 
IIB Governance 28 5  1 34 
IIC Policy 16 7  2 25 
IIIA Economics 27 6   33 
IIIB Monetary 30 6   36 
IVA Migration 4 3 1  8 
IVB Physical 8 2   10 
IVC Borders 34 16   50 
IVD Social 24 2   26 
VA Food trade 21 7   28 
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VB Specific 
Food 
Products 
25 4   29 
VC Nutrition 6 2   8 
Total  276 71 4 3 354 
 
 
I GENERAL 
Here we present the country chapters of the most recent Africa Yearbook (published in 
Leiden) and of the Economist Intelligence Unit (published in London). These also contain 
useful information about regional policies and cross-border developments. The Africa 
Yearbook started in 2003, and each country chapter (as well as the chapter for West 
Africa as a whole) has a section about ‘foreign affairs’, and ‘socio-economic 
developments’, covering regional and cross-border issues as well. Together these are 
thirty titles, all in English. We also present some useful web resources. 
II HISTORY, GOVERNANCE, AND POLICY OPTIONS 
IIA STUDIES ABOUT THE HISTORY OF WEST AFRICAN INTEGRATION 
Publications focus on the historical process of the start (in 1976) and evolvement of 
ECOWAS, and about the development of ideas about West African regional integration as 
a tool for economic and regional development. It looks at the dynamics of trade 
liberalization, and about the differences between the UEMOA block and the larger region, 
bridging the French/English/Portuguese divide. It puts the trade and investment agenda in 
a larger framework of external relations in general, and discusses the levels of integration: 
West Africa, Africa and global. It does so acknowledging the dominant position of Nigeria, 
but also the influence of South Africa. And some publications look at the global shifts, 
with Africa partly looking East. There is a series of publications (produced by the French 
publishing company Karthala, following an initiative by UNESCO in Paris) about the nation 
states and the challenges of regional integration, with fifteen country cases. And some 
publications deal with the crisis of the state and regionalism, and with issues like identity, 
citizenship and conflict.  
Two examples of publications in this section are: 
Regional economic communities: exploring the process of socio-economic 
integration in Africa / A.O. Olutayo & A.I. Adeniran. - Dakar: CODESRIA, 2015. 
 
Les États-nations face à l'intégration régionale en Afrique de l'Ouest: le cas du Burkina 
Faso / S.O. Kane. - Paris: Karthala, 2008. (Hommes et sociétés, ISSN 0290-6600, Les 
États-nations face à l'intégration régionale en Afrique de l'Ouest; 6). 
 
The agencies behind these 37 publications are diverse: 
Global agencies: UNESCO in Paris, OECD in Paris, the UNU Institute on Comparartive Regional 
Integration  Studies, based in Bruges, Belgium,  
Agencies in Africa: UNECA in Addis Ababa, CODESRIA in Dakar, the UEMOA Commission, based in 
Ouagadougou, ENDA in Dakar, the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution in Monrovia, two 
think tanks based in Praia, Cape Verde (ISCJS and FAC), and the Development Policy Management 
Forum in Nairobi. 
Agencies in Europe (ZEI: the Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung in Bonn, FERDI: a 
French thinktank on development, VADEA: the Varazdin Development and Entrepreneurship 
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Agency in Croatia, organiser of the International Conferences on Economic and Social 
Development),  
Agencies in North America and Asia (the National Bureau of Economic Research, a thinktank in the 
USA, the Backgrounder Journal, based in Washington DC, the Observer Research Foundation in 
New Delhi). 
Academic Journals: the African Development Review, the Journal of African Development, the 
Africa Review, and Afrika Spektrum; but also the European Review of Agricultural Economics. 
Academic publishers: Ashgate in the UK, Karthala and l’Harmattan in Paris, the Mendel University 
Publishers in Brno, and the EUE in Saarbrücken. 
 
IIB STUDIES ABOUT LEGAL AND GOVERNANCE ASPECTS OF WEST AFRICAN REGIONAL 
INTEGRATION 
There are conceptual studies on types of ‘regionalisms’ and on the level of progress made 
in terms of the stages of integration, that compare legal/ institutional arrangements with 
actual practices indicating a significant implementation gap. There are other governance 
studies that address the widening integration agenda since 1993, with the addition of 
good governance, rule of law, food security, peace, stability, and security, migration, and 
criminality. It is clear that the recent attention for the 3D agenda also results in a 
combination of Development, Diplomacy and Defense in West Africa. Particularly the 
publications with specific attention for the Mano River Union show a recent emphasis on 
peace enforcement along borders and the impact on cross-border trade. Some studies 
compare the institutional arrangements of ECOWAS and UEMOA and the differences 
between legal heritage based on the Anglo-Saxon system and the civic law traditions of 
France. Part of the implementation problems of ECOWAS institutional arrangements deal 
with the competing competences in adjudication of the ECOWAS Court of Justice and 
national courts, and the same is true for the ECOWAS Parliament in its relationship with 
national Parliaments. But there are also higher-order competence issues: ECOWAS’s 
relationship to the African Union, and its conventions.  
Two examples of publications in this section are: 
Competing Competences in Adjudication: Reviewing the Relationship between the 
ECOWAS Court and National Courts. Ojomo, Edefe. African Journal of Legal Studies 7.1 
(2014): 87-122. 
Market integration process in the Economic Community of West African States, (ECOWAS) 
/ Y. Xu. In: IHK blog: Subsahara-Afrika: (2015), 11. Mai 2015. 
In an introductory text we found this simple but illuminating overview:  
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Figure 2.1: Levels of regional economic integration 
 
 
 
 
Most studies about legal and governance aspects of West African integration can be found in 
academic journals and in the academic press, but in addition there are also African institutions 
involved and a few others. 
African agencies: African Union and UNECA, both in Addis Ababa, the African Development Bank in 
Tunis/Abidjan, and the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration. 
International agencies and non-academic press: the World Bank, ODI in London, the IHK (the 
Industrie und Handels Kammer in Germany), and the Association of European Border Regions 
(based in Gronau, Germany). As well as Palabres Actuelles from France,  the Great Insights 
Magazine, published by ECDPM in Maastricht, and the Washington Quarterly. 
Academic journals: the Journal of African Law, the African Journal of Legal Studies, Cahiers 
Africains d’Administration Publique, Recht in Afrika, the Journal of Asian and African Studies, 
Penant (the French journal of civil law in Africa) as well as he Global Journal of Comparative Law, 
the International Journal of Administration and Governance, the American Journal of International 
Law, the Revue Internationale de Droit Economique, Contemporary Economic Policy, and the 
iCourts Working Paper Series. 
Academic Publishers: l’Harmattan in Paris, Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille, Howard 
University Press in the USA, Cambridge UP, and the Politik und Gesellschaft Series of Scientia 
Bonnensis in Germany.  
 
IIC POLICY OPTIONS, FOREIGN (DONOR) SUPPORT, AND COMPARATIVE STUDIES 
This section  contains specific publications about donor support to regional integration 
processes in West Africa, or particular countries, and literature that  focuses on the 
empirical comparison of ECOWAS with other African trade blocks (SADC, COMESA, EAC), 
for example by looking at the rules and regulations, and at the impact of measures on 
trade volumes and directions. Some studies deal with opportunities for donor 
engagement, and there is specific attention for Europe-Africa linkages, e.g. the EU-West 
African Regional Indicative Programme, the European Partnership Agreement, and the 
new Accelerating Trade in West Africa initiative. Also the African Development Bank, and 
the World Bank published diagnostic studies, and strategic documents.  
source: IHK blog; XU, 2015 
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Two examples of publications in this section are: 
ECOWAS and SADC economic partnership agreements: a comparative analysis / I. 
Ramdoo. - Maastricht : ECDPM, 2014. (ECDPM Discussion Paper). 
Document de stratégie d'intégration régionale pour l'Afrique de l'Ouest 2011-2015. - s.l.: 
Banque africaine de Développement, Fond African de Développement, Tunis, 2011. 
 
Institutional publishers and academic publishers are both active in this field, but almost none from 
Africa itself. 
International agencies: the African Development Bank, the World Bank, the European Union, the 
OECD, the Sahel and West Africa Club (SWAC/OECD), Saana Consulting in London, ODI in London, 
the Centre for Economic Policy Research in London, the International Centre for Trade and 
Investment in Geneva (publishing Trade Negotiations Insights), Verein für Sozialpolitik in Germany 
(organizing the German Development Economics Conferences), and ECDPM in Maastricht.  
Academic journals: the Journal of African Law, Géopolitique Africaine, and the South African 
Journal of Economics.  
Academic publishers: University of Geneva, Department of Political Economy, University of Bonn, 
Springer, Tectum Marburg, and the Michigan State University Food Security Group. And Pro Quest 
Dissertation Publishing (Ann Arbor Michigan). 
 
III. ECONOMICS 
IIIA STUDIES ABOUT TRADE AND ACTUAL ANALYSIS OF TRADE STATISTICS IN THE ECOWAS 
REGION, AND ABOUT THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGIONAL 
INTEGRATION IN WEST AFRICA. INCLUDING METHODOLOGICAL STUDIES.  
Studies assess the effects of the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme (ETLS) on intra-
regional trade, including the impact of tariff and non-tariff barriers on trade. There are 
studies about the common external tariff that was finally implemented in 2015. Various 
studies focus on the impact of measures and policies such as monetary cooperation, the 
customs union, or common economic policies. Some studies deal with the measurement 
problems, the ‘empirics’ of trade statistics, in a situation of the dominance of informal 
trade arrangements. Also transit or re-export trade gets some attention.  Among the 
impediments to marketing the lack of market and price information is highlighted by 
some authors. Specific attention is given to the impact of trade liberalization or trade 
enhancement on energy intensity, on technology transfers, and on income (or poverty) 
and employment. Some authors deal with global and/versus regional trade. There is some 
attention for political economy issues, but not much. And the ‘real’ political economy 
issues (who ‘owns’ the transport and trade sector?, what connections exist between the 
political elite, and the security forces/police/customs on the one hand, and the actors in 
the cross-border (food) value chains  on the other?) are hardly touched in the literature 
found so far.    
Two examples of publications in this section are17: 
Final report: political economy of regionalism in West Africa / V. Chambers, M. Foresti  & 
D. Harris. - London: Overseas Development Institute (ODI), 2012. 
                                                          
17
 After finalizing the annotated bibliography an important addition has been published by ECDPM, 
see: http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/ECDPM-2016-Political-Economy-Regional-Integration-
Africa-ECOWAS-Report.pdf 
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An empirical analysis of integration and intra-regional trade in ECOWAS / E.A. Dada & A.I. 
Adeleke. In: Journal of African development: (2015), vol. 17, no. 1, p. 95-116. 
 
Again, the lack of African agencies publishing about the economics of regional integration in West 
Africa is remarkable, with the exception of the African Development Bank. And again most 
publications come from academic sources. 
International agencies: African Development Bank, World Bank (including its Diagnostic Trade 
Integration Studies and the Country Economic Memoranda), IMF, ILO, IDRC from Canada, ODI in 
London, ECDPM in Maastricht, the EcoMod Network on Statistical Modeling, and the Brookings 
Africa Growth Initiative.  
Academic Journals: Review of African Political Economy, Revue Africaine d’Intégration, African 
Journal of Business Management, Journal of African Development, as well as the Revue 
d’Economie du Développement, the Economics Bulletin, the Review of International Economics, 
the International Journal of Management and Network Economics Applied Research, the Global 
Business Review,  the Journal of Policy Reform, the International Journal of Business and Economic 
Sciences, the Renewable and Sustainable Energy Review,  
Academic publishers: the University of Bonn, the University of Munich, The NAI in Uppsala,  the 
Cornell University’s Department of Applied Economics and Management, the Michigan State 
University, the Milwaukee Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, and the Quebec 
Département d'Economique de la Faculte d'Administration à l'Universite de Sherbrooke. 
 
IIIB INVESTMENT ANALYSES AND MONETARY ISSUES 
Studies deal with the analysis of foreign investment (including ‘impact investing’) in West 
Africa, and sometimes link it  to domestic investments (crowding in, crowding out; impact 
on credit constraints; impact on productivity; knowledge and technology transfers; 
spillover effects). There are specific studies on economic and monetary cooperation (e.g. 
UEMOA and WAMZ), the role of central banks, the impact of monetary integration on 
intraregional trade and (how to attract) different kinds of financial inflows (investments, 
development assistance, remittances) and their impact. Some studies deal with 
administrative constraints (‘red tape’) of FDI, and on the impact of tax regimes, and fiscal 
coordination. A few studies start to compare global companies with smaller 
multinationals, partly with an African background.  Finally some studies compare formal 
financial arrangements, with informal finance and microcredit.  
Two examples of publications in this section are: 
An evaluation of the viability of a single monetary zone in ECOWAS / O. Ogunkola. - 
Nairobi: African Economic Research Consortium, 2005. (AERC research paper; 147). 
Why doesn't regional monetary cooperation follow trade cooperation? / S. Cooper. In: 
Review of international political economy: (2007), vol. 14, no. 4, p. 626-652. 
 
The background of these studies is quite diverse, with many international academic journals 
participating in the debate.  
African agencies: Isodec, Tamale (Ghana), and AERC (African Economic Research Consortium) 
Nairobi.  
International agencies: World Bank, ILO, National Bureau of Economic Research USA, EcoMod, 
Global Impact Investing Network (USA). 
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Academic Journals: Journal of African Business, Journal of African Economics, Journal of Developing 
Areas, Revue d’Economie du Développement,  International Journal of Economic Policy in Emerging 
Economies, Review of International Political Economy, Journal of World Business, Journal of 
Business Management, Business and Economic Research, Journal of Economic and Sustainable 
Development,  International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and 
Management Sciences, International Journal of Financial Research, Global Business and Economics 
Research, International Journal of Trade and Global Markets, Applied Economics Letters, Revue 
d’Economie Financière.  
Academic Publishers: University of Munich, Hamburg Institute of International Economics, 
Economica Paris, Menaibuc Paris, L’Harmattan Paris, Université de Paris, Claremont McKenna 
College California USA. 
 
IV. GEOGRAPHY AND SOCIOLOGY 
IVA MIGRATION & REMITTANCES 
There is attention for the 1979 ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol Dakar ( which writers 
call an ‘empty promise’). The literature further discusses law & order issues, and the 
developmental/ economic impact of mobility, cross-border movement and remittances of 
the diaspora. There is some gender-specific attention for the geographical mobility of 
men versus women, and the development of transnational spaces of labour mobility 
within West Africa, partly as a response to policies, but a lot of it spontaneous.  
Two examples of publications in this section are: 
Operationalizing the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons: Prospects for Sub-
Regional Trade and Development. Adepoju A., In The Palgrave Handbook of International 
Labour Migration 2015 (pp. 441-462). Palgrave Macmillan UK. 
Mobilités dans l'espace ouest-africain: ressources, développement local et intégration 
régionale / E. Boesen & L. Marfaing. - Paris: Karthala, 2014. (Hommes et sociétés). 
 
This is a small section in the international literature on regional integration in West Africa, and 
almost all publishers are academic ones, and only one based in Africa itself.  
Academic publisher in Africa: Covenant University, Nigeria 
Academic Journal: Insight on Africa (SAGE) 
Other Academic publishers: Karthala in Paris, Lang in Frankfurt, ICS in Lisbon, and Palgrave 
Macmillan in London, New York and Shanghai.  
 
IVB GEOGRAPHY AND PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
Studies look at the spatial patterns of trade relations and analyze the impact of 
infrastructural development: transport, telecommunications, and energy infrastructure. 
There are studies about the impact of population growth and urbanization on trade 
routes, and about the shifts in markets, indicating a gap between actual physical 
infrastructural arrangements and the many ambitious plans that have been formulated 
during the last few years. Studies dealing with the ‘spatiality’ of economic development 
highlight the importance of understanding the actual poles and axes of regional networks, 
but it is important to go beyond the designated ‘corridors’,  as a lot of movement of goods 
and people does not follow these corridors.  
Two examples of publications in this section are: 
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West African spatial patterns of economic activities: combining the 'spatial factor' and 
'mobile space' approaches / O.J. Walther, A.M. Howard & D. Retaillé. In: African studies: 
(2015), vol. 74, no. 3, p. 346-365. 
ECOWAS's infrastructure: a regional perspective / R. Ranganathan and V.Foster. - 
Washington, D.C.  The World Bank, 2011. (Policy Research Working Paper Series). 
 
Also this section only has a few titles, but these cover all the important fields of physical 
infrastructure development. Important contributions come from international agencies, but also 
academic sources have contributed. 
International agencies: World Bank, JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency). 
Academic Journals: African Development Review, African Studies, Géotransports. 
Academic Publishers: the University of Pretoria in South Africa, Karthala Paris and Cornell 
University’s Department of Applied Economics and Management.  
 
IVC REALITY OF CROSS-BORDER RELATIONS, AND BORDERLAND STUDIES 
This part of the literature mainly deals with border zone dynamics and linkages. Studies 
give attention to border-zone dynamics, ‘development at the border’, and social-spatial 
cross-border connections, or ‘cross-border micro-regionalism’. Some of these studies 
make a plea for joint land use planning in border areas, and cross-border natural resource 
management. There are discussions about the costs of travel and (long-distance) trade, 
with increasing attention for the role of corruption, illicit trade, criminal networks and the 
link with violence and insecurity. Most studies go beyond economics, and also deal with 
political contexts, and next to traders also study the role of political ‘patrons’. There are 
studies about so-called quasi-formal forms of trading, and many about informal, 
unrecorded trade and smuggling. Some studies deal with the ways entrepreneurs deal 
with illegality. Some studies link the growing informality in trade relations with the 
disengagement of the state following structural adjustment measures.   
 
Two examples of publications in this section are: 
Entrepôt trade and smuggling in West Africa: Benin, Togo and Nigeria / Stephen S. Golub. 
In: The World economy: (2012), vol. 35, no. 9, p. 1139-1161. 
Cross-border criminal activities in West Africa: options for effective responses /P. Addo. – 
Accra: Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, 2006. (KAIPTC occasional 
paper;12).  
  
Many different agencies have contributed to the publications in this section, some from within 
Africa. 
African agencies: Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra, SNV-Ghana (in Accra and 
Tamale),  Nairobi: African Forest Forum.  
International agencies: World Bank (including its Economic Review), OECD, CEPII (Recherche et 
Expertise sur l’Economie Mondiale) Paris, IRD Paris, CEPS/INSTEAD (since 2014: Luxembourg 
Institute of Socio-Economic Research, LISER), Chatham House in the UK, ECDPM in Maastricht (and 
their Great Insights Magazine). 
Academic Journals: Review of African Political Economy, Africa, Africa Insight, Territoires d’Afrique, 
South African Journal of Economics, International Journal of Asian Social Science, The Pakistan 
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Journal of Social Issues, Journal of Borderland Studies, World Development, The World Economy. 
Foreign Trade Review, Autrepart, Journal of Business Venturing, Cogent Economics and Finance, 
International Journal of Humanitarian Studies, Natural Resources Forum, EchoGéo, Tourism Review 
Studies, EAS Strategic Options (CIRAD), European Science Journal.  
Academic Publishers: Edward Elgar Publishers UK, Pearson France, Karthala Paris, Université 
Bordeaux III, Montpellier Université, Uppsala NAI, Quebec Departement d'Economique de la 
Faculte d'administration à l'Universite de Sherbrooke.  
 
IVD SOCIOLOGY OF CROSS-BORDER LINKAGES AND GENDER DIMENSIONS 
The literature pays geographically specific attention to traders (including ‘outsider’ 
brokers and traders), (shifts in) their trade networks, and the impact of their (ethnic/ 
linguistic) background, with some attention for age-old traders networks (e.g. the 
Mourides and the Yoruba). There is a lot of literature on women traders and their relative 
importance. This attention for gender and trade in West Africa goes back a long time. 
Social network studies of cross-border traders show the empirical connections, but also 
issues like, what is called, adverse incorporation, and ‘laissez-faire integration’, and its 
impact on poverty and well-being, including attention for the high risks women traders 
face in terms of violence and theft, as well as their needs to have ‘patrons’.  
Two examples of publications in this section are: 
Violence against young women in informal cross-border trading in South-West Nigeria: 
implications for economic development and poverty reduction / T.O. George, O. 
Chukwuedozie & M.I. Ozoya. In: International journal of gender and development issues: 
(2015), vol. 2, no. 4, p. 112-120. 
Small businesses performance in West African border regions: do social networks pay off? 
/ M. Kuepie, M. Tenikue, and O. Walther. – Esch-sur-Alzette / Belval.: LISER, 2014. (LISER 
Working Paper Series) 
Most of the literature in this section comes from academic journals, and from UN sources. 
African agencies: CODESRIA, UNECA 
International sources: UN Women, UNIFEM, UNU CRIS in Bruges Belgium, UKAID, LISER in 
Luxemburg, and Women in Development/WIDTECH, Washington DC. 
Academic Journals: African Studies, African Development Studies, Journal of Borderland Studies, 
Journal of Gender Studies, International Journal of Gender and Development Studies, Journal of 
Women’s Entrepreneurship and Education, Geojournal, Territoires en Mouvement/Revue de 
Géographie et Aménagement, World Development, Journal of Development Economics, 
Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, Global Journal of Agricultural Sciences, Global 
Journal of Human Social Sciences, Sociology and Political Science.  
Academic Publishers: Karthala Paris, Rüdiger Köppe Verlag Köln, University of Southern Denmark 
Department of Border Studies.  
 
V CROSS-BORDER FOOD TRADE AND FOOD & NUTRITION SECURITY 
Studies focus on different dimensions of the insecurity/volatility of food trade, and the 
link between agricultural growth, investments and market developments across borders. 
Some studies  take the perspective of agro-value addition and cross-border trade. Others 
discuss the trade in seeds and fertilizers. There is attention for ECOWAP and for CAADP 
programmes and their implementation. But several studies zoom in on barriers to trade 
flows of agricultural produce across borders in the region. 
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Two examples of publications in this section are: 
Cross-border trade flow in agricultural products in West Africa / Comité permanent Inter-
États de Lutte contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel (CILSS). - Ouagadougou: CILSS, 2013. 
Extent and drivers of intra-regional trade in food products in ECOWAS / D.F. Arawomo & 
A.A. Badejo. In: International journal of trade and global markets: (2015), vol. 8, no. 4, p. 
310-323. 
 
There are relatively many African sources, as well as international agencies dealing with this topic, 
and some academic journals and publishers.  
African sources: African Development Bank, CILSS in Ouagadougou, Laboratoire d’Analyse 
Regionale et de Expertise Sociale in Cotonou,  UNECA: African Economic Conference on ‘Regional 
Integration in Africa’ (held in Johannesburg), Ambassade des Pays-Bas Cotonou.  
International sources: IFPRI Washington, FAO Rome, OECD Paris, Club du Sahel/SWAC Paris, 
Montrouge: Fondation pour l'Agriculture et la Ruralité dans le Monde (FARM), World Bank, ODI 
London, ECDPM (Great Insights Magazine) Maastricht, USAID: Food Across Borders Conference in 
Accra.  
Academic Journals: Journal of African Economics, African Finance Review, Revue Tiers Monde, 
Revue d’économie du développement , European Journal of Business Management, International 
Journal of Trade and Global Markets, International journal of academic research in business and 
social sciences.  
Academic Publishers: University of Bonn/ZEF, Michigan State University, Suffolk University Boston. 
 
VB REGIONAL TRADE IN SPECIFIC FOOD PRODUCTS 
This section deals with regional trade in specific food products, with most studies dealing 
with livestock, followed by rice and horticultural produce (mainly tomatoes), and fruits 
(mangoes, pineapple). There are also studies about the regional trade in millets, yam and 
cassava. Most studies assume a positive impact of growing regional trade. One study 
deals with the risks: the risk of spreading of livestock diseases. Most attention goes to the 
regional trade of specific agricultural products in the central trade corridor of West Africa, 
connecting Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Togo with Burkina Faso and Mali. There is much less 
attention for the Western and the Eastern corridors.  
Two examples of publications in this section are: 
Implementation of the Trade Hub Livestock Value Chain Program for the Mali-Côte d'Ivoire 
export corridor / R. Cook. - Bethesda: Abt Associates for USAID Trade Hub West Africa, 
2015. 
Regional integration in West Africa: costs, tradeoffs and integration between Ghanaian 
and Burkinabe fresh tomato markets / J. Amikuzuno, E. Setsoafia & A.Y. Seini. In: UDS 
international journal of development: (2015), vol. 1, no. 1, p. 42-58. 
 
Literature partly comes from Africa itself, and among the international agencies also from 
commercial research agencies. 
African agencies: CILSS in Ouagadougou, International Institute for Tropical Agriculture in Ibadan,  
International Livestock Research Institute in Nairobi, the African Association of Agricultural 
Economics (based in Nairobi), LARES Cotonou. 
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International agencies: FAO Rome, CFC/Common Fund for Commodities, Amsterdam, USAID Trade 
Hub West Africa, the International Association of Agricultural Economists, the Agricultural 
Economics Society, the Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, CERDI (Centre d'études et 
de recherches sur le développement international in Clermont-Ferrand), Buck Consultants 
(Nijmegen and The Hague, The Netherlands), Abt Associates (Bethesda, USA). 
Academic journals: UDS International Journal of Development (Ghana), Asian Journal of 
Agricultural and Rural Development, Journal of Development Studies, Géocarrefour, Outlook on 
Agriculture. 
 
VC REGIONAL TRADE AND FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY 
Finally, there is some literature connecting regional integration processes with food 
security issues, and resilience, and one study discusses the tensions between growing 
regional food trade and food sovereignty. Food security can be supported by combining 
locally/regionally produced food and imported food. Food sovereignty puts more 
emphasis on the goal of local/regional food sufficiency. If Africa’s total and urban 
population will continue to grow, and if global competition for food available on the world 
market will become more tense (and both expectations are probably realistic) regions like 
West Africa do wise to put a lot of emphasis on feeding its own population as much as 
possible. In the literature there is some attention for these and related policy aspects: for 
instance the regional approach to food security propagated by the Comprehensive Africa 
Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), and for the impact of aid and trade for the 
West African livestock sector for food security in the region. 
During the scoping conference the relatively limited number of publications linking food 
trade with food security was seen by the participants as a striking conclusion in view of 
the important role for agricultural/ food products in West African regional trade.  
Two examples of publications in this section are: 
The impact of closer regional economic integration on food security in West Africa. 
Roquefeuil, Q. de, D. Plunkett and F. Ofei. 2014. (Discussion Paper 154). Maastricht: 
ECDPM. 
Commerce transfrontalier et sécurité alimentaire en Afrique de l'Ouest: cas du bassin 
ouest: Gambie, Guinée Bissau, Guinée, Mali, Mauritanie, Sénégal. s.l.: CILSS, FAO,FEWS-
NET, 2010.  
 
Sources of information for this important topic were mainly  found in publications by international 
agencies, with a considerable Dutch contribution here. 
African agencies: CILSS, Ouagadougou 
International agencies: IFPRI, FAO, the Famine Early Warning System (USAID), Wageningen 
University and LEI, ECDPM.  
Academic Journal: Food Policy 
Academic publisher: Karthala. 
 
When one looks at the major sources of funding and initiative for the studies in the 
inventory it is clear that global policy organizations are quite dominant, as well as 
‘western’ academic publishers of books and journals. With the exception of the African 
Development Bank and CILSS there are few ‘African’ think tanks involved, although 
internationally funded organizations like CILSS and SNV mainly work with African staff, 
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and many publications are written by people originating from Africa or working in Africa, 
but publishing in international journals and books. During the scoping conference it was 
remarked that in terms of identifying useful local knowledge production, disclosing 
publications from these kinds of local, West African, sources can be challenging as they 
are often not digitally available. Another local source of knowledge that is largely 
unexplored is  the abundance of locally produced (African) master’s theses and PhD 
dissertations, in addition to other forms of ‘grey literature’. Although the library of the 
African Studies Centre in Leiden has an explicit policy to give priority to the search for 
books and journals from Africa itself, the budget limitations for acquiring these local 
sources probably means that a lot of it goes unnoticed.  
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INTERMEZZO 1: THE DEMOGRAPHIC AND GEOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT IN WEST AFRICA IN 
2050 
Ton Dietz 
 
The fifteen current ECOWAS countries have a joint population of more than 350 million 
inhabitants in 2016, of which half can be found in Nigeria. Since Independence around 
1960 population growth has been very high, based on high fertility rates, and increasing 
average age figures. Although also West Africa is experiencing a demographic transition, 
with lowering fertility rates, demographers expect rapid further growth. The medium 
variant of population predictions for 2050 shows that the region will have close to 800 
million people in 35 years from now. If current fertility rates would prevail (in 2016 the 
regional fertility rate is 5.61 live-born children per woman, on average) it would be even 
more than 900 million, which is unlikely.  
The current urbanization rate in the region is 45% and it is likely that that will further 
increase to probably 60% in 2050. That would mean a total urban population in West 
Africa of ca 475 million people; an additional 314 million people on top of the current 161 
million. This will mean that there will be a further shift to net food consumers, with 
changing diets, based on a more urban, and –on average- probably more prosperous 
lifestyle.  
Among the urbanites there are already 65 million people living in agglomerations of more 
than a million people each. West Africa currently counts 23 of these million-plus cities, 
with Lagos the regional giant. In 2050 there will be more of those mega-urban spaces. The 
current ones by then are expected to have close to 170 million inhabitants: that is one-
third of all urban people and 22% of the total predicted population. These people will 
probably be the most important ‘magnets’ of demand for food in the region, food that will 
probably predominantly be produced in their home countries (and a bit in the cities 
themselves, with ‘urban agriculture’), but most likely increasingly on a larger geographical 
scale: in the region of West Africa, through cross-border trade, and through cross-
continental imports from elsewhere in the world. It can be expected that the remaining 
farmers in West Africa will become more commercial and will sell more of their produce 
to the major areas of urban demand in the region. It can also be expected that the urban 
diets, particularly with growing average income and a growing middle class, will show 
shifts in composition: with relatively less staple foods, and relatively more processed 
foods, more horticultural products, more meat and other livestock products, and more 
fish and eggs. So not only urban demand for food will grow, but also the composition of 
that demand will change rather dramatically. One could model the likely urban food 
demand in 2050 (with different scenarios), but we leave that to a later opportunity.  
The current geo-political situation in the region shows three land-locked states, Mali, 
Burkina Faso and Niger, all of them mainly in the Sahel region. These are the most 
vulnerable countries in terms of food and nutrition. For their food and other imports from 
outside the region, and for their exports to the world market these states depend on their 
coastal neighbours: Senegal, Guinea, and Côte d’Ivoire for Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, 
Togo and Benin for Burkina Faso, and Benin and Nigeria for Niger. The three land-locked 
countries currently have a population of almost 60 million people. According to the mid-
variant prediction there will be 160 million in 2050. Niger’s predicted population growth 
particularly is astonishing: it is the current world champion fertility, with a fertility rate of 
7.63, and an expected population of more than 70 million in 2050. In these three land-
locked countries the urbanization rate is still much lower than in the region as a whole:  
38% for Mali, 30% for Burkina Faso and 18% for Niger. Most likely this will be much higher 
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in 2050, particularly if the region will be hit by one or more major droughts, which is 
likely. Also the Sahel metropoles in these three land-locked countries will be huge: 9 
million people will probably live in Bamako in 2050, 5.8 million people in Ouagadougou, 
and 4.6 million in Niamey. This puts very high pressure on their national governments (all 
three metropoles are the seat of national governments) to provide these urbanites with 
food (and water, and energy, etc.).  
Urban populations and their political leaders and business people are generally in a better 
bargaining position to acquire food, than rural populations, their political leaders, and 
small-scale and often informal business people in the most marginal areas. Recently West 
Africa as a whole did experience relatively benign food situations: the famine early 
warning website (http://www.fews.net/) only shows a recent ‘crisis’ situation in north-
eastern Nigeria (but that is mainly due to the Boko Haram threat), and a ‘stress situation’ 
for other parts of north-eastern Nigeria, for south-eastern Niger, and for parts of Guinea 
(situation October-December 2015, accessed 11/3/ 2016). For the January-March 2016 
period the situation becomes a bit more problematic, with a current food crisis in not only 
north-eastern Nigeria, but also in south-eastern Niger, and with food stress in a 
contiguous band from central-north Mali to central Niger (and still in Guinea). The Sahel 
and northern Savannah areas are known for their climate variability, and the likelihood of 
occasional major droughts (and floods) is a given, and with potentially devastating effects, 
as we have seen before. Climate variability is not the same as climate change. Climate 
change scenarios for West Africa are partly contradictory. If we take Augio Dai’s 2012 
study as a point of reference18, the rainfall situation in the period of the next twenty years 
does not yet show major reasons to worry. Most of the area’s average conditions will not 
change much, some of the northern Savannah areas will even get a bit more rainfall, and 
only Senegal and the southwestern corner are predicted to become drier. Beyond the 
mid-Century the calculations show deteriorating rainfall situations in much of the area, 
and particularly all over the northern Savannah zones of West Africa. On top of likely 
higher average temperatures these are reasons for major concern. What is also a major 
reason of concern is what the climate change calculations are for the most important 
regions where Africa’s imported food comes from: rice from Asia, and wheat from the 
United States’ mid-west. These global food baskets will partly experience worsening 
rainfall conditions, with probably dire consequences for their export abilities from the 
mid-Century onwards. And in other increasing food-stressed areas of the world (Southern 
China; the Middle East) greater purchasing power and geo-political muscle will mean that 
West Africa’s ability to continue to gain access to world food reserves and to import from 
food export zones will be threatened.  
West Africa does wise to invest a lot of efforts in greater regional food sovereignty, and in 
regional food production, and in a self-evident and cheaper system of food trade across 
the West African borders, with extra attention for the three landlocked countries and 
their major cities. The major reason to do so is geo-strategic, and long-term: world 
demand for food will further increase, world  supply of food faces structural challenges, 
partly because of likely negative impacts of climate change, and West African demand 
might not be able to compete effectively on the world market for food, whenever food 
demand is higher than food supply on the world market.  
The table 2.2 gives the statistical evidence for the demographic data used in this 
intermezzo.  
                                                          
18
 See: https://www2.ucar.edu/atmosnews/news/2904/climate-change-drought-may-threaten-
much-globe-within-decades Augio Dai, 2012.  
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Table 2.2: West Africa: Population and Metropolitan situation in 2016 and predictions 
for 2050 
 Current 
populati
on in  
millions 
Current 
yearly 
change 
in % 
Current 
fertility 
rate 
Current 
Net 
migration 
X1000 
Current 
Urbanizati
on rate 
Agglomer
ations > 1 
million 
Current 
populati
on in 
millions 
Predicted 
population in 
2050 in millions 
Benin 11.2 2.64 4.89 -2 44   22.5 
      Cotonou 1.6 3.9 
Burkina 
Faso 
18.6 2.92 5.65 -25 30   42.8 
      
Ouagadoug
ou 
2.1 5.8 
Cape 
Verde 
0.5 1.25 2.37 -2 64   0.7 
Côte 
d’Ivoire 
23.3 2.43 5.10 +10 51   48.8 
      Abidjan 5.1 12.8 
Gambia 2.1 3.22 5.78 -3 60   5.0 
Ghana 28.0 2.27 4.25 -10 54   50.1 
      Accra 4.6 9.9 
      Kumasi 2.7 5.7 
Guinea 12.9 2.68 5.13 -2 37   27.5 
      Conakry 2.2 5.6 
Guinea- 
Bissau 
1.9 2.39 4.95 -25 49   3.6 
Liberia 4.6 2.48 4.83 -4 50   9.4 
      Monrovia 1.3 3.2 
Mali 18.1 3.04 6.35 -60 38   45.4 
      Bamako 3.0 9.0 
Niger 20.7 4.10 7.63 -6 18   72.2 
      Niamey 1.1 4.6 
Nigeria 187.0 2.63 5.74 -60 49   398.5 
      Lagos 17.1 43.8 
      Kano 3.6 9.2 
      Ibadan 3.2 8.2 
      Abuja 2.8 7.2 
      Pt Harcourt 2.1 5.4 
      Kaduna 1.7 4.4 
      Onitsha 1.1 2.8 
      Maiduguri 1.1 2.8 
      Benin City 1.1 2.8 
      Aba 1.0 2.6 
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      Zaria 1.0 2.6 
Senegal 15.6 3.04 5.18 -20 44   36.2 
      Dakar 3.3 9.2 
Sierra 
Leone 
6.6 2.15 4.79 -4 39   11.4 
      Freetown 1.4 2.9 
Togo 7.5 2.63 4.69 -2 40   15.7 
      Lomé 1.8 4.5 
Total 358.6 2.73* 5.61* -215 45*  64.6 
789.8 
(aggl: 168.9) 
* average, weighed by population 
 
Sources:  
For current population, urbanization rate, current annual population growth, current 
fertility rate, and current net migrants: http://www.worldometers.info/world-
population/population-by-country/  
For agglomeration data: http://www.citypopulation.de/world/Agglomerations.html; for 
Kano, Benin City and Zaria (all in Nigeria, and all city populations): 
http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/nigeria-population/major-cities-in-nigeria/  
Also see: http://www.ascleiden.nl/publications/africa-continent-states-continent-cities 
(2012). 
For predicted country populations in 2050 (medium variant): 
http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/publications/files/key_findings_wpp_2015.pdf 
For predicted urban population 2050: Own calculations based on 
[pop2050/pop2016]x1.2xaggl2016, supposing that the agglomeration will grow 20% faster 
than the population as a whole. Please compare 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Projections_of_population_growth For the ten most 
populous urban areas in West Africa in 2050 they arrive at figures that are showing the 
same trend.   
All accessed  10/3/2016 
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Intermezzo 2: FAO’s Food balance sheets as an indicator of shifts in food composition 
and origin: some notes about Burkina Faso 
Ton Dietz 
 
In ‘Digging Deeper: Inside Africa’s Agricultural, Food and Nutrition Dynamics’ (Akinyoade, 
A., W. Klaver, S. Soeters and D. Foeken, 2014, Leiden: Brill, ASC African Dynamics Series) 
the relevance of using FAO’s food balance sheets was proven for four countries in Africa, 
including Nigeria. Food balance sheets connect the data on food production, and food 
imports, with data on food exports, agro-industrial usage, usage as feed and seed, food 
wasted, and finally food available for human consumption in the country. In ‘Digging 
Deeper’ these average data were then compared with the detailed figures on child growth 
and malnutrition from the WHO Global Database. Both datasets can be combined to give 
a dynamic picture of changes in food and nutrition in the region. 
Given our suggestion to particularly look at Burkina Faso (part of the Central Corridor of 
West Africa’s regional economy, and mainly connected to production from and imports 
through Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire), it is revealing to see the recent shifts in this country. As 
the FAO food balance sheets do not specify the origin of imports (and the destination of 
exports), these datasets are not useful as a direct source of information on intra-regional 
food connectivity, but they hint at ways to look at that. We suggest that it would be good 
if the Netherlands government would stimulate the FAO, the AfDB, the ECOWAS 
Commission, and CILSS (as well as UNCTAD), to join hands in developing a more integrated 
dataset, in which the import and export data in the food balance sheets are specified with 
regard to countries of origin and destination. 
 For Burkina Faso we compare the year 2000 with the latest year for which there are FBS 
data, 2013. In average food security terms the data show a major improvement, despite 
impressive population growth,  and in absolute terms we also see a considerable increase 
in the non-cereal calories in the diet (but not yet in relative terms). The importance of rice 
(mostly imported) has stabilized in absolute terms, but dwindled in relative terms. The 
relative importance of imports has increased, but especially the absolute increase in 
cereal and other food imports is considerable. On the other hand, Burkina Faso’s food 
exports also increased a lot, and partly to neighbouring countries.  
Burkina Faso is a clear example of what the FAO, AfDB and ECOWAS show for West Africa 
as a whole in their very important study about ‘Agricultural Growth in West Africa; Market 
and Policy Drivers’ (Rome 2015; authors: Frank Hollinger and John Staatz): there is a clear 
shift in agricultural consumption patterns, and a greater regional and global integration of 
food trade. But a lot of it is still unknown. The much better food situation in 2013 
compared to 2000 can also be shown by looking at the WHO data on child malnutrition. 
And although the figures are indeed showing major improvements, malnutrition is still 
widespread and particularly high In Burkina Faso’s Sahel region in the north of the 
country.  
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Table 2.3: Burkina Faso: Comparing Data from the Food Balance Sheets for 2000 and 
2013 
 2000 2013 
Population 11.6m 16.3m 
Kcal/day available 2318 2720 
Of animal origin 145 =   6% 159 =    5% 
Of vegetative origin 2173 = 94% 2561 = 95% 
Of which cereals 1537 = 66% 1740 = 64% 
and of which rice 196 = 13% 207 =   8% 
Non-cereal Kcal/day 781 980 
Cereal balance sheet 
(kmt – 1000 metric  
tonnes) 
Production 2252 kmt + 343 
kmt imports (= 12%) – 59 
kmt exports + 387 stock 
variation = 2923 kmt, of 
which 379 available for 
agro-manufacturing  
(mainly sorghum for beer 
brewing) + 55 kmt as seed + 
216 kmt is wasted; remains 
2273 kmt for human direct 
consumption.  
Production 4768 kmt + 703 kmt 
imports (= 14%) – 34 kmt exports – 
528 kmt stock variation = 4908 kmt, 
of which 693 kmt available for agro-
manufacturing + 34 kmt as feed + 74 
kmt as seed + 431 kmt is wasted; 
remains 3677 kmt for human direct 
consumption. 
Composition cereal 
imports 
Rice: 179 kmt 
Wheat: 95 kmt 
Other: 69 kmt 
Total: 343 kmt 
Rice: 483 kmt 
Wheat: 191 kmt 
Other: 29 kmt 
Total 703 kmt 
Other major food imports Milk: 53 kmt 
Vegetable oils: 25 kmt 
Fish: 19 kmt 
Treenuts: 18 kmt 
Vegetables: 12 kmt 
Sugar: 12 kmt 
Fruits: 11 kmt 
 
Sugar: 159 kmt 
Fish: 99 kmt 
Vegetable oils: 83 kmt (mainly palm 
oil) 
Milk: 89 kmt 
Vegetables: 45 kmt (mainly 
tomatoes) 
Fruits: 37 kmt 
Major food exports Maize: 42 kmt 
Oil crops (sesame and 
others): 27 kmt 
Millet: 10 
Sesame: 113 kmt 
Treenuts: 111 kmt 
Maize: 34 kmt 
Beans: 30 kmt 
Vegetables: 28 kmt 
Fruits 22 kmt 
source: http://faostat3.fao.org/download/FB/FBS/E;  
accessed 18/3/2016. 
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Table 2.4: Nutrition status in Burkina Faso, 2003 and 2010: severe malnutrition 
 2003 2010 
% of children 0-5 years with 
weight/age -3sd 
16 8 
Idem height for age -3sd 24 15 
W/A for worst area (Sahel 
Region) 
25 16 
H/A for worst area (Sahel) 35 21 
source: http://www.who.int/nutgrowthdb/database/countries/who_standards/bfa_dat.pdf?ua=1;  
accessed 18/3/2016; 3sd = three standard deviations below WHO health standard. 
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SECTION 3: INVENTORY OF STATISTICS ON REGIONAL TRADE IN WEST AFRICA  
Marie-Luise Rau, with maps by Wil Hennen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The available trade statistics give an overview of the situation of regional trade, indicating 
trade linkages and integration between partner countries. Much trade and business is 
made in the informal sector of developing countries in general, and in West Africa in 
particular, and thus not recorded in the official statistics. Nevertheless, the trade statistics 
officially collected is the data available for a comparative analysis, giving an overview of 
the region as a whole, unlike the data on informal trade and business, which is collected in 
some projects for some trade corridors, areas and/or specific sectors. In the scoping 
study, the official trade data is taken as a starting point, while envisioning further 
investigations into the important issue of informal trade. 
First, the trade indicators looked at are briefly introduced and subsequently applied to the 
available trade data. After the overview of trade in West Africa, we zoom in on agri-food 
trade, which constitutes an important issue with regard to food security, in a more 
Section conclusions: 
- The share of intra-ECOWAS trade (in terms of trade value) has been much lower 
than extra-ECOWAS trade, with extra-ECOWAS trade increasing rapidly.  
- ECOWAS trade has been biased towards a few countries. Nigeria has certainly 
been a dominant exporter in both intra and extra-ECOWAS trade. Côte d’Ivoire 
and Benin with large ports follow suit, but with much lower numbers than Nigeria.  
- Focusing on intra-ECOWAS trade, Benin, Senegal and Togo are important 
exporters in the region supplying products to other ECOWAS members.  Burkina 
Faso, Mali  (in particular agri-food products) and Sierra Leone much depend on 
supplies from ECOWAS members, with the highest share of their imports coming 
from the aforementioned countries.  
- Overall, almost 70% of the recorded value of intra-ECOWAS trade is attributed to 
trade in minerals (mainly oil trade). Manufacturing accounted for about 20% and 
agricultural products (edible and non-edible) made up for only about 10%, 
according to official statistics. For many West African countries, much trade of 
agri-food products has taken place with other trade partners outside the region 
and a large proportion of agri-food trade is believed to be informal unregistered 
trade.  
- Official trade statistics are considered to only capture a small proportion of intra-
regional trade in West Africa. For agri-food products, for example, up to 75% 
could be informal trade (World Bank, 2015). It would be interesting to look into 
options to better account for informal trade and combining such information with 
an analysis about who engages in informal trade and why.  
- Trade diagnostic indicators are best used for evaluating trade flows within the 
region and other countries. Here the exports and import shares as well as the net 
trade position are presented for the countries in West Africa; in a second step 
other indicators based on economic theory of international trade could be 
calculated in order to derive insights about possible priorities for trade. Examples 
could be indicators of trade complementarity, comparative advantages and trade-
related competitiveness. Note that one important task related to the trade 
analysis is the improvement of the trade data available, accounting for 
unregistered and informal trade. 
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detailed analysis for five countries: Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, as well as Ghana and 
Côte d’Ivoire. These countries are of particular interest being landlocked countries in the 
region (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger) as well as specific (although different) partners for 
Dutch ‘aid and trade’ cooperation (Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire).  
 
INDICATORS TO POINT OUT TRADE RELATIONS 
Several indicators point out trade relations between partner countries. For the 
comparison across countries, trade values are used in the calculation of such indicators. 
On the one hand, the absolute values provide information on the magnitude of trade 
flows, next to the direction of trade. On the other hand, however, the relative comparison 
in terms of trade shares much better point out trade relations and linkages between 
countries. In addition, other indicators, such as indicators of comparative advantages for 
example, investigate trade relations by closely linking them to trade theory. Combining 
principles of trade theory and trade statistics allows for a theoretical underpinning of 
trade diagnostics with the aim to explain trade across countries. Such an in-depth analysis 
would be interesting in order to provide insights about trade of the West African region 
with partners and within the region alike. For the scoping paper, the following indicators 
are used in order to provide an overview of the trade relations in the West African region 
as a first step: 
 Exports from and imports to West African partners and partners elsewhere, 
denoted as the Rest of the World (ROW): The respective trade data are used to 
provide an indicator of the net trade position, also known as trade balance. The 
net trade position (NT) is defined as exports minus imports (X-M). Thus if NT > 0 
the country is a net exporting country, if NT < 0 the country is a net importing 
country.  
 Share of exports to partners in the region: exports to ECOWAS, UEMOA and 
WAMZ in total exports 
 Share of exports to partners elsewhere (ROW): exports to ROW in total exports 
 
The indicators of shares of exports to countries in the region on the one hand and to 
other countries not in the region points out the relative importance of intra-regional trade 
in West Africa. The higher the intra-regional trade, the closer the relation between 
countries. In the analysis of regional integration, a high level of intra-regional trade is an 
indicator of how integrated economies and markets are. As an example, intra-EU trade, 
i.e. trade within the European Union generally makes up for more than 70% of total trade. 
The trade data comes from the UNCTAD trade database. In the appendix 3-A3, the details 
on the chapters of the SITC trade classification are provided. For the product aggregation 
see appendix 3-A1. It should be noted that the trade data refers to the exports to the 
respective partner countries or regions, i.e. the value of imports as reported by the 
respective partner countries. Information on imports can be considered as being more 
reliable since the partner country reports the information rather than the country that the 
product originates from. Furthermore, the value of imports represent prices with 
customs, insurance and freight costs (CIF prices), which gives a more realistic figure for 
the value of the products being sold. The trade value is provided in US dollar (USD). 
With regard to the country aggregation, it is distinguished by West African countries. Note 
that Mauritania is included as a country although not being a member of ECOWAS. As 
regions, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA, Union Economique et 
Monétaire Ouest-Africaine) with French speaking countries of West Africa, the West 
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African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) as well as the entire region, i.e. ECOWAS plus Mauritania, 
are considered. For details on the country aggregation see appendix 3-A1.  
ANALYSIS OF TRADE INDICATORS – OVERVIEW OF THE WEST AFRICAN REGION 
Figure 3.1 presents the exports of the West African countries to ECOWAS and the rest of 
the world (ROW) in the time periods 1995 until 2014. It is clearly shown that countries 
outside the region have been playing a very important role as trade partners for the West 
African countries, with an increasing trend. As illustrated in figure 3.2, imports from the 
ROW considerably increased, mainly manufacturing and agri-food products. The latter 
indicates food imports from other countries in the West African regions. Overall, regional 
trade within ECOWAS has been rather limited, but a slightly increasing trend can also be 
observed. 
Figure 3.1: Exports of West African countries to ECOWAS and the ROW (million USD) 
 
Note: The data refers to the import values (CIF prices) of all products, as reported by the ECOWAS 
countries. source: COMTRADE, UNCTAD 
Figure 3.2: Imports from ROW in West African countries, million USD, 1995-2014 
 
source: COMTRADE, UNCTAD 
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Calculating the average for the years 2010-2014, the share of exports of the respective 
countries in the region to ECOWAS was only 11% of the total exports. In the same time 
period, the share of imports from ECOWAS in total imports was 17%. Large variations are 
found across countries, as expected. For the time period 1995-2014, figure 3-A3.1 and 3-
A3.2 in the appendix 3-A3 provide an overview of the share of regional trade in total 
trade, i.e. share of the individual ECOWAS countries in total exports and the share of the 
individual ECOWAS countries in total imports, respectively. 
Figure 3.3 illustrates the net trade positions, also referred to as trade balance, in the 
region for the respective countries. The net trade positions point out the trade directions, 
defining whether the respective countries are net exporters or net importers. Note that 
the net trade position refers to the exports and imports in the West African region. In 
general, intra-regional trade in West Africa has been dominated by a few countries that 
are the main exporters and importers in the West African region. Above all, Nigeria is the 
largest net exporting country, which is not surprising given its natural resources/oil and its 
role as exporter worldwide. Benin (mainly agriculture and minerals but also other goods in 
transit through Benin’s international port of Cotonou) and Côte d’Ivoire (mainly cocoa, 
coffee but more importantly minerals and manufacturing, with Abidjan port being the 
second biggest port in Africa) follows suit but with much smaller trade values. As 
illustrated in figure 3.3, Togo (mainly manufacturing) and Mauritania (mainly agri-food 
products) have been net exporters, with their exports to the other West African countries 
exceeding their imports from the region. It is interesting to note that Ghana appears to 
have turned a net exporter to the region in recent years, boosting its exports of 
manufacturing products. In contrast, Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso and Mali have become 
more dependent on imports from the region, i.e. exporting less to the region and 
importing more from the region (in relative terms).  
Figure 3.3: Net trade positions of the respective countries with regard to trade in 
ECOWAS (all products) (million USD), 1995-2014 
 
source: COMTRADE, UNCTAD 
Intra-regional trade has been higher within the UEMOA of the francophone countries 
during the time period 1995 to 2014 (see figure 3.4). On average, the value of trade within 
the UEMOA was about four times larger than intra ECOWAS trade. It is interesting to note 
that the UEMOA has a single currency (West African Franc, CFA, which is guaranteed by 
the French Treasury and whose exchange rate is tied to that of the Euro) since 1994, and 
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this regional integration through a common currency could have boosted trade amongst 
the UEMOA countries. In addition, colonial history, language, ethnic ties are also strong 
reasons why UEMOA countries have strong trade relations amongst each other. 
Establishing a monetary union encompasses a common accounting system, reviews of 
member countries' macroeconomic policies (convergence criteria), a regional stock 
exchange as well as some kind of legal and regulatory frameworks, for example for a 
banking system. All these factors could be reasons for the comparatively high trade flows 
amongst UEMOA members. The UEMOA is known as the most advanced regional 
integration agreement, including implementation and enforcement, in Africa. With longer 
time series of the trade data and other data, it would be interesting to investigate in an 
econometric analysis the increase of trade in the UEMOA.  
Figure 3.4: Overview of intra-regional trade in the regions with monetary unions: 
WAMZ, UEMOA 
 
source: COMTRADE, UNCTAD 
Which products are traded most in the region? Figure 3.3 provides an overview of the 
four groups of products: agri-food products, nonedible agricultural products, 
manufacturing products and minerals. In terms of value, mainly minerals (including oil) 
were traded within the West African region in the time period 2010-2014, making up for 
almost 70% of the intra-regional trade value. Manufacturing accounted for about 20% and 
agricultural products (edible and non-edible) made up for only about 10%. For many West 
African countries, much trade of agri-food products takes place with other trade partners 
outside the region. On average, the share of agri-food products within ECOWAS was 
about 12% of the trade with other countries (ROW); the one for non-edible agricultural 
products was only about 1%. For the details of the exports and imports of the four 
products in the individual West African countries see table 3-A3.1 and table 3-A3.2 in the 
appendix 3-A3. Note that agri trade does not reflect informal trade flows within the 
region, which concern mostly staple food products and are estimated to be rather 
significant. 
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ANALYSIS OF AGRI-FOOD TRADE - FOCUS ON BURKINA FASO, MALI AND NIGER AS WELL 
AS GHANA AND CÔTE D’IVOIRE 
The analysis of agri-food trade presents the corresponding trade shares with a special 
emphasis on the question with whom the countries mainly trade according to the official 
trade statistics. The trade partners seem to be particularly interesting for Burkina Faso, 
Mali and Niger since they are landlocked countries. Furthermore, Mali and Niger have non 
ECOWAS countries as direct neighbours. Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire are also considered as 
they are important partners for the EU as well as the Netherlands. Zooming in on agri-
food trade for the five countries in West Africa sheds light on their connectedness in the 
region and neighbouring countries, which is important for growth and development, 
including food security, especially for landlocked countries. In appendix A4, the details of 
the export and import linkages of the aforementioned countries are respectively given for 
the time period 1995 up to 2014. 
Figure 3.5 presents the net trade position of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger as well as 
Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire for ten specific groups of agri-food products, as defined in 
appendix 3-A1. The net trade position refers to net exports to ECOWAS, i.e. exports to 
ECOWAS minus imports from ECOWAS, and nicely illustrates how these countries are 
linked to the region.  
As shown, the net trade position of the landlocked countries Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger 
was rather weak in the last years. These countries seem to have engaged in trade much 
less than for example Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire that are also presented in figure 3.5. 
Further Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger were mainly net exporters, such that the imports 
exceeded the exports of the respective agri-food products. Mali exported more nonedible 
agri-food products than it imported, while Burkina Faso also exported more fruits, 
vegetables and nuts as well as fish.  
Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire exported a rather large value of traditional export products from 
developing countries, i.e. sugar, coffee, tea and cocoa, to the ECOWAS region. These 
products could be transported to ECOWAS partners and from there further to developed 
countries. Information about whether products are traded as trade in transit, whereby the 
trade partner reported is not the final destination, is usually not sufficiently covered in 
official trade statistics. 
For Mali and Niger, trade with the adjacent countries that are not part of ECOWAS is also 
considered. As presented in table 3-A4.1, exports of live animals from Niger to its 
neighbours outside ECOWAS made up about 86% of Niger’s total live animal exports. This 
high share is the exception. Exports of Mali and Niger to the adjacent neighbouring 
countries not members of ECOWAS were limited in recent years. For imports, fruit, 
vegetables and nuts from neighbouring countries that were non-ECOWAS members 
scored 14% and 18% of the total imports of Mali and Niger, respectively. 
In conclusion, for the landlocked countries Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger the ECOWAS 
neighbours play an important role as export destination but also for sourcing of some 
agri-food products. However, it should be noted that overall the ECOWAS partners appear 
more important for exporting agri-food products. For example, on average Burkina Faso 
exported about 61% of its agri-food exports to ECOWAS partners. Mali and Niger exported 
less to ECOWAS partners, with the average share of exports to ECOWAS amounting to 
35% and 34% respectively. Concerning imports, the share of the respective agri-food 
products from ECOWAS partners was lower, except for Burkina Faso that on average 
imported about 37% of its total imports from ECOWAS partners. For the other countries, 
the average import share was only between 10 and 15%.  
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For further investigating the intra-regional trade, maps can be used to visualise the trade 
directions. As an example, for the five countries under review the maps of their respective 
export and import portfolio of the different groups of agri-food products are shown in 
appendix 3-A4, see figure 3-A4.1 to figure 3-A4.4, with the interactive maps made 
available, too. The trade flows across the region can be readily traced back and a time 
dimension could be added in order to make the changes in trade visible (see maps in 
appendix 3-A5). 
Figure 3.5: Net trade positions of the respective countries with regard to ECOWAS, 
detailed agri-food products, average 2010-2014, million USD 
  
source: COMTRADE, UNCTAD 
 
DATA ISSUES - INFORMAL TRADE 
OECD (2012) defines informal cross-border trade as “trade in legitimately produced goods 
and services, which escapes the regulatory framework set by the government, as such 
avoiding certain tax and regulatory burdens”. Informal trade thus refers to products being 
traded by both formal and informal firms that are not recorded on official government 
records and that fully or partly evade payment of official duties and charges. In the West 
African region, informal trade is considered to be significant, and particularly evolving in 
the context of trade and gender, with many women being engaged in the informal sector 
and trade. For agri-food trade in the West African region, ECDPM explicitly reviews the 
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situation of informal trade in their study. A recent approximation of informal trade in agri-
food products in West Africa estimates that informal trade could be as much as 75% of 
intra-regional trade in West Africa (World Bank, 2015).  
There are different forms of informal trade. Next to parallel trade, which occurs in 
addition to official trade but is not recorded, re-exporting has been practised in the West 
African region. Re-exporting means that products are imported legally through formal 
channels into countries and are then shipped to other countries under different labels and 
with little or no transformation through processing, except for the transport. Although 
some information on re-exports may officially be reported, the presence of informal trade 
is not covered by official trade statistics. Hence they show only part of the trade that 
actually takes place, thereby underestimating trade across countries where informal trade 
is an issue.  
Other information on informal trade is not readily available. In fact, collecting information 
on informal trade is complex, requiring much effort and resources. Methods to collect 
information for example include the specific monitoring of borders and their 
surroundings, i.e. that people are posted to observe traders and record all products that 
are not officially recorded and cleared through customs. Alternatively, the movement of 
trucks carrying not recorded products could be tracked and subsequently recorded. 
For the scoping paper, the trade statistics relied on the recorded figures officially provided 
by UNCTAD. Hence, informal trade cannot be specifically analysed at this stage. The trade 
statistics show general trends and cover the dynamics of time series, using data for 1995 
up to 2014, as well as averaging the trade data over the years 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 
2014 for the calculation of the indicators about regional integration. 
In appendix 3-A.7, products that have often been found to be informally traded are listed. 
A substantial proportion of informal cross-border trade is related to staple food 
commodities (e.g. maize, rice and cattle) and low-quality consumer goods (e.g. clothes, 
shoes and electronic appliances) (OECD, 2009). Yusuff (2015), for example, specifically 
investigates women traders engaging in informal trade in order to make a living from their 
very small, informal enterprises, and in fact families. Along the trade corridor informal 
trade of products but also services (like people in low-skill border-related services such as 
taxis and porterage, travel worker…) takes place, posing threats to those engaged in it but 
also brings possibilities of income-generation19.In addition to other sources such as 
reports on custom monitoring or road blocks (USDA, CLISS) for example, the literature 
identified in this scoping study could be a good starting point to further investigate 
informal, unregistered trade in the ECOWAS region. According to the studies, a good 
overview on informal trade in the ECOWAS region is missing, and the magnitude of 
informal trade seems to be unclear. Furthermore, how does informal trade work? Who is 
engaged in informal trade and why? Such analysis could include a specific review of 
studies looking into the issue but also some interesting insights may be derived by for 
example comparing production data, consumption data and trade data. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19
 In a recent survey, Tyson (2015) looks into the role of small-scale cross-border trade on the 
Kenya–Uganda transcontinental trucking route, not part of ECOWAS. 
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APPENDIX 3-A1: DETAILS ABOUT THE TRADE DATA – PRODUCT AND COUNTRY 
AGGREGATION 
The database used is the UNCTAD trade database, Comtrade. For developing countries 
the data is available in the standard classification system of trade codes: Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC), revision 3. The SITC provides 6 digits codes of 
traded products, with chapters being one level of classification with subchapters and so 
on. For the analysis the aggregation is presented in the tables below. The list of product 
groups, i.e. chapters classified in the SITC revision 3 is provided in Appendix 2-A2.  
Product Aggregation 
Aggregation of broad groups of 
products - trade overview 
SITC chapters/subchapters, SITC rev. 3 
Agriculture & food 0, 11, 41, 42 
Inedible agriculture (cotton, 
wood…)  
12, 2, 43 
Mineral fuels 3 
Manufacturing 5, 6, 7 and 8, 9 
 
Aggregation of groups of agri-food 
products – specific country 
analysis 
SITC chapters/subchapters, SITC rev. 3 
LiveAnimal 00, 03411 (live fish) 
Meat 011, 012, 016 
OtherAnimal 0021, 0222, 0224 (dairy), 025 (eggs, albumin), 0616 
(honey), 0814 (animal meal/fodder), 41 (animal oil/fat) 
Fish 03412-19, 0342, 0344, 0345, 035, 036, 037 
FruitVegNuts 054, 0561, 057 
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Cereals 4 
SugarCoffeeTeaCocoaSpices 0610-0612, 0615, 0619 (sugar), 7 
OtherPlant 08 animal feed 
ProcessedFood 017, 0223,023, 024 (milk processed), 0564, 0566, 0567, 
058, 059 (fruit & vegetables processed), 062 (sugar 
confectionary), 11 (beverages), 43 (processed veg/animal 
fats 
09 (misc. food products) 
Inedible agricultural products 20, 21 (skin, hide, fur), 23-26 (animal or plant fibre, textile), 
29 (crude animal material) 
 
The trade data is by large available for time series, whereby there may be gaps for one or 
several years. Trade data for Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia is not 
available for all years. The trade data for the years 1995 to 2014 is extracted. The data for 
2015 is available, but the data for 2015 is not officially declared and can still change. 
Hence the year 2014 is used as the latest year for the trade data approved.  
Country aggregation 
 UEMOA countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinee-Bissau, Mail, Niger, 
Senegal and Togo; 
 WAMZ countries: Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierrra Leone; 
 ECOWAS countries: WAMZ and UEMOA 
 West African countries: ECOWAS and Mauritania 
 Rest of the World (ROW): all other countries not part of the region, as defined. 
 
Aggregation of the specific countries looked at with a focus on agri-food trade 
Individual country Neighbour countries in the West 
African Region 
Other neighbour countries 
Burkina Faso Mali, Niger, Benin, Togo, Ghana, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea 
_ 
Mali Niger, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Guinea, Senegal, Mauritania  
Algeria, Libya 
Niger Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin, Nigeria Chad, Algeria, Libya 
Ghana Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Togo _ 
Côte d’Ivoire Liberia, Guinea, Mali, Burkina 
Faso, Ghana 
_ 
 
 
APPENDIX 3-A2: SITC REV.3 (STANDARD INTERNATIONAL TRADE CLASSIFICATION, REV.3) 
SITC Rev.3 (Standard International Trade Classification, Rev.3) 
0 - Food and live animals 
 00 - Live animals other than animals of division 03 
 01 - Meat and meat preparations 
 02 - Dairy products and birds' eggs 
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 03 - Fish (not marine mammals), crustaceans, molluscs and aquatic invertebrates, 
and preparations thereof 
 04 - Cereals and cereal preparations 
 05 - Vegetables and fruit 
 06 - Sugars, sugar preparations and honey 
 07 - Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices, and manufactures thereof 
 08 - Feeding stuff for animals (not including unmilled cereals) 
 09 - Miscellaneous edible products and preparations 
1 - Beverages and tobacco  
 11 – Beverages 
 12 - Tobacco and tobacco manufactures  
2 - Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 
 21 - Hides, skins and furskins, raw 
 22 - Oil-seeds and oleaginous fruits 
 23 - Crude rubber (including synthetic and reclaimed) 
 24 - Cork and wood 
 25 - Pulp and waste paper 
 26 - Textile fibres (other than wool tops and other combed wool) and their 
wastes 
 27 - Crude fertilizers, other than those of division 56, and crude minerals 
(excluding coal, petroleum etc.) 
 28 - Metalliferous ores and metal scrap 
 29 - Crude animal and vegetable materials, n.e.s. 
 
3 - Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 
 32 - Coal, coke and briquettes 
 33 - Petroleum, petroleum products and related materials 
 34 - Gas, natural and manufactured 
 35 - Electric current 
4 - Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 
 41 - Animal oils and fats 
 42 - Fixed vegetable fats and oils, crude, refined or fractionated  
 43 - Animal or vegetable fats and oils, processed; waxes of animal or vegetable 
origin; inedible mixtures or preparations of animal or vegetable fats or oils, n.e.s.  
 
5 - Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 
 51 - Organic chemicals 
 52 - Inorganic chemicals 
 53 - Dyeing, tanning and colouring materials 
 54 - Medicinal and pharmaceutical products 
 55 - Essential oils and resinoids and perfume materials; toilet, polishing and 
cleansing preparations 
 56 - Fertilizers (other than those of group 272) 
 57 - Plastics in primary forms 
 58 - Plastics in non-primary forms 
 59 - Chemical materials and products, n.e.s. 
6 - Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 
 61 - Leather, leather manufactures, n.e.s., and dressed furskins 
 62 - Rubber manufactures, n.e.s. 
 63 - Cork and wood manufactures (excluding furniture) 
 64 - Paper, paperboard and articles of paper pulp, of paper or of paperboard 
 65 - Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles, n.e.s., and related products 
54 
 
 66 - Non-metallic mineral manufactures, n.e.s. 
 67 - Iron and steel 
 68 - Non-ferrous metals 
 69 - Manufactures of metals, n.e.s. 
7 - Machinery and transport equipment 
 71 - Power-generating machinery and equipment 
 72 - Machinery specialized for particular industries 
 73 - Metalworking machinery 
 74 - General industrial machinery and equipment, n.e.s., and machine parts, 
n.e.s. 
 75 - Office machines and automatic data-processing machines 
 76 - Telecommunications and sound-recording and reproducing apparatus and 
equipment 
 77 - Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances, n.e.s., and electrical parts 
thereof (including non-electrical counterparts, n.e.s., of electrical household-type 
equipment) 
 78 - Road vehicles (including air-cushion vehicles) 
 79 - Other transport equipment 
8 - Miscellaneous manufactured articles 
 81 - Prefabricated buildings; sanitary, plumbing, heating and lighting fixtures and 
fittings, n.e.s. 
 82 - Furniture, and parts thereof; bedding, mattresses, mattress supports, 
cushions and similar stuffed furnishings 
 83 - Travel goods, handbags and similar containers 
 84 - Articles of apparel and clothing accessories 
 85 - Footwear 
 87 - Professional, scientific and controlling instruments and apparatus, n.e.s. 
 88 - Photographic apparatus, equipment and supplies and optical goods, n.e.s.; 
watches and clocks 
 89 - Miscellaneous manufactured articles, n.e.s.  
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APPENDIX 3-A3: ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES FOR ECOWAS TRADE ANALYSIS 
Figure 3-A3.1: Export shares of individual West African countries in total trade (million 
USD) 
 
source: COMTRADE, UNCTAD 
 
Figure 3-A3.2: Import shares of individual West African countries in total imports 
(million USD) 
 
source: COMTRADE, UNCTAD
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Table 3-A3.1: Exports to ECOWAS (in 1000 USD) and share in total exports, average 2010-2014 
 
all products  agri-food  
nonedible 
agriculture  
manufacturin
g  minerals  
average 
2010-2014, 
1000 USD 
Share of 
ECOWAS in 
total exports 
average 
2010-2014, 
1000 USD 
Share of 
ECOWAS in 
total exports 
average 
2010-2014, 
1000 USD 
Share of 
ECOWAS in 
total exports 
average 
2010-2014, 
1000 USD 
Share of 
ECOWAS in 
total exports 
average 
2010-2014, 
1000 USD 
Share of 
ECOWAS in 
total exports 
Benin 477,730.3  28%        35,552.4  15%   480.7  0%           28,964.9  8%  412,732.3  84% 
Burkina Faso     64,658.3  6%        24,938.7  25%        559.3  0%           35,172.5  9%       3,987.8  94% 
Cape Verde       1,693.1  2%          1,088.1  2%            5.8  12%       287.7  1%          311.5  41% 
Côte d'Ivoire 1,055,421.9  10%      285,097.7  5%   28,084.8  2%         272,895.5  35%    469,343.9  25% 
Gambia, The      10,694.5  7%        5,663.3  6%         152.0  1%          1,269.7  16%       3,609.4  77% 
Ghana 501,130.9  5%      136,297.2  4% 13,607.9  5%         264,142.2  11% 87,083.7  10% 
Guinea   36,153.0  2%        28,397.9  19%     251.6  1%           7,333.0  3%      170.5  0% 
Guinea-Bissau   22,187.1  8%        21,119.7  11%      101.1  1%      954.1  14%     12.3  0% 
Liberia      18,166.7  2%          1,331.2  4%   8,974.8  3%     7,426.7  2%   433.9  0% 
Mali   55,039.4  5%          4,301.5  7%      427.9  0%           50,103.0  8%  207.0  25% 
Mauritania  298,189.1  10%      283,451.9  36%        126.7  4%           11,627.6  5%  2,982.9  2% 
Niger   145,908.9  19%        11,189.3  46%   351.5  17%             9,051.5  1%  125,316.7  32% 
Nigeria 3,393,066.8  4%        29,108.9  2%    1,145.3  0%         213,856.3  13% 3,148,956.3  3% 
Senegal 604,622.0  30%      117,225.8  17%   4,339.8  9%         203,920.0  24%  279,136.5  73% 
Sierra Leone    19,728.0  3%              837.0  2% 46.2  1%           17,248.7  7%     1,596.1  30% 
Togo  664,970.7  31%        65,114.4  18%   3,467.7  3%         327,637.4  38% 268,751.2  68% 
source: COMTRADE, UNCTAD 
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Table 3-A3.2: Imports from ECOWAS (in 1000 USD) and share in total imports, average 2010-2014 
 
all products agri-food nonedible agriculture manufacturing minerals 
average 2010-
2014, 1000 USD 
Share of 
ECOWAS in 
total imports 
average 2010-
2014, 1000 USD 
share of 
ECOWAS in 
total imports 
average 2010-
2014, 1000 USD 
share of 
ECOWAS in 
total imports 
average 2010-
2014, 1000 USD 
share of 
ECOWAS in 
total imports 
average 2010-
2014, 1000 USD 
share of 
ECOWAS in 
total imports 
Benin 417,741.5  17% 38,990.9  4% 3,447.5  4%  133,332.3  13% 241,970.8  58% 
Burkina Faso 937,298.9  32% 122,874.4  33% 5,045.1  33% 347,836.8  19%   461,542.6  49% 
Cape Verde 5,675.2  1% 1,394.6  1% 1,803.9  1% 1,620.8  0%     855.9  15% 
Côte d'Ivoire 2,476,974.4  26% 98,649.0  6% 12,479.2  6% 209,199.3  5% 2,156,646.9  87% 
Gambia, The 95,711.2  28% 1,990.5  2%   866.6  2%             14,072.2  10% 78,782.0  82% 
Ghana 716,030.6  6% 91,250.3  5%      1,760.1  5%          224,462.4  2% 398,557.7  56% 
Guinea  59,997.2  3% 10,393.6  2%      4.4  2%             33,448.8  3% 16,150.3  27% 
Mali 1,541,823.2  41% 135,105.4  30%  5,877.1  30%          357,828.0  17% 1,043,012.7  68% 
Mauritania 53,886.7  2% 8,517.3  2%    3,201.8  2%             38,388.4  3% 3,779.3  7% 
Niger 272,499.4  16%    75,117.1  18%    5,065.4  18%          142,917.3  12%    49,399.5  18% 
Nigeria 448,271.2  2% 173,262.9  2%    3,826.6  2%          161,467.1  0% 109,714.5  24% 
Senegal 809,043.6  13% 91,528.6  7%  24,664.1  7%             40,727.6  2% 652,123.3  81% 
Sierra Leone 821,995.1  40%     7,156.1  3%     7.6  3%             39,551.0  4% 775,280.4  94% 
Togo 133,996.2  10% 35,472.4  18% 1,083.6  18%             53,876.0  6%  43,564.2  33% 
source: COMTRADE, UNCTAD 
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APPENDIX 3–A4: ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES FOR SELECTED ECOWAS COUNTRIES 
Figure 3-A4.1a: Share of exports of agri-food products to ECOWAS in exports to all 
destinations,  1995-2014 – Burkina Faso 
 
source: COMTRADE, UNCTAD 
Figure 3-A4.1b: Share of imports of agri-food products from ECOWAS in imports from all 
countries, 1995-2014 – Burkina Faso 
 
source: COMTRADE, UNCTAD 
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Figure 3-A4.2a: Share of exports of agri-food products to ECOWAS in exports to all 
destinations, 1995-2014 – Code d’Ivoire  
 
source: COMTRADE, UNCTAD 
Figure 3-A4.2b: Share of imports of agri-food products from ECOWAS in imports from all 
countries 1995-2014 – Code d’Ivoire  
 
source: COMTRADE, UNCTAD 
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Figure 3-A4.3a: Share of exports of agri-food products to ECOWAS in exports to all 
destinations, 1995-2014 – Ghana  
 
source: COMTRADE, UNCTAD 
Figure 3-A4.3b: Share of imports of agri-food products from ECOWAS in imports from all 
countries, 1995-2014– Ghana 
 
source: COMTRADE, UNCTAD 
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Figure 3-A4.4a: Share of exports of agri-food products to ECOWAS in exports to all 
destinations, 1995-2014 – Mali  
 
source: COMTRADE, UNCTAD 
Figure 3-A4.4b: Share of imports of agri-food products from ECOWAS in imports from all 
countries, 1995-2014 – Mali  
 
source: COMTRADE, UNCTAD 
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Figure 3-A4.5a: Share of exports of agri-food products to ECOWAS in exports to all 
destinations, 1995-2014 – Niger  
 
source: COMTRADE, UNCTAD 
 
Figure 3-A4.5b: Share of imports of agri-food products from ECOWAS in imports from all 
countries, 1995-2014 – Niger  
 
source: COMTRADE, UNCTAD 
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Table 3-A4.1: Overview of trade shares (exports and import shares) with regard to ECOWAS, average 2010-2014 
 
EXPORT 
 
to ECOWAS 
to ECOWAS 
neighbours 
to other 
neighbours IMPORT 
 
from ECOWAS 
from ECOWAS 
neighbours 
from other 
neighbours 
  
average 
2010-
2014, 
1000 USD 
average 
2010-
2014, 
1000 USD share 
average 
2010-
2014, 
1000 USD share 
average 
2010-
2014, 
1000 USD share 
 
average 2010-
2014, 1000 
USD 
average 
2010-2014, 
1000 USD share 
average 
2010-
2014, 
1000 USD share 
average 
2010-
2014, 
1000 USD share 
B
u
rk
in
a 
F
as
o
  
LiveAnimal 3,598.86 3,598.74 100% 3,598.7  100% 
  
LiveAnimal 453.3          124.2  27%       89.6  20% 
  Meat 33.53 22,51 67% 22.5  67% 
  
Meat           325.5            16.8  5%   18.0  6% 
  OtherAnimal 1,128.52 1,128.52 100% 422.0  37% 
  
OtherAnimal   21,228.7      5,630.9  27%   5,471.6  26% 
  Fish 195,113.37 3,237.22 2%   2,481.6  1% 
  
Fish     10,124.7      2,120.1  21%    332.5  3% 
  Cereals 3,408.08 3,255.83 96%    2,903.5  85% 
  
Cereals   171,608.7    37,686.1  22% 36,633.7  21% 
  fruitVegNuts 41,506.27 9,427.62 23%    9,424.7  23% 
  
fruitVegNuts     7,180.9      4,957.5  69%     4,953.7  69% 
  SugarCoffee 
TeaCocoaSpices 
432.30 221.80 51%    167.3  39% 
  
SugarCoffee 
TeaCocoaSpices 
 52,048.0    21,248.9  41% 21,201.0  41% 
  otherPlant 591.36 566.74 96%        566.7  96% 
  
otherPlant     1,799.1      1,517.4  84%     1,496.7  83% 
  ProcessedFood 2,809.51 1,996.46 71%   1,300.9  46% 
  
ProcessedFood     75,045.4    30,968.8  41%      17,748.7  24% 
  nonedible 378,412.57 559.31 0%   434.7  0% 
  
nonedible     16,988.4      5,045.1  30%     5,007.3  29% 
  
C
ô
te
 d
'I
vo
ir
e 
LiveAnimal 99.3 52.6 53%      52.6  53% 
  
LiveAnimal   2,341.4            99.9  4% 118.4  5% 
  Meat 66.7 29.8 45%         29.3  44% 
  
Meat 75,088.5            33.8  0%       11.7  0% 
  OtherAnimal 1676.2 1,197.5 71%     844.9  50% 
  
OtherAnimal    80,262.6      3,365.7  4%     778.7  1% 
  Fish 407.9 147.9 36%     130.9  32% 
  
Fish   343,584.5    65,058.5  19%   25,037.0  7% 
  Cereals 61768.6 39,104.2 63%  31,940.4  52% 
  
Cereals 767,979.1          587.5  0%     250.1  0% 
  fruitVegNuts 783141.7 16,178.3 2% 5,754.2  1% 
  
fruitVegNuts     61,325.4      4,020.9  7%   1,027.4  2% 
  SugarCoffee 
TeaCocoaSpices 5042837.7 42,475.9 1% 23,340.0  0% 
  
SugarCoffee 
TeaCocoaSpices    28,007.8      2,465.5  9%  2,119.5  8% 
  otherPlant 42408.5 818.4 2%    509.5  1% 
  
otherPlant 52,337.9      8,688.3  17% 1,408.6  3% 
  ProcessedFood 65817.4 46,422.5 71%  30,957.7  47% 
  
ProcessedFood 189,552.3    12,867.6  7%  2,337.4  1% 
  Nonedible 1384511.9 28,084.8 2%   4,990.2  0% 
  
nonedible   63,827.4    12,479.2  20% 13,954.3  22% 
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Table 3-A4.1 continued: 
 
EXPORTS  to ECOWAS 
to ECOWAS 
neighbours 
to other 
neighbours IMPORTS  from ECOWAS 
from ECOWAS 
neighbours 
from other 
neighbours 
 
product 
average 
2010-2014, 
1000 USD 
average 2010-
2014, 1000 USD share 
average 
2010-2014, 
1000 USD share 
average 
2010-2014, 
1000 USD share product 
average 2010-
2014, 1000 
USD 
average 
2010-2014, 
1000 USD share 
average 
2010-2014, 
1000 USD share 
average 
2010-2014, 
1000 USD share 
G
h
an
a 
 
LiveAnimal 1,022.66 32.4 3%         32.2  3%   LiveAnimal     10,543.5      4,464.1  42% 4,426.9  42%   
Meat 351.38 314.7 90%         271.8  77%   Meat 213,621.2          105.9  0% 63.5  0%   
OtherAnimal 11,226.80 8,942.4 80%   1,548.9  14%   OtherAnimal    81,656.7      5,449.5  7% 315.8  0%   
Fish 195,113.37 3,237.2 2%  2,481.6  1%   Fish  233,345.3    32,132.3  14%   444.1  0%   
Cereals 12,284.13 7,231.3 59%       4,713.8  38%   Cereals  548,876.5      7,441.8  1%  5,886.1  1%   
fruitVegNuts 402,110.65 50,560.3 13%  442.1  0%   fruitVegNuts    31,100.2    17,060.7  55%    7,715.3  25%   
SugarCoffeeTeaC
ocoaSpices 3,057,806.71 7,875.8 0% 3,008.3  0%   
SugarCoffeeTeaCocoa
Spices   197,306.8      5,117.7  3%   3,157.1  2%   
M
al
i 
LiveAnimal       450.5  49.2  11%    46.7  10% 0 0% LiveAnimal  1,907.4              9.3  0%  75.0  4% 0 0% 
Meat     93.7      21.4  23%           1.0  1%       17.0  18% Meat     430.2       8.1  2% 103.8  24% 0 0% 
OtherAnimal           215.2  129.8  60%      141.5  66% 0 0% OtherAnimal 121,243.5      3,970.7  3%  9,997.5  8%           0.6  0% 
Fish    407.9          147.9  36%      130.9  32% 
 
0% Fish    27,959.4      9,019.9  32% 20,636.5  74%    -    0% 
Cereals 2,284.2    1,866.0  82%   1,864.9  82% 
 
0% Cereals  426,417.8    23,981.0  6%  50,642.1  12%         93.6  0% 
fruitVegNuts  10,442.4   279.9  3%   255.4  2% 8.9  0% fruitVegNuts 33,624.2      5,750.8  17%  17,438.6  52%     2,287.9  7% 
SugarCoffeeTe
aCocoaSpices 536.4       238.0  44%        234.8  44%             -    0% 
SugarCoffeeTeaCoc
oaSpices    302,398.8    10,160.3  3%    39,086.8  13%           21.3  0% 
otherPlant 434.8       63.2  15%    62.9  14%             -    0% otherPlant     4,527.5      1,092.8  24%   2,370.4  52%                -    0% 
ProcessedFood   4,788.3  1,170.3  24%   1,153.8  24%             -    0% ProcessedFood   293,551.6    49,415.4  17%  118,978.6  41%         134.9  0% 
nonedible 327,065.5        427.9  0%  487.4  0%      500.0  0% nonedible      53,356.2      3,907.9  7%  14,616.5  27%             8.0  0% 
N
ig
er
 
LiveAnimal 1,588.2          61.0  4%    22.7  1%  1,361.5  86% LiveAnimal              89.1              9.4  11%       9.4  11%                -    0% 
Meat      68.8  23.4  34%  18.8  27%             -    0% Meat 1,166.0            10.2  1%  1.3  0%           19.6  2% 
OtherAnimal      630.3       4.5  1%  2.2  0%             -    0% OtherAnimal 36,703.4      1,665.7  5% 169.3  0%   78.4  0% 
Fish 114.5          5.5  5%    5.5  5%        11.9  10% Fish 1,826.4          477.7  26% 307.8  17%     0.6  0% 
Cereals 595.2     66.2  11%     56.6  10%             -    0% Cereals 189,278.2    20,663.3  11% 14,632.4  8%     3,734.0  2% 
fruitVegNuts 12,589.5  10,481.2  83% 762.3  6%           2.2  0% fruitVegNuts 11,143.8      4,690.8  42% 2,990.6  27%     1,524.1  14% 
SugarCoffeeTe
aCocoaSpices  281.9      104.2  37%     101.5  36%           3.8  1% 
SugarCoffeeTeaCoc
oaSpices 47,272.3      6,645.7  14% 280.1  1%     33.7  0% 
otherPlant 208.6  0.3  0%   0.3  0%            -    0% otherPlant      6,111.9      5,667.7  93% 4,212.4  69%             1.6  0% 
ProcessedFood 1,056.4      309.5  29%     259.6  25%           6.3  1% ProcessedFood      76,628.3    18,303.2  24%    2,664.9  3%         630.9  1% 
nonedible 2,346.5         351.5  15%        334.7  14%           1.7  0% nonedible 44,101.0      5,065.4  11%     703.0  2%           13.4  0% 
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APPENDIX 3-A5: MAPS FOR AGRI-FOOD IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF THE SELECTED 
COUNTRIES, AVERAGE TRADE VALUE 2010-2014 (SOURCE: COMTRADE) 
 
BURKINA FASO 
For interactive maps see:  
http://www3.lei.wur.nl/gisdata/TradeFlow/BiPartiteECOWAS/BiPartite_BurkinaFaso.html 
 
 
NIGER 
For interactive maps see:  
http://www3.lei.wur.nl/gisdata/TradeFlow/BiPartiteECOWAS/BiPartite_Niger.html 
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MALI  
For interactive maps see:  
http://www3.lei.wur.nl/gisdata/TradeFlow/BiPartiteECOWAS/BiPartite_Mali.html 
 
 
GHANA  
For interactive maps see:  
http://www3.lei.wur.nl/gisdata/TradeFlow/BiPartiteECOWAS/BiPartite_Ghana.html 
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CÔTE D’IVOIRE 
For interactive maps see:  
http://www3.lei.wur.nl/gisdata/TradeFlow/BiPartiteECOWAS/BiPartite_CotedIvoire.html 
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borders / Y. Olabisi. In: Journal of women's entrepreneurship and education: (2014), no. 1-2, 
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Yoruba of Benin/Nigeria / S. Golub & J. Hansen-Lewis. In: The informal sector in Francophone 
Africa : firm size, productivity, and institutions / ed.by N. Benjamin & A.A.Mbaye. - 
Washington, D.C. : The The World Bank: (2012), p. 173-194. 
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integration in West Africa / K. Meagher In: Regionalism and regional integration in Africa : a 
debate of current aspects and issues / ed. by H. Melber. - Uppsala : Nordic Africa Institute: 
(2001), p. 40-53. 
Impact of informal re-exports between Benin and Nigeria: a CGE analysis / P. Mathieu and 
S.Luc. - Quebec : Departement d'Economique de la Faculte d'administration à l'Universite de 
Sherbrooke, 2009. (Cahiers de recherche ; 09-14) 
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(Côte d'Ivoire) / K. Djibril, W. Xiangrong, F. Fousseni & A. Koffi. In: The Pakistan journal of 
social issues: (2012), vol. 3, p. 119. 
Unraveling the health-related challenges of women in the informal economy: accounts of 
women in cross-border trading in Accra, Ghana / C. Wrigley-Asante. In: GeoJournal: (2013), 
vol. 78, no. 3, p. 525-537. 
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Stratagems and spoils : a critical analysis of informal trade on the Ghana/Togo border / S. 
Zeka. In: Africa insight: (2010), vol. 40, no. 2, p. 165-176. 
Accounting for the size of the informal sector in Nigeria / O.H. Solomon. In: South African 
journal of economics: (2011), vol. 79, no. 4, p. 470-489. 
Social network analysis and informal trade / W. Olivier. - Sønderborg : University of Southern 
Denmark, Department of Border Region Studies, 2015. (Working Paper; 01/15) 
http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles//B/C/E/%7BBCE47C6D-39B8-42FA-BB31-
DA07CBC19367%7DWalther-2015-WB-WP.pdf 
Informal trade : looking beyond the trees / J. Roda, A. Ismariah & A.Z. Noor. In: EAS strategic 
options: (2012), vol. 2012, no. 14, p. 12-13. 
http://www.frim.gov.my/v1/fif/pdf_file/fifsept2012.pdf#page=12 
Informal cross-border trade and trade facilitation reform in sub-Saharan Africa / C. Lesser and 
E.Moisé-Leeman. - Paris : OECD, 2009. (OECD Trade Policy Working Paper ; 86) 
http://www.oecd.org/tad/42222094.pdf 
Cooperation and integration in Africa : the case of informal cross border trade / O. Oculi. Full 
Papers presented at the XIth CODESRIA General Assembly: 06-10 December, 2005, Maputo, 
Mozambique, 2005. http://www.codesria.org/spip.php?article711&lang=en 
 
APPENDIX 3-A7: PRODUCTS IDENTIFIED AS OFTEN BEING TRADED INFORMALLY IN WEST 
AFRICA (Source: Yérima, ECOWAS customs tariffs and site observations, published in 
Assessing Regional Integration in Africa IV: Enhancing Intra- African Trade by the Economic 
Commission for Africa) 
UNPROCESSED PRODUCTS 
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SECTION 4: INVENTORY OF DUTCH BILATERAL POLICIES IN WEST AFRICA 
Paul Lange 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This section deals with the bilateral policies that have been pursued by The Netherlands’ 
government in recent years through its network of Embassies in West Africa. It primarily 
builds on the Multi-Annual Strategic Plans (MASPs) that The Netherlands have developed for 
a number of countries in the region, supplemented by information from other policy 
documents. Where possible this information has been complemented in consultation with 
the Embassies themselves.  
The section does not attempt to comprehensively discuss the Dutch policy framework for this 
region but rather aims to assess the extent to which these policies pay attention to the 
promotion of regional (economic) integration in West Africa and address cross-border issues. 
It further highlights some recent/ ongoing initiatives that have been supported and funded by 
the Dutch government that fit within this category, with a particular focus on efforts aimed at 
regional trade in the agro-food sector.  
In an effort to further complement the picture of Dutch bilateral relations with the region in 
addition to the network of Dutch Embassies, this section will also touch upon the role of the 
Section conclusions: 
- The new strategic policy agenda of The Netherlands aims to provide a response to 
key developments in the global economy by linking aid, trade and investment.  
- One of the key elements of this agenda is the reorganization of its bilateral 
relations with other countries in the world. For West Africa, this means that there 
are three types of relationships with the 4 (partner + focus) countries in the region, 
with a network of Embassies in 5 countries (and a sixth forthcoming).   
- The new policy agenda puts much value on trade facilitation. It considers the 
regional level as the most appropriate and logical framework for designing its 
interventions aimed at trade facilitation. West Africa is one of two regions (the 
other being East Africa) on the African continent where The Netherlands targets its 
trade facilitation efforts 
- The added value of supporting regional initiatives and/ or applying a regional 
approach in West Africa is generally recognized at the Embassy level, and 
particularly through trade promotion & facilitation and in the area of agriculture & 
food security.  
- Despite this general acknowledgement, in practice many of the interventions in 
which the Embassies have been involved in recent years are country-based with 
little regional/ cross-border linkages and often little coordinated with other 
Embassies in the region.   
- Ghana and to a lesser extent Benin and Senegal seems to be the cases in which a 
regional approach has been most developed and consistently applied by the Dutch 
Embassy and has resulted in supporting a number of concrete regional/ cross-
border initiatives. 
- Promising but only recently introduced instruments to give shape to a more 
coordinated Dutch regional approach in West Africa – i.e. the appointment of an 
ECOWAS permanent representative and the creation of the position of regional 
economy envoy – have yet to prove their (full) potential.   
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Netherlands African Business Council (NABC) in West Africa through its mission to strengthen 
business relations between Dutch businesses and the region.20  
 
DUTCH POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR AID, TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
In 2013 the Dutch government launched its policy framework A World to Gain. A New Agenda 
for Aid, Trade and Investment.21 Shaped in a context of declining availability of Official 
Development Assistance (ODA), this new strategic policy agenda aims to provide a response 
to key developments in the global economy by linking aid, trade and investment. It builds on 
three primary objectives: 1) to eradicate poverty; 2) sustainable, inclusive growth all over the 
world; and 3) success for Dutch companies abroad. There are a number of key elements of 
this new policy agenda that are particularly relevant for the Dutch bilateral approach towards 
West Africa.  
The Dutch government has used this new agenda as an opportunity to reorganize its bilateral 
relations with other countries in the world. It now distinguishes three types of relationships: 
aid relationship, transitional relationship and a trade relationship. Currently The Netherlands 
have chosen to be engaged in a multi-year bilateral (aid) relationship with 15 countries in the 
world as so-called ‘partner countries’. These are countries with whom it maintains either an 
aid (7 countries in total) or a transitional relationship (8 countries). For the latter group, the 
bilateral relationship will initially shaped by both aid and trade, but the intention of the Dutch 
government in these countries is to gradually further strengthen the focus on trade (and 
investment). The countries in which the emphasis is on the promotion of trade and 
investment are referred to as ‘focus countries’ (26 countries).  
In West Africa, The Netherlands conducts its bilateral relationships through a network of 
Embassies in 5 countries: Abuja (Nigeria), Accra (Ghana; also covering Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, 
Sierra Leone and Togo), Bamako (Mali, also covering Burkina Faso and Niger), Cotonou 
(Benin) and Dakar (Senegal, also covering Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea and Guinea-Buissau). 
Recently an economic and trade consulate was opened in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire.22 In 
September 2015 Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Koenders announced that the consulate in 
Abidjan will be upgraded to the status of full Embassy.23 This is currently in the process of 
being effectuated. All three types of bilateral relationships are present in the region. The 
Netherlands are engaged in an aid relationship with Mali and have a transitional relationship 
with Benin and Ghana. The Netherlands maintains a trade relationship with Nigeria (See 
Figure 4.1).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20
 It falls outside the scope of this section to discuss the role of all Dutch (civil society) organisations 
supporting regional(economic) integration in West Africa, with or without funding from the Dutch 
government. 
21
 NL MFA (2013), A World to Gain, A New Agenda for Aid, Trade and Investment: 
https://www.government.nl/binaries/government/documents/letters/2013/04/05/global-dividends-a-
new-agenda-for-aid-trade-and-investment/a-world-to-gain-en.pdf 
22
 The consulate published a market exploration study about the country, ‘Industry-specific Market 
Study in Ivory Coast’: 
 http://ghana.nlambassade.org/bijlagen/abidjan-info/marktverkenning-ivoorkust.html 
23
 NL MFA (2015), ‘Koenders versterkt diplomatie in reactie op instabiliteit rond Europa’: 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2015/09/11/koenders-versterkt-diplomatie-in-reactie-
op-instabiliteit-rond-europa  
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Figure 4.1: Map indicating Dutch bilateral relationships with West African countries and 
location of Dutch Embassies in the region 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An inventory made by the African Studies Centre Leiden, and published in January 2016, 
shows the following historical relationship between The Netherlands as provider of 
development assistance (in various forms) to countries in West Africa (See Table 4.1).24 
  
                                                          
24
 Kazimierczuk (2015), Historical overview of development policies and institutions in the Netherlands, 
in the context of private sector development and (productive) employment creation, ASCL working 
paper No. 122: 
http://www.ascleiden.nl/publications/historical-overview-development-policies-and-institutions-
netherlands-context-private.  
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Table 4.1: Development relationship between the Netherlands and West African countries  
Country 67-73 73-77 77-82 82-89 89-98 98-02 02-07 07-10 10-12 12-16 
Total 
years 
Burkina 
Faso 
- + + - + + + + - - 32 
Mali - - - - + + + + + + 27 
Ghana - - - - + + + + + + 27 
Benin - - - - + - + + + + 23 
Senegal - - - - + + + + - - 21 
Nigeria + - - - - + - - - + 17 
Cape Verde - - - - + + + - - - 19 
Mauritania - - - - + - - - - - 10 
Niger - - - - + - - - - - 10 
Guinea- 
Bissau 
- - - - + + - - - - 14 
Côte 
d’Ivoire 
- - - - + - - - - - 5 
Total 1 1 1 0 10 7 6 5 3 4  
 source: adapted from Kazimierczuk, 2015  
 
For its partner countries The Netherlands has drawn up a so-called Multi-Annual Strategic 
Plan (MASP) in which it sets out the details of its bilateral development cooperation policy. In 
the case of West Africa, this means that MASPs have been developed for Mali, Benin and 
Ghana but not for Nigeria. That is not to say that there are no Dutch development funds 
available for the non-partner countries in the region, for example in the case of Senegal 
where a Dutch Embassy is located.    
The policy document further emphasizes regional integration and cooperation as the way 
forward to address transnational issues such as food security and instability, particularly 
within the framework of its engagement with countries with which it maintains an aid 
relationship. In West Africa this concerns Mali. It is indicated that The Netherlands seeks to 
use a regional approach where possible and where this adds value to bilateral planning. The 
Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa are mentioned as examples where The Netherlands 
have already put this into practice. For West Africa this intention has not (yet) been 
formulated.  
In addition to reconfirming its four policy spearheads – 1) water; 2) food security 3) security 
& rule of law; and 4) women’s rights & sexual and reproductive health & rights (SRHR) – the 
policy document further reveals the Dutch policy focus on trade facilitation, as linked to 
support for private sector development and the  business climate. This is presented as an end 
in itself but also as a means to support other policy objectives such as food security. This 
policy focus on trade facilitation includes an emphasis on the promotion of regional trade. 
Regional trade promotion is particularly mentioned as policy objective within the framework 
of its engagement with countries with whom The Netherlands maintains a transitional 
relationship. In West Africa this applies to Benin and Ghana. In the case of Nigeria as a 
country with whom The Netherlands is engaged through a trade relationship, it is particularly 
emphasized that it seeks to secure new free trade agreements and that through these 
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countries it can promote internationalization of the Dutch private sector, particularly in 
sectors where The Netherlands excels, such as agrifood, water, life sciences and health.   
 
TRADE FACILITATION AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
The Netherlands put much value on trade (facilitation) as part of its strategic agenda for aid, 
trade and investment. It considers the regional level as the most appropriate and logical 
framework for planning its interventions aimed at trade facilitation.25 Driven by experience, 
interventions at the regional level are considered to be easier to undertake and to be more 
efficient than at other levels, such as the global level.   
This preference for the regional level builds on a strong belief in the added value of regional 
trade promotion, for example because of the large potential as regional trade is still rather 
limited in Africa, as larger markets provide more opportunities to (Dutch) businesses and it 
allows for a better alignment of supply and demand (for instance with regard to trade in 
agricultural and food products). It is further put forward that operating within the regional 
framework is supported by growing international consensus and strong political commitment 
on the African continent.  
West Africa is one of two regions (the other being East Africa) on the African continent where 
The Netherlands focuses its trade facilitation efforts. Three out of fifteen Dutch development 
partner countries are located in the region.26 The focus on West Africa further builds on an 
increasing concern about the security and stability situation in West Africa (e.g. migration, 
population pressure, Ebola), the growing interest of Dutch businesses to invest in, and trade 
with West African countries and the various opportunities the region offers to Dutch 
organizations of all sorts (businesses, knowledge institutes, civil society organizations).  
By working together with other donors and local actors and involving private sector and civil 
society actors, The Netherlands aim in West Africa for a coordinated approach, focusing on 
agricultural trade, and value chains of perishable products in particular. This allows The 
Netherlands to link up with Dutch knowledge institutes and businesses that operate in this 
particular area. Another particular entry point concerns the emphasis on establishing key 
transport and trade corridors. 
Dutch interventions aimed at trade facilitation are coordinated by the Department for 
Sustainable Economic Development (DDE, part of the Directorate-General for International 
Cooperation) in collaboration with the Department for International Trade Policy and 
Economic Governance (IMH, part of the Directorate-General for Foreign Economic Relations). 
Among the wide range of ongoing and planned trade promotion and facilitation 
interventions, there are a number of initiatives funded by The Netherlands that exclusively 
target West Africa in various forms:  
a) support to (local) capacity building to improve policy dialogue, advocacy and 
implementation: civil society, private sector, stakeholder groups, regional economic 
communities (e.g. ENDA/ CACID; ECOWAS; ROPPA27) 
b) (financial) involvement in concrete programmes: Capacity Building Customs and 
Logistics programme (in collaboration with the World Customs Organization and 
                                                          
25
 This section draws on: NL MFA/ DDE (2015), Result Area Trade Facilitation and Regional Integration 
[internal document]; and NL MFA/ DDE, ‘Regional Trade West Africa’, Presentation at the Scoping 
conference, 27 January 2016.  
26
 Benin, Ghana and Mali. 
27
 Network of Farmers’ and Agricultural Producers’ Organizations of West Africa (‘Reseau des 
Organisations Paysannes et des Producteurs Agricoles de l’afrique de l’ouest’, ROPPA) 
77 
 
EVO); Accelerating Trade in West Africa (ATWA, initiated by DANIDA); ‘Programme 
d’appui au commerce intra-régional et de renforcement de la gouvernance 
commerciale participative en Afrique de l’Ouest’ (See Box 4.1) 
c) commissioning of studies to broaden the knowledge base for regional trade 
initiatives in the agricultural sector: on the livestock sector (Wageningen University); 
on value chain perishables in Benin and Nigeria (Buck Consultants International); on 
livestock and fresh produce in West Africa (Wageningen University/ Buck Consultants 
International).     
Box 4.1: Programme d’appui au commerce intra-régional et de renforcement de la 
gouvernance commerciale participative en Afrique de l’Ouest28 
Launched in 2014, the ‘Programme d’appui au commerce intra-régional et de renforcement de la 
gouvernance commerciale participative en Afrique de l’Ouest’ aims to mobilize non-state actors 
(private sector, traders, civil society, trade union organizations, farmers' organizations, Chambers of 
Commerce) to increase and improve regional trade through better implementation of regional 
protocols issued by ECOWAS. The programme is implemented by ENDA/ CACID together with the 
Platform of West African Civil Society on the Cotonou Agreement (‘Plateforme des Organisations de la 
Société Civile de l'Afrique de l'Ouest sur l'Accord de Cotonou’, POSCAO) for which ENDA/ CACID holds 
the secretariat. The programme aims to build upon existing initiatives and to undertake 
(complementary) actions on the local, national and regional level, covering the whole ECOWAS region. 
It is projected to run until the end of 2016.   
The programme seeks to: 1) create a critical mass of informed and skilled actors capable of carrying 
out strategic advocacy for integration and effective implementation of the protocols, policies and 
regulations to strengthen intra-regional trade; 2) ensure the mobilization and effective involvement of 
West African actors, including local elected officials, community-based organizations, civil society, in 
the monitoring and implementation of protocols in regulations and policies concerning the free 
movement of goods and people; 3) disseminate the protocols, regulations and other legal instruments 
of ECOWAS with non-state actors for effective ownership; and 4) substantially increase regional trade 
through awareness and advocacy campaigns on the barriers to the development of intra-regional 
trade.  
A wide range of activities are carried out to achieve these objectives including development of 
research and analytical capacities, training and capacity building, facilitation of consultation and multi-
stakeholder dialogue and creation and operationalization of multi-stakeholder platforms.  
Among a wide range of beneficiaries including private sector actors, the media, civil society actors and 
various national ministries, the programme particularly targets youth through building regional 
citizenship and enhanced leadership for West African integration and development, and women by 
building on their role, interests and specific constraints in informal cross-border trade in West Africa. 
 
DUTCH EMBASSIES’ BILATERAL POLICIES AND INITIATIVES IN WEST AFRICA 
BENIN  
The current Multi-Annual Strategic Plan (MASP) 2014-201729 continues to a large extent on 
the path set in motion by the ‘Meerjarig Strategisch Plan’ drawn up for the period 2012-
2015.30 Although The Netherlands officially maintains a transitional relationship with Benin as 
                                                          
28
 ENDA/ CADID (2014), Programme d’appui au commerce intra-régional et de renforcement de la 
gouvernance commerciale participative en Afrique de l’Ouest [undisclosed document].  
29
 NL MFA (2014), Multi-Annual Strategic Plan 2014-2017 - The Netherlands – Benin: 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/rapporten/2014/02/05/meerjarige-
strategische-plannen-mjsp-2014-2017/benin-multi-annual-strategic-plan-2014-2017.pdf 
30
 NL MFA (2011), Meerjarig Strategisch Plan 2012-2015 Nederlandse Ambassade te Cotonou, Benin: 
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indicated in A World to Gain, for Benin it is pointed out in the current MASP that the 
relationship is to a large extent mainly based on aid cooperation but actively seeks to bring 
about this transformation.   
The Embassy indicates that it will (continue to) prioritize the three spearheads water & 
sanitation, food & nutrition security and Sexual and Reproductive Health & Rights (SRHR), 
and that it aims to intensify its focus on private sector development together with economic 
diplomacy. Within the last area, particular policy objectives are increasing the involvement of 
Dutch businesses such as in the agricultural sector and improving of the business climate, in 
which support for improvement of the functioning of the port of Cotonou plays an important 
role.  
In the area of agriculture and food security, the Embassy builds on its full-fledged sector 
strategy that was initiated in 2012. It emphasizes the need to move beyond a sole focus on 
agricultural production and to adopt a market-based model that seeks to further the 
sustainability and profitability of the agricultural sector. The MASP particularly stresses the 
regional setting in which Benin operates and the “obvious” need to address food security 
issues at the regional level. For example, it is indicated that Benin has a significant 
comparative advantage in terms of transit trade of commodities and in local processing of 
agricultural products, particularly thanks to the port of the country’s capital Cotonou and the 
presence of a large hinterland including Niger and Nigeria, and to a lesser extent Burkina 
Faso, Mali and Chad. It is further concluded that the country’s economic future particularly 
depends on trade with the economic powerhouse of the region Nigeria, which is until now 
limited by logistical difficulties and as a result of a broad range of trade barriers heavily 
dominated by illicit and informal trade. Although the Embassy specifically refers to the 
regional scope through which it seeks to enable Benin to benefit from the proximity of the 
Nigerian market and use the Port of Cotonou to provide for larger trade flows between Benin 
and its hinterland, it concludes at the same time that “solutions are likely to be country-
specific”. That seems to refer to an approach in which interventions are in-country based but 
(implicitly) built on  regional linkages.  
A number of initiatives supported by the Embassy within the area of agriculture and food 
security in recent years seem to fit within this line of thinking. For example,  in the area of 
rural transport infrastructure the Embassy provided financial support to the national and 
local government to enable them to improve feeder roads. In the area of agro-business 
development it was financially involved in a project executed by SNV that supports the 
establishment of an agri-business service centre assisting Beninese agro-businesses. It also 
applies to its support to initiatives in particular value chains (e.g. cotton, maize, jatropha) and 
to enhance access to agricultural inputs and to rural credit, and its efforts to promote private 
sector development more broadly.    
An example of a major initiative in the area of agriculture and food security where the 
regional focus seem to be more explicit is the ‘Approche Communal pour le Marché Agricole 
au Benin’ (ACMA) that aims to increase food security and develop agricultural markets in 
Benin (See Box 4.2).  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                        
http://benin.nlambassade.org/binaries/content/assets/postenweb/b/benin/nederlandse-ambassade-
in-cotonou/meerjarige-strategische-plannen-benin1.pdf 
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Box 4.2: Approche Communal pour le Marché Agricole au Benin (ACMA)31 
Launched in 2014, The ‘Approche Communal pour le Marché Agricole au Benin (ACMA)’ (‘Communal 
Approach to Agricultural Market Access in Benin’) is a project funded by the Dutch Embassy in Benin 
that aims to improve food security and increase agricultural incomes of small-holder farmers and rural 
entrepreneurs. More in particular, the projects seeks to strengthen the power of local stakeholders 
involved in trade, to increase trade within local markets in Benin and cross-border transactions with 
Nigeria, and to enhance the local supply of targeted commodities (i.e. palm oil, cassava, chili pepper, 
fish and maize). The project is projected to run until 2017.  
The project is implemented in three regions in south-eastern Benin – Ouémé, Plateau and Zoo –  by a 
consortium of organizations led by the International Fertilizer Development Centre (IFDC) and further 
supported by Sahel Capital, CARE International, the Royal Tropical Institute (KIT) and the Benin 
Consulting Group (BeCG).   
Its demand-driven intervention strategy builds on six axes: 1) market intelligence; 2 competitive 
supply; 3) multi-stakeholder interaction; 4) access to finance; 5) inclusion of vulnerable groups; and 6) 
facilitation of value chain logistics.  
Some of the challenges encountered by the programme are the cumbersome import procedures at the 
Nigerian border due to the involvement of several organizations, the persistence of a number of 
transport barriers (e.g. expensive professional transporters), various constraints related to the need to 
conduct cross-border payments (e.g. impossibility for a Beninese organization to open a bank account 
in Nigeria) and the incongruence of national policies on trade in agricultural products among ECOWAS 
countries and between Benin and Nigeria in particular.
32
 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, a number of results have been achieved such as in the area of 
market intelligence through the identification of buyers, transporters and export costs, in the area of 
multi-stakeholder interaction by means of the installation of a so-called Intercommunual Consultation 
Framework and in the area of access to finance through the creation of a ACMA/ 2SCALE Guarantee 
Fund for the benefit of direct economic actors. 
 
With regard to other policy areas, it is mentioned that the Embassy aims to promote a 
regional approach to security and human rights, building on recognition of the international/ 
transnational character of various sources of instability in the region (e.g. Boko Haram, 
piracy, drugs trade). Joint and concerted actions with other embassies (and donors) in the 
region are considered where possible, thereby making use of available central funds. This has 
resulted in (albeit modest) support to a number of initiatives that have given substance to 
this approach.      
 
GHANA 
The Multi-Annual Strategic Plan (MASP) 2014-2017 is grounded in the recognition that 
Ghana’s status as lower middle income country and consistent economic growth in recent 
years will allow The Netherlands to build and strengthen its trade and investment agenda for 
the country.33 The projection is that development funds for Ghana will be phased out by 
                                                          
31
 ‘Approche Communal pour le Marché Agricole au Benin’, presentation by IDFC, September 2015 
[undisclosed document].   
32
 ‘Trade Policies on Agricultural Products: opportunities and constraints’, Presentation at the 
Borderless Conference, May 2015: 
http://borderlesswa.com/sites/default/files/ba2015/ppt/panel1/Trade%20Policies%20on%20Agricultu
ral%20Products_Borderless%20ACMA.pdf 
33
 NL MFA (2014), Multi-Annual Strategic Plan 2014-2017 - Ghana: 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/rapporten/2014/02/05/meerjarige-
strategische-plannen-mjsp-2014-2017/ghana-multi-annual-strategic-plan-2014-2017.pdf. 
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2020. In that sense the current strategic framework  very much continues on the path chosen 
with the launch of the MASP for the period 2012-2015.34 
However, whereas in the previous MASP the embassy still indicated that the bilateral 
relationship with Ghana builds heavily on development assistance for its three spearheads – 
water, agricultural modernization and sexual and reproductive health and rights – in the 
current MASP the Embassy points out that it has shifted even more to private sector driven 
growth particularly focusing on sectors where The Netherlands has particular comparative 
advantages (e.g. expertise, networks, business opportunities) beyond financial means and 
which are relevant for Ghana’s development, such as in water, health and agriculture. In 2012 
the Embassy finalized its programmes that were implemented under its budget support and 
public-sector oriented policies.  
The current MASP emphasizes the strategic position of Ghana as regional hub for business 
and trade, and its critical role in the provision of regional stability. Based on this, the Embassy 
indicates that it is well positioned to support initiatives that have regional impact and include 
the other countries that are covered by the Embassy – Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone and 
Togo – particularly in the area of trade promotion, in agriculture and food security 
programmes and through the provision of (regional trade) services to Dutch businesses that 
have ambitions beyond Ghana only. An example of a regional initiative supported by the 
Dutch Embassy in Ghana is the West African Port Development Partnership (See Box 4.3). 
Although it seeks to expand its regional (trade) service delivery throughout the countries that 
this Embassy covers, it is indicated that in the case of Côte d’Ivoire and Togo service provision 
has so far been limited to consular and migration affairs and the maintenance of a relevant 
network and knowledge base for trade requests.  
 
Box 4.3: West African Port Development Partnership35 
Launched in 2013, the West African Port Development Partnership is a collaboration between the 
Dutch Embassy in Accra and a group of Dutch businesses and knowledge institutes that operate in the 
area of port development. The programme ended in 2015 and is followed-up by the African Corridors 
platform initiative (See also Box 4.5). 
The initiative builds on the recognition that ports play a critical role in both the development of 
markets and economies of countries as well as the broader West African region but that West African 
ports at the same time increasingly face (capacity) pressures.  
The PDP aims to support port development in the region by providing knowledge and expertise as part 
of a comprehensive and sustainable approach towards port development in three critical areas: 
management, infrastructure & development and transport & logistics. Activities that are undertaken as 
part of this initiative include high-level meetings, on the job training, business-to-business 
collaboration and company presentations.    
The initiative is part of the broader Port Development Partnership (PDP) Africa-Netherlands and is 
coordinated by the Netherlands-African Business Council (NABC). As the Partnership was founded 
thanks to support of the Dutch Embassy in Accra, the initial activities of this Partnership therefore 
focus on ports in West Africa in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia and Togo.  
 
In the MASP it is announced that after years of political instability the head office of the 
African Development Bank (AfDB) will move back to Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, as has been 
                                                          
34
 NL MFA (2011), Multi-Annual Strategic Plan 2012-2015 – Ghana: 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/jaarplannen/2012/02/15/meerjarige
-strategische-plannen-ghana/meerjarige-strategische-plannen-ghana.pdf 
35
 Port Development Partnership Africa – Netherlands: http://portdevelopmentafrica.com/en 
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effectuated in 2014. It is further mentioned that the Dutch representative at the AfDB is to be 
supported from Accra.36 This return is presented by the Embassy as an opportunity to 
enhance its regional presence as well as to strengthen the Dutch network and knowledge 
base for regional business opportunities. It is stressed that this will require the Embassy to 
carefully consider how to best promote the Dutch interests (government, businesses and 
others) at the African Development Bank.    
In line with the strategic positon of Ghana as a regional hub for business and trade, the 
Embassy identifies (extra-)regional trade facilitation and promotion as a key policy objective 
in the area of agriculture and food security. This seems to apply to not only intra-regional 
trade but also extra-regional trade, considering the particular focus of the Embassy on cocoa, 
palm oil and vegetables as commodities for which there are also significant Dutch interests. 
In the case of cocoa, in collaboration with other Embassies in the region, the Embassy in 
Accra encourages its implementing partners to connect with other cocoa producing countries 
in West Africa. The Embassy plans to expand its regional service delivery including for Dutch 
businesses to support them in their regional objectives. It further indicates to actively 
collaborate with Ghanaian trade associations and the national government to address trade 
facilitation issues such as customs operations and standardization and classification 
procedures. 
Peace and security is presented as another area where the Embassy applies a regional focus, 
for example through the support it provides to the Marine Trade Sharing Information Centre 
which is particularly involved in addressing the regional impact of piracy, for example through 
data collection and analysis.   
 
MALI 
Through the Multi-Annual Strategic Plan (MASP) 2014-2017 for Mali the Embassy indicates 
that its work in recent years has been particularly dominated by a series of events since early 
2012 that have severely aggravated the level of insecurity and instability in the country.37 This 
made a significant revision of the previous ‘Meerjaren Strategisch Plan’ for the period 2012-
2015 necessary, although enhancing resilience and countering exclusion were already 
identified as the main elements and the structural development goals that were set at the 
time are still considered to be valid – security & rule of law, sexual and reproductive health 
and rights and water management & food security.38     
This has forced the Embassy to rapidly adjust its development programme in the transition 
period until the elections and the installation of a new democratic government. Where 
possible and thanks to coordination with other donors, the Embassy has attempted to 
continue to work on structural (development) issues, like support to macro-economic and 
budgetary stability. Interventions were mainly undertaken in the area of security & rule of 
law, such as support to political and civil dialogue, and to the protection of human rights and 
religious tolerance. In other areas the Embassy was forced to take a pragmatic stance, by 
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 It is not clear how the relatively recent decision to upgrade the Dutch consulate in Abidjan to full 
Embassy will affect this arrangement. 
37
 NL MFA (2014), Multi-Annual Strategic Plan 2014-2017: Mali: 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/rapporten/2014/02/05/meerjarige-
strategische-plannen-mjsp-2014-2017/mali-multi-annual-strategic-plan-2014-2017.pdf 
38
 NL MFA (2011), Het Meerjaren Strategisch Plan. Ambassade van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in 
Bamako, Mali: 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/jaarplannen/2012/02/15/meerjarige
-strategische-plannen-mali/meerjarige-strategische-plannen-mali.pdf 
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focusing on the facilitation of a minimum level of basic services (health, education, 
agriculture) at the local level.  
It is mentioned that the end of the transition period has allowed the Embassy to resume 
programming in its three priority areas – security & rule of law, sexual and reproductive 
health and rights, and water management & food security. In the area of security & rule of 
law, although deemed much needed, it is indicated that regional institutional conditions have 
not allowed for designing and implementing a coherent regional approach in order to tackle 
transnational security issues such as cross-border crime and jihadism.  
In the area of water management & food security, it is mentioned that the Embassy will also 
be involved in initiatives that aim to address water resource management at the regional 
level. An example of a major regional initiative funded by the Embassy is the PCA-GIRE 
programme, an integrated water resource management programme focusing on the Niger 
River Basin (See Box 4.4).  
 
Box 4.4: Programme Conjoint d’Appui (PCA) – Gestion Intégrée des Resources en Eau 
(GIRE)39 
Launched in 2015, the ‘Programme Conjoint d’Appui (PCA) – Gestion Intégrée des Resources en Eau 
(GIRE)’ is an initiative funded by The Netherlands in conjunction with Sweden aimed at supporting the 
implementation of the National Action Plan for Integrated Management of Water Resources (‘Plan 
d’Action de Gestion Intégrée des Resources en Eau’, PAGIRE) initiated by the Malinese national 
government in 2008.  
The programme consist of two support pillars each supported by one donor, which were merged to 
create synergies in terms of the programmes’ implementation. While PCA-GIRE as a whole particularly 
targets the Niger river basin in Mali, the support pillar which is funded by The Netherlands – ‘Renforcer 
la Gestion Intégrée des Ressources en Eau au Mali’ – includes a cross-border component encompassing 
Guinee as well, as to provide a more comprehensive approach to the water management challenges 
experienced in Mali. This support pillar is designed to last until 2019. The support pillar funded by 
Sweden – ‘Projet d’Appui à l’Amélioration de la Connaissance et de la Gestion des Ressources en Eau’ – 
already started in 2014 and is projected to run until 2016.  
PCA-GIRE is structured around the following objectives: 1) create an enabling environment (financial, 
legislative, political, regulatory) that facilitates the implementation of PAGIRE; 2) build a coordinated, 
transboundary approach aimed at enhancing food security, energy reliability and sustainable water 
management that takes into account the interests of the countries concerned (Mali, Guinee as well as 
Burkina Faso); 3) strengthen knowledge and monitoring to better inform decision-making on water 
management; 4) promote more efficient use of water and land by stakeholders to improve food 
security and raise rural incomes; and 5) ensure the inclusion of cross-cutting issues (gender, 
governance, climate change adaption, capacity building) into sectoral strategies and planning.    
 
As a land-locked country Mali very much depends on its neighbouring countries for the 
supply of (basic) commodities. In the case of trade (facilitation), dealt with under ‘other 
instruments of international cooperation’, it is mentioned that the intention is that this will 
be coordinated as much as possible with the Dutch consul in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso). 
However, apart from joint trade missions in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, it is indicated by 
the Embassy in Bamako that regional trade promotion has received little attention in recent 
years. 
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 Gouvernment du Mali (2016), ‘Fiche descriptive du programme conjoint d'appui à la GIRE (PCA-
GIRE)’ [undisclosed document].  
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SENEGAL  
As Senegal is no longer a partner country for a number of years already, there is – apart from 
possible other development funding streams such as for the private sector instruments – in 
principle no structural development budget available for this country. That also means that 
there is no Multi-Annual Strategic Plan for this country. The Netherlands has been in the 
process of phasing out its bilateral development programme since 2012. In the transition 
phase (2012-2014) the Embassy has particularly provided support to environmental 
conservation, including two regional initiatives. However, it is indicated that this support role 
will be gradually transferred to the European Union’s mission, based in Dakar, Senegal.   
One is through its collaboration with the ‘Organisation pour La Mise en Valeur de Fleuve 
Sénégal’ (OMVS), which dates back to 2006. OMVS is an intergovernmental organization – 
comprising Guinee, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal  – aimed at the sustainable development of the 
Senegal River Basin in the areas of energy, transport/ navigation and agriculture/ food 
security. A particular example of a programme funded by the Embassy is the ‘Projet de 
Gestion Intégrée des Ressources en Eau et de Développement des usages à buts multiples’ 
(PGIRE II), the second stage of a programme that aims to strengthen regional integration and 
cooperation between the four countries in the area of water (resources) management.40 
The second concerns its support for the ‘Partenarait Régional pour la Conservation de la zone 
côtière et Marine en Afrique l’Ouest’ (PCRM). The PCRM is a broad-based partnership that 
aims to provide a common approach to promote conservation and sustainable development 
in the coastal area encompassing Cape Verde, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Mauritania, Senegal and Sierra Leone.41 The partnership is involved in wide range of activities 
to support this overall objective, including capacity building, resource mobilization, policy 
advocacy & harmonization.  
Since the bilateral development programme has come to an end, The Netherlands is 
particularly involved in Senegal through the number of policy instruments it has its disposal 
to support private sector development and through its support to civil society organizations.  
In addition, there a number of other recent/ upcoming activities that initiated and supported 
by the Embassy that target regional integration and cooperation:    
- Planning to finance a feasibility study commissioned by Senegal on the maritime 
linkages between Senegal and Cape Verde, building on an agreement between the 
two countries to enhance trade of goods and services by sea.42  
- Financial support for the creation of a ECOWAS Citizen House, initiated by ENDA/ 
CACID and located in Ziguichor, Senegal. This is a center for information and 
documentation on regional integration and development, serving Senegal, Guinea-
Bissau and The Gambia in particular.43 Planned activities include training workshops 
and capacity building for stakeholders in regional trade and awareness-raising 
campaigns on ECOWAS legal instruments. 44   
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NIGERIA 
As The Netherlands maintains a trade relationship with Nigeria, there is in principle no 
development budget (delegated funds) available for this country. That also means that there 
is no Multi-Annual Strategic Plan for this country.  
In recent years, the bilateral relationship with Nigeria has been primarily shaped by the focus 
on human rights, made possible through the Embassy’s Human Rights Fund. Furthermore, 
representing The Netherlands in one of the Dutch focus countries, the Embassy in Nigeria has 
been particularly involved in efforts aimed at strengthening trade and investment relations 
between The Netherlands and Nigeria and promoting the interests of Dutch businesses, 
amongst others through its various policy instruments for private sector development. 
The Dutch Embassy in Nigeria (potentially) takes  a strategic position in efforts to promote 
regionalism and to apply a regional approach in West Africa from within the region, because 
of the position of Nigeria as economic powerhouse of the region and given the fact that the 
headquarters of ECOWAS is located in the country’s capital Abuja. This has very recently been 
given an impetus through 1) the appointment of a Dutch permanent representative at 
ECOWAS based at the Embassy in Abuja, and 2) the creation of the position of regional 
economic envoy (or ‘regional business manager’) for West Africa who resides in the 
Embassy’s Lagos office. In the case of the former, the emphasis has been put on peace & 
security issues, reflected by the fact that The Netherlands is member of the ECOWAS working 
group for political affairs, peace & security. The Netherlands generally follows the EU line 
with regard to ECOWAS affairs.  
Regarding the latter, being a creation of the Ministry’s International Enterprise Department 
(DIO) – which is part of the Directorate for Foreign Economic Relations – the position of 
regional economic envoy is largely meant to enhance economic diplomacy, in order to 
promote the Dutch business interests in the region. As this is a relatively new position that 
needs time to take further shape, the regional dimension has been largely unaddressed and 
efforts until now have mainly focused on Nigeria only and consisted of looking into private 
sector development initiatives within Nigeria in which Dutch (and international) businesses 
could play a role, for example in transport infrastructure development, the energy sector and 
the poultry sector.  
 
OTHER BILATERAL ACTORS: NETHERLANDS AFRICAN BUSINESS COUNCIL (NABC) 
 
Box 4.5:  Netherlands African Business Council (NABC) in West Africa45 
The role of the Netherlands African Business Council (NABC) is to foster the trade and investment 
dialogue between the Netherlands and West African countries. NABC uses both a regional and national 
approach to improve trade and business relations between the Netherlands and African countries. 
With regard to West Africa, NABC especially focuses on overcoming barriers and enhancing trade and 
investment relations. Additionally, NABC is working towards increased public-private sector 
cooperation. 
Trade 
Trade dominates the business relations between the Netherlands and West African countries. From 
NABC’s experiences in organising trade missions towards countries (e.g. Ghana, Mali, Burkina Faso, 
Côte d’Ivoire and other countries), trade related to the agribusiness sector is apparent. Trade from 
West Africa to the Netherlands comprises commodities, cocoa, (sesame) seeds, cashew, and fruits. 
Fertilizers, agri-machinery, and onions travel from the Netherlands to West African countries, mostly 
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the countries along the coast. In addition, Dutch companies active in the transport & logistics sector 
also do business in West Africa, in both landlocked and coastal countries. From NABC’s experiences, 
Dutch companies export machinery, trucks, specialised digging, dredging and transport equipment to 
West Africa. Lastly, energy related business are increasingly interested in doing business in West 
Africa, particularly renewable energy. 
Agribusiness 
In the GhanaVeg program NABC works together with the Dutch Embassy Ghana, the Centre for 
Development Innovation of the Wageningen University and the IFTC. The GhanaVeg program focuses 
on development of the Ghanaian vegetable sector.  In this program, NABC is responsible for linking 
Dutch horticulture companies to Ghanaian business partners through personal business support and 
the organization of four trade missions to and from Ghana, 2 business seminars and press releases. 
This has resulted in over 15 Dutch companies traveling to Ghana in the last two years, and more than 
five GhanaVeg subsidized projects being developed with Dutch input from the seed, fertilizer, logistics 
& trade sectors. 
Port Development – African Corridors 
The Ports Development Partnership (PDP) aims to put the expertise of the Dutch ports sector at the 
disposal of West African ports. West African ports find themselves operating in an increasingly 
complex environment influenced by factors like sustainability, safety and economies of scale. With the 
Port Development Partnership NABC united a consortium of Dutch companies and organisations active 
in sectors directly related to port development, focusing at: 1) Port management; 2) Infrastructure & 
development; and 3) Transport & logistics. The PDP program ended in 2015.    
As a follow-up, NABC is building on the insights in both opportunities and barriers of the PDP program 
by creating a African Corridors platform, which unites the Dutch companies active/ interested in 
further development of corridors. In connecting landlocked countries like Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and 
the hinterland of other West African countries with ports on the West African coast (from Senegal to 
Nigeria), the Dutch private sector has expertise, knowledge and the right equipment in developing 
these corridors and contribute to regional integration and trade.  
NABC’s activities with regard to West Africa:  
- Trade missions (last 3 years): Incoming: Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and outgoing: 
Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria. 
- Informational sessions on doing business in the Netherlands, Dutch economic instrument exploration 
to the local public and private sector in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. 
- Business seminar (West African Business Seminar) and country/ sector specific knowledge sessions. 
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SECTION 5: INVENTORY OF EXISTING (POLICY) INITIATIVES 
Paul Lange 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INITIATIVES BY REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN WEST AFRICA 
 
This sub-section summarizes some of the major initiatives aimed at regional integration taken 
by regional organizations in West Africa, with an emphasis on economic integration. The 
main focus is on ECOWAS and UEMOA as these are generally recognized as the two key 
regional organizations in West Africa who have moved the integration agenda in West Africa 
forward (See Figure 5.1). In recent years, there have been a very large number of initiatives 
taken by ECOWAS and UEMOA across a wide range of thematic areas. This section zooms in 
on some major (policy) initiatives and programmes by ECOWAS and UEMOA in four key areas 
of economic integration: trade, agriculture, industrial development and infrastructure. When 
discussing these initiatives, this section particularly attempts to highlight some of the main 
challenges brought forward by the literature that account for the (potential) gap between 
agreement and the insufficient implementation and limited progress that many of these 
initiatives have generally encountered.  
This sub-section concludes with highlighting the role of the sub-regional institution 
Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (‘Comité permanent Inter-
Etats de Lutte contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel’, CILSS). In addition to ECOWAS and UEMOA, 
CILSS is considered to be among the frontrunners in West Africa in terms of driving regional 
integration and plays a key role in the (technical) implementation of ECOWAS and UEMOA 
initiatives, particularly in the area of agriculture & food security.  
Section conclusions: 
- ECOWAS and UEMOA are generally recognized as the two key regional 
organizations in West Africa that have moved the integration agenda in West 
Africa forward. 
- Both have developed many initiatives in a wide range of sectors and areas to 
further regional (economic) integration and cooperation, including around trade, 
agriculture, industrial development and infrastructure.   
- Looking at these particular initiatives, the overall level of progress on regional 
integration in West Africa has been below expectations. The gap between regional 
agreement and implementation/ enforcement on the ground is a major concern 
for many of these initiatives. 
- The most engaged bilateral and multilateral development partners around the 
promotion of regional integration in West Africa are the African Development 
Bank; World Bank; European Commission; Germany/ GIZ; United Kingdom/ DfID; 
United States/ USAID; Japan/JICA; The Netherlands, Spain/ AECID and France/ AFD.   
- There is a multitude of (policy) initiatives by a wide range of development partners 
aimed at regional (economic) integration in West Africa. Many of these initiatives 
target trade promotion & facilitation, what appears to be an important dimension 
of regional integration for several development partners. In addition, many of 
these initiatives build on agriculture & food security as a major area of attention.  
- Despite the rise of institutional frameworks to coordinate their initiatives and 
increasing multi-donor programmes, the engagement of development partners in 
West Africa is still to a large extent fragmented and donor coordination is largely 
regarded as insufficient. 
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Figure 5.1: Map indicating ECOWAS and UEMOA member states  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES 
West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) 
The West African Economic and Monetary Union (‘Union Économique et Monetaire Ouest-
Africaine’, UEMOA) was founded in 1994 to promote the economic and monetary integration 
among the Francophone West African countries.46 Its existence can be traced back to the 
creation of the West African Monetary Union (‘Union Monetaire Ouest-Africaine’, UMOA). 
Established in 1962, UMOA was particularly rooted in monetary integration and cooperation 
between the West African Francophone countries that share the West African CFA franc as 
common currency. Many of the UEMOA members have been member of a regional 
organization since their independence and therefore share a history of regionalism.  
The creation of UEMOA was a result of the need felt by its member states to reinforce and 
complement its advancement in the area of monetary affairs with stronger economic 
integration and cooperation, including the creation of a customs union. Its focus on economic 
integration is reflected in its 1994 founding Treaty that was grounded in the following five 
broad objectives: 1) greater economic competitiveness; 2) convergence of macroeconomic 
policies and indicators; 3) creation of common market; 4) coordination of sectorial policies; 
and 5) harmonization of fiscal policies. The need to strengthen economic integration and 
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cooperation among its members has been reiterated by UEMOA in subsequent strategic 
policy frameworks including the more recent ones, such as its Strategic Plan 2011-2020 and 
its Vision 2020.     
It has been generally concluded that UEMOA since its establishment has fared relatively well, 
for example in terms of progress made regarding the establishment of a free trade area, the 
establishment of macro-economic convergence criteria, and monetary integration thanks to 
its historical legacy of a common currency.47 It has gone through a significant institutional 
transformation, through the establishment of a number of Community institutions and the 
creation of specialized institutions such as the Central Bank of West African States (‘Banque 
Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest’, BCEAO) and the West African Development Bank 
(‘Banque Ouest Africaine de Développement’, BOAD). It also initiated a number of common 
general and sectoral policies and programmes in a wide range of thematic areas (e.g. 
agriculture, industrial development, energy, environment) and in some cases at an earlier 
stage than ECOWAS, for example in the case of its agricultural policy (‘Politique Agricole de 
l’UEMOA’, PAU), industrial policy (‘Politique Industrielle Commune’, PIC) and its common 
external tariff. Notwithstanding these achievements, it is however indicated that its successes 
in terms of economic integration compare unfavorably with the monetary dimension.48 
Furthermore, it is concluded that many of the policies it has introduced in the course of the 
years are hampered by implementation challenges, for example in the area of the free 
movement of people.49 
 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
Regional integration is at the heart of the existence of the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), as set forth in its founding Treaty of 1975. From the very beginning 
as laid down in its founding objectives, the Community has put major emphasis on 
strengthening economic integration and cooperation, as a means to promote accelerated and 
sustained economic development of its Member States. In order to give the integration 
process real meaning, a key ECOWAS objective from the start has been to establish a West-
African-wide customs union, through creating a free-trade zone among the ECOWAS member 
countries and developing a common external tariff for trade with non-member countries. 
Since the 1994 revised Treaty the focus of the Community has gone well beyond economic 
matters, most notably in terms of cooperation around political, legal and security issues.  
 
Notwithstanding this gradual broadening of its scope , the focus on economic integration has 
been to a large extent preserved by ECOWAS, demonstrated by its central role in subsequent 
ECOWAS general regional development strategies, including the most recent ones. In 2007, 
ECOWAS launched its Vision 202050, its current main regional development strategy in which 
it aims to move from a ‘ECOWAS of states’ to a ‘ECOWAS of people’. In this document, 
ECOWAS reaffirmed its commitment to improve the West African integration process and to 
enhance its effectiveness, in which economic (and monetary) integration is one of the 
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building blocks. In 2010 ECOWAS issued its Regional Strategic Plan 2011-2015.51 It identified 
deepening socio-economic (and monetary) integration as one of its strategic priorities and 
referred to it as the main mission of the ECOWAS institutions, needed in order to raise the 
living standards of its people. In 2013, ECOWAS adopted the Community Development 
Programme (CDP)52 which has been set up to implement its Vision 2020 and to draw up a 
coherent programme of activities needed to realize this vision. Implementation of the CDP is 
planned for 2014-2018 and builds on four priority areas, including the ‘consolidation of 
economic integration’.  
 
Since its establishment there have been numerous ECOWAS initiatives aimed at moving the 
regional integration process forward.53 The institutional arrangements of ECOWAS have 
evolved significantly, through erecting a Community institutional architecture and the 
establishment of several specialized sub-agencies, such as the West African Health 
Organization (WAHO) and the West African Monetary Institute (WAMI). In 2007 the ECOWAS 
Secretariat was restructured into a Commission. It has set up and articulated various common 
policies and programmes in all sectors mentioned in the revised 1994 Treaty, such as in 
agriculture, industry, mining, education and legal matters.  
 
As a result, there are a number of areas in which ECOWAS has made significant headway and 
in which it is regarded a frontrunner on the African continent, for example in the area of free 
movement of people, regional peace & security issues and political governance.54 However, 
despite the fact that its founding objectives were essentially economic, real progress in terms 
of regional economic integration has generally been slow.55 Lack of funding, capacity and 
(political) will in the Member States are generally put forward as the main reasons for the 
limited advancement in this dimension of integration.  
 
 
TRADE 
UEMOA Customs Union56 
The UEMOA customs union was put in place in two steps. With regard to an internal free 
trade area, its member countries decided in 1996 to remove tariffs on intraregional trade, 
starting with unprocessed goods of local origin and traditional handicraft products. The 
breakdown of tariffs on trade in industrial products – subject to certain eligibility criteria – 
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were phased out over four years. Alongside tariff barriers, quantitative restrictions on 
intraregional trade for these products were also gradually eliminated.   
 
Concerning the common external tariff, its introduction was already arranged for in its 1994 
founding Treaty. The CET establishment benefited greatly from the fact that the differences 
in tariffs were already minor, as all of the member countries belonged to the West African 
Economic Community (‘Communauté Economique de l’Afrique Ouest’, CEAO) which had a 
Community Regional Tax, the predecessor of the UEMOA CET. Amongst others things, the 
UEMOA CET provided for the harmonization of custom duty through a four-band tariff 
structure based on a product classification, ranging from a 0% tariff rate for basic social 
goods, to a 20% tariff rate for finished consumption goods. To address the impact of the 
UEMOA CET in terms of changing market circumstances and the interests of local producers, 
its establishment was complemented by a number of accompanying measures, including 
common safeguard measures. One is the Decreasing Protection Tax (‘Taxe Dégressive de 
Protection’, DTP) which is a community mechanism that can be applied at the national level 
to provide protection to certain products and industries, in the case of UEMOA for agro-
industrial products in particular.  
 
Although the creation of the UEMOA customs union has been generally considered to be 
successful – for example in terms of the gradual increase of products and businesses that 
were approved for duty exemption – it is at the same time concluded that the persistence of 
non-tariff barriers and administrative weaknesses in the region has hampered its 
implementation.57 Most non-tariff barriers result from (ad hoc) national trade regulations 
that conflict with the UEMOA trade rules. In addition, it was mentioned that despite their 
common trade regime, after their introduction member states have continued to dispute on 
the tariff rates.58  
 
ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme (ETLS)59 
The ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme (ETLS) is the main ECOWAS framework for creating 
a free trade area by eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers (such as customs duties, quotas 
and prohibitions) among the ECOWAS countries. It is an important pillar of its aim to establish 
a common market, as already included in the 1975 ECOWAS founding Treaty. It particularly 
aims to encourage entrepreneurial development in the region; increase intraregional trade 
and boost economic activity; enhance West African competitiveness on the global market; 
and improve GDP of the ECOWAS member states, thus better welfare for citizens.  
 
Although the Scheme was already adopted in 1979, and its implementation should have 
started the same year, it only came into force in 1990. The Scheme covers three groups of 
products: unprocessed goods, traditional handicraft products and industrial products. 
Under the ETLS only goods that adhere to a number of conditions – for example the ECOWAS 
Rules of Origin as only products that originate within the region qualify – are allowed to move 
duty-free and quota-free across the region, whereby approval is required on a product-to-
product and enterprise-to-enterprise basis. While the start of the implementation period 
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resulted in an immediate and full liberalization of trade in unprocessed goods and traditional 
handicrafts, there was planned for a phased liberalization for trade in industrial products in a 
maximum period of ten years, according to the level of economic strength of three groups of 
ECOWAS member countries (See Figure 5.2). Trade liberalization for these products was to be 
implemented alongside the gradual establishment of a Common External Tariff (CET) to fully 
realize the aim of a customs union.  
 
However, despite the agreed implementation schedule, total elimination of all trade barriers 
did not happen in the course of the 10-year time period and has still not yet fully 
materialized. There has been a number of attempts to speed up implementation of the ETLS. 
As one of the more recent efforts, during the ECOWAS Summit of July 2013 the so-called 
Authority of Heads of State and Government (AHOSG) agreed on a roadmap which provided 
for a set of initiatives to fast-track ETLS implementation, including the establishment of a 
monitoring mechanism and computerization of the approval process.   
Figure 5.2: Implementation of ETLS for industrial products  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A large number of reasons have been brought forward to account for the poor 
implementation of the ETLS to date. Examples include member states’ (in)actions that 
impede or even go against the trade liberalization provisions (e.g. the imposition of periodic 
export bans and levying of taxes on products of ECOWAS origin), ongoing bureaucratic 
bottlenecks for example in the form of approval delays, the persistence of both non-tariff 
(e.g. interstate differences in standards and weights, non-mutual recognition of quality 
certificates issues by national structures) and tariff barriers (e.g. different kinds of taxes and 
fees), lack of awareness of ETLS rules and procedures among a wide range of stakeholders,  
and the incidence of corruption among law enforcement agents at borders (e.g. extortions, 
intimidation and harassment).60  
 
ECOWAS Common External Tariff (CET)61 
A second important pillar in the establishment of a customs union by ECOWAS is the setting 
of a common external tariff. In 2006, the ECOWAS member states decided to use the four-
band tariff structure of the UEMOA Common External Tariff that had already been in use 
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since 2000 and approved its extension to cover the whole ECOWAS region. Negotiations 
between the UEMOA and non-UEMOA countries that followed particularly revolved around a 
fifth tariff band and the designation of agricultural products in particular, as to underline the 
importance of agriculture for the ECOWAS region. In October 2013 the member countries 
authorized the final adoption of the ECOWAS CET. The member countries reached agreement 
on a five-band structure, with more than half of the agricultural tariff lines distributed in the 
two highest bands (See Figure 5.3 and 5.4).  
Figure 5.3: Structure of the ECOWAS CET 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Distribution of agricultural tariff lines between the five bands  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alongside the adoption of the CET, the member states also agreed on a number of 
supplementary protection or safeguard measures available for ECOWAS countries during a 
transition period to help adjust to the new tariff structure (also because many ECOWAS 
countries are heavily reliant on import taxes as a source of income) and to deal with the 
market volatility of agricultural products in particular, such as the Import Adjustment Tax and 
the Complementary Protection Tax. It is indicated that implementation and enforcement of 
these measures may become very challenging because it will involve careful monitoring of 
prices and volumes and efficient decision-making to ensure their effectiveness.62   
The CET was to become operational on January 1, 2015. However, the actual implementation 
date has varied between the member countries and many of them have missed the deadline 
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due to delayed national ratification and the required training and capacity building of 
customs officials. Furthermore, it is indicated that CET implementation may also be 
challenged and vary among member states because of possible violations of the states’ WTO 
commitments due to incongruencies between their so-called bound tariffs and the CET rates. 
At the time of their accession to the WTO, each member state has individually negotiated 
their bound tariffs, with the result that some have relatively low bound tariffs compared to 
the CET tariff bands while other member states work with relatively higher tariff rates at the 
WTO.63   
 
AGRICULTURE 
 
UEMOA Common Agricultural Policy (PAU)64 
The UEMOA Common Agricultural Policy (‘Politique Agricole de l’UEMOA’, PAU) was initiated 
in 2001, and predates the adoption of ECOWAP by four years. The Policy’s overall aim is to 
contribute to the food security of the population, the economic and social development of its 
Member States and rural poverty reduction. It is built around three axes: 1) improving the 
competitiveness and production of key agricultural value chains – rice, maize, livestock, meat, 
poultry and cotton – and the enabling environment; 2) deepening the common market for 
the agricultural sector and improving the management of shared resources; and 3) 
integrating the agricultural market of the UEMOA countries into the regional and 
international markets.  
There have been a number of activities undertaken to support the implementation of PAU, 
particularly in the first two axes. One is the establishment by UEMOA in 2006 of the Regional 
Agricultural Development Fund (‘Fonds Régional de Développement Agricole’, FRDA) to 
finance UEMOA’s agricultural development through developing agricultural finance systems, 
by supporting capacity building and by promoting regional institutional investments. Another 
is the creation of a Regional Agricultural Information System (‘Systėme d’Information Agricole 
Régionale’, SIAR) to strengthen the availability of statistical information that can help to 
inform the design and implementation of agricultural strategies in the region. In addition, 
there have been efforts to further policy and legislation harmonization, for example around 
seeds & pesticides and veterinary pharmaceuticals.   
The PAU is implemented in parallel to and in coordination with ECOWAP. However, its 
implementation that started in 2002 has taken much longer than originally planned as it has 
been confronted with a number of obstacles. Some of the implementation challenges that 
have been identified are a strong dependence on funding by external development partners 
which is said to have compromised the independence of UEMOA in designing the programme 
and which has affected the speed of implementation; the inadequate implementation at the 
national level of regional harmonization processes - such as with regard to input standards - 
due to lack of financial resources and (human) capacities; the insufficient and ineffective 
consultation with stakeholders, such as farmers’ organizations; the policy incongruence 
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between the PAU mission to promote agricultural growth and the UEMOA Common External 
Tariff that resulted in decreased protection for the agricultural sector through lower tariff 
rates in several member states; and lack of a formal monitoring and evaluation system that 
limits the ability to measure the impact and to make adjustments when needed.   
 
ECOWAS Agricultural Policy (ECOWAP)65 
In order to develop an integrated and region-wide approach to agricultural development as 
to underline the importance of agriculture for West Africa, ECOWAS adopted in 2005 its 
regional agricultural policy ECOWAP. With its adoption, ECOWAP merged with the existing 
Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) initiated by the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in 2001 as a African-wide approach to 
promote agriculture-led development. West Africa was through ECOWAP the first region in 
Africa that developed a regional approach to the CAADP.  
 
ECOWAP/ CAADP provides a common framework for agricultural development, focusing on 
three key areas: 1) increasing the productivity and competitiveness of West African 
agriculture; 2) implementing a free trade area within West Africa for agricultural goods and 
services; and 3) adopting a common trade regime for agricultural goods and services towards 
countries outside of the ECOWAS region. The overall objective of ECOWAP/ CAADP is to 
address the fundamental structural and policy problems that obstruct agricultural growth and 
competitiveness in the region. More in particular, the regional policy seeks to achieve the 
following objectives: a) food security for people in the region; b) reducing food dependence 
and achieving food sovereignty; d) involving producers in markets; e) creating jobs with 
guaranteed incomes in order to improve living conditions and services in rural areas; f) 
intensifying production systems in a sustainable manner; g) reducing the vulnerability of 
West African economies by limiting factors of instability and regional insecurity; h) adopting 
appropriate funding mechanisms. 
 
ECOWAP/ CAADP builds on three particular components: 1) investment programs at the 
national (National Agricultural Investment Plan, NAIP) and the regional level (Regional 
Agricultural Investment Plan, RAIP) backing the national/ regional sector-wide approach to 
agricultural development (‘Compacts’) developed as part of the CAADP framework; 2) 
introducing a complementary set of policy and regulatory reforms that enable 
implementation, for example in the area of taxation and investment policies; and 3) setting 
up the institutional framework required to implement the regional policy framework, 
including the creation of the ECOWAS Development Fund (ECOWADF) and the Regional 
Agency for Food and Agriculture. 
 
Although agreement took some time after the adoption of ECOWAP – apart from Guinea- 
Bissau who reached agreement in 2011, the national compacts of all ECOWAS countries and 
the regional compact were signed in 2009 – the ECOWAS region is in terms of the ECOWAP/ 
CAADP process ahead of other regions on the continent. However, the implementation 
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process has been ongoing for a number of years. Some of the (potential) challenges to 
implementation that have been raised are the insufficient buy-in of both signatory 
stakeholders to the Compact (e.g. farmers’ organizations, donors) as well as non-signatory 
stakeholders (e.g. emerging economies such as China, Brazil and India that increasingly play 
an important role with regard to agricultural development in West Africa); lack of policy 
constancy needed to effectuate broad-based and significant agricultural transformation; 
inadequate alignment of the regional component with the national component of ECOWAP/ 
CAADP and with incentives/ interests of the many stakeholders involved to ensure coherence 
and coordination of efforts; and  the trade-off between financing and ownership of efforts as 
many of the programmes undertaken within the framework of ECOWAP/ CAADP are to a 
large extent funded by external actors.66    
 
In 2015 ECOWAS organized the ECOWAP+10 Conference to take stock of 10 years of 
implementation and to examine perspectives for the future. Some of the implementation 
challenges raised earlier were confirmed at this occasion. It was generally agreed that 
ECOWAP continues to be “a patchwork of embryonic donor-driven programmes” as it has 
suffered from a lack of (financial) resources and leadership within ECOWAS and has been 
undermined by uneven implementation and inconsistent enforcement.67  
 
 
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
UEMOA Common Industrial Policy (PIC)68 
The Common Industrial Policy (‘Politique Industrielle Commune’, PIC) was created in 1999 to 
enhance industrial development in the UEMOA region. It builds on the following six focus 
areas: 1) development of structures and programmes aimed at quality promotion; 2) 
upgrading of businesses and their enabling environment; 3) promotion of information 
networks; 4) promotion of investments and exports; 5) development of SMEs/ SMIs; and 6) 
strengthening of consultation processes at the regional level.   
 
One of the few (visible) concrete initiatives taken within the PIC framework is the West Africa 
Quality Programme (WAQM)69, set up in 2001 and implemented by the United Nations 
Industrial Development Programme (UNIDO). This programme aimed at improving the 
(regional) quality infrastructure in the UEMOA region and promoting a regional approach 
towards metrology, accreditation and standardization. When the programme provisionally 
came to an end in 2005, it had resulted in the creation of a Regional Coordination Committee 
on Quality, and three permanent regional structures, namely the West African Accreditation 
System, the Regional Secretariat of Standardization, Certification and Quality Promotion, and 
the West African Secretariat for Metrology. These practical achievements in this initial phase 
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led to the continuation of the programme that is still ongoing and currently covers the whole 
ECOWAS region.    
 
Another initiative is the Restructuring and Upgrading Programme (‘Programme de 
Restructuration et de Mise à Niveau’, PRMN)70 that was introduced in 2006. The programme 
focused on reviving industrial production, promoting investment and employment and 
strengthening the industries’ competiveness at the regional and international level. More in 
particular, the programme aimed at strengthening the capacity of business to implement 
technological change according to the demands of regional and international markets, and 
building a supportive environment capable of providing these businesses with the skills and 
capacities to become more competitive. Although the pilot phase of the programme (2007-
2012) was generally considered to be rather successful in terms of its efficiency and impact, 
some of the challenges that were identified related to the lack of consideration of business 
constraints – (unfair) competition from imports, particularly agri-business products, the weak 
transport infrastructure, the lack of access to certain industrial raw materials – over-
centralization of the programme management at the regional level and insufficient 
integration of existing business support structures at the national level.  
 
West African Common Industrial Policy (WACIP)71 
In an effort to promote industrial development in the West African region, ECOWAS adopted 
in 2010 the West African Common Industrial Policy (WACIP). The vision of the Policy is to 
“maintain a solid industrial structure, which is globally competitive, environment-friendly and 
capable of significantly improving the living standards of the people by 2030.”72 It is 
envisioned that WACIP will be implemented over a 20-year time period, and that measures 
will be taken to promote alignment with other sector policies such as ECOWAP and 
comprehensive trade policy frameworks like CET and ETLS.   
The Policy aims to diversify and broaden the region’s industrial base and has set a number of 
quantitative targets that relate to raising the share of West African manufacturing industry in 
raw material processing, regional GDP, in intraregional trade and in the volume of exports to 
the world market. A cross-cutting objective of the Policy is also to use industrial development 
as a means to further increase the level of intraregional trade within the ECOWAS region.  
Implementation of the Policy is divided into ten programmes that together aim to provide for 
a coherent approach towards industrial development in the region: 1) development of micro-
enterprises, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises/Industries (SMEs/ SMIs) and major 
industries; 2) industrial research and development programme (IR&D); 3) development of 
regional intellectual property rights (IPRs); 4) development of regional financing;  
5) development of a Business Opportunity Information Management System (ECO-BIZ);  
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6) creation of the regional industrial partnership network; 7) infrastructure development;  
8) Standardization, Quality Assurance, Accreditation and Metrology Programme (SQAM);  
9) Managerial capacity and skills development programme; and 10) industry restructuring 
and rehabilitation programme.  
Since its adoption, there have been a number of initiatives to take the implementation of 
WACIP forward, including sensitization workshops, identification of support assessments and 
capacity development/ skills development programmes.73 The Standardization, Quality 
assurance, Accreditation and Metrology (SQAM) programme has been mentioned as an area 
where concrete results have been achieved, particular in terms of capacity building and 
harmonization, by building on progress made by the West Africa Quality Programme (WAQP). 
At the same time it is indicated that overall programme implementation has been very 
limited as the other nine programmes were not yet operational. This has been attributed to a 
lack of disincentives within the framework of WACIP to prevent non-compliance by ECOWAS 
member states. WACIP also does not provide protection mechanisms that allow local 
industries to develop. For example, it has been indicated that WACIP does not prevent 
member countries to export raw material without prior local processing, driven by 
suppressive customs tariffs.74 Furthermore, it has also been brought forward that 
implementation of national industrial policies developed within the framework of WACIP has 
been inefficient and has not (yet) produced the desired results – for example in terms of 
increasing value added exports – or even counterproductive outcomes such as competing 
production facilities.75  
 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
UEMOA Road Infrastructure and Transport Programme (PACITR)76 
The UEMOA Road Infrastructure and Transport Community Action Programme (‘Programme 
d‘Actions Communautaires des Infrastructures et de Transports Routiers’, PACITR) was 
adopted in 2001 and was to cover a ten-year period. It has four general objectives: 1) to 
ensure convergence of national policies and regional coordination of road sector actions; 2) 
to improve competitiveness of UEMOA member States’ economies through the free 
movement of goods and services and the reduction of road transport costs; 3) to alleviate 
poverty;  and 4) to reduce the social costs of road insecurity.  
 
PACITR further builds on the following components: 1) interstate road infrastructure, 
involving periodic maintenance and rehabilitation of asphalted roads, development and 
asphalting of missing road links and engineering works particularly between the region’s 
capital cities; 2) trans-border rural road pilot programme; 3) facilitation of interstate road 
transportation and transit, focusing on the harmonization of procedures and regulations, 
establishing juxtaposed border checkpoints and setting up an observatory that monitors and 
redresses abnormal practices on interstate roads; and 4) road safety. Figure 5.5 provides a 
map indicating the planned road infrastructure projects within the framework of PACITR.   
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Although according to official planning PACITR was due to expire in 2010, it was indicated in a 
2013 UEMOA evaluation report that implementation was still ongoing.77 
Figure 5.5: PACITR planned road infrastructure projects  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ECOWAS infrastructure initiatives78 
In terms of infrastructure, ECOWAS has been working so far mainly in three key areas: 
transport, telecommunications and energy. There is a series of ongoing multi-country and 
regional projects and programmes that further infrastructural development in West Africa. 
These initiatives are to a large extent undertaken within the framework of the Programme for 
Infrastructure Development (PIDA). PIDA serves as an African-wide strategic framework for 
both continental and regional infrastructural development in energy, transport, information 
& communication technology and cross-border water resources, and is developed in 2012 by 
the African Union, the African Development Bank and NEPAD. ECOWAS was selected as lead 
regional economic community for the implementation of a number of infrastructural projects 
that were identified as part of the first round of PIDA priority projects (2012-2020) in West 
Africa (See Table 5.1).  
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Table 5.1: List of PIDA projects in West Africa  
source: AfDB/ AU/ NEPAD, 2012 
 
  
Project Description 
Costs 
(US$ millions) 
Countries 
Sambagalou 
128 MW of hydropower capacity, 
930 km from the mouth of the 
Gambia River to supply Senegal, 
Guinea, Guinea Bissau and Gambia 
300 Senegal, OMVG 
West Africa Power 
Transmission Corridor 
2,000 km line along the coast 
connecting with the existing 
Ghana–Nigeria line with a capacity 
of 1,000 MW 
1,200 
Guinea, Guinea 
Bissau, Gambia, Sierra 
Leone, Liberia,  
Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana 
 
Kaleta 
 
Hydropower generation of 117 
MW 
179 Guinea – OMVG 
Nigeria–Algeria 
Pipeline 
4,100 km gas pipeline from Warri 
to Hassi R’Mel in Algeria for export 
to Europe 
NA Nigeria, Niger, Algeria 
 
Abidjan-Lagos 
Coastal Corridor 
 
Modernization ARTIN corridor in 
West Africa 
290 
Nigeria, Benin, Toga, 
Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire 
 
Dakar-Niamey 
Multimodal Corridor 
 
Modernization ARTIN corridor in 
West Africa  
590 
Senegal, Mali, 
Burkina Faso, Niger 
Praia-Dakar-Abidjan 
Multimodal Corridor 
Marine transport improvement; 
maritime service creation 
between island and mainland;  
modern information system that 
links the maritime service with 
ports and road corridor in the 
Dakar-Abidjan Corridor; 
modernization ARTIN corridor  
150 
Cape Verde, Senegal, 
Gambia, Guinea 
Bissau, Guinea, 
Sierra Leone, Liberia, 
Côte d’Ivoire 
 
Abidjan-
Ouagadougou/ 
Bamako 
 
Modernization/ rehabilitation 
multimodal corridor  
540 
Côte d’Ivoire, 
Burkina Faso, Mali 
 
West Africa Hub Port 
and Rail Programme 
 
Regional hub port and rail linkage 
master plan; port expansion 
2,140 ECOWAS countries 
West Africa Air 
Transport 
Transport service level increase 
 
420 ECOWAS region 
Fomi 
Hydropower station;  
water supply irrigation and 
regulation of the Niger River (nine 
countries) 
384 Niger River Basin 
 
Gourbassy 
 
Multipurpose dam  NA Senegal River Basin 
Noumbiel 
Multipurpose dam with 
hydropower generation 
NA Volta River Basin 
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In order to come a more comprehensive regional approach towards infrastructure 
development, ECOWAS is in the process of drafting a regional infrastructure development 
master plan targeting energy, transport, cross-border water resources and communication 
technologies.79 
In the area of transport there are projects that mainly involve construction work (‘hard’ 
infrastructure) as well as projects that focus on transport and trade facilitation (‘soft’ 
infrastructure), to address the existence of numerous checkpoints and non-tariff barriers 
following from uncoordinated procedures that guide the movement of goods and persons.   
In the case of the former category, there are many corridor and infrastructure development 
interventions across the region, targeting road transport in particular – the West Africa road 
network is referred to as one of the areas where ECOWAS has made significant progress80 – 
and to a lesser extent railway infrastructure. Examples include the Abidjan – Lagos Corridor 
Highway Development project, the Trans-Gambia transport corridor project and the Dakar – 
Bamako railway line project. Progress in the area of air and water-based transportation is 
particularly to be found in regulatory and institutional reforms.   
With regard to transport and trade facilitation, one of the key ECOWAS initiative is the 
Interstate Road Transport and Transit Facilitation Programme for West Africa (ISRTTFP-WA) 
developed in collaboration with UEMOA. The programme includes the following components: 
1) simplification and harmonization of road transport regulations, procedures and 
documents; 2) establishment of joint border posts along interstate corridors; and  
3) establishment of observatories to identify and analyze abnormal practices which impede 
traffic fluidity on road corridors.81 Another example is the ECOWAS Joint Border Posts 
programme, which involves the construction of and installation of equipment for a number of 
posts across the region. Despite high expectations it is indicated that programme 
implementation has been lacking due to lack of funding and limited availability of capacity 
and knowledge within the member states to assist ECOWAS in carrying out the 
programme.82  
Notwithstanding the large number of infrastructural works and the practical achievements of 
some of these projects, there are a number of factors identified that have obstructed 
effective implementation of transport facilitation programmes, including limited conversion 
of ETLS protocols into national laws and insufficient sensitization with rules and procedures 
which makes that numerous checkpoints and non-tariff barriers continue to exist.83     
 
Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) 
Following the severe drought that hit the Sahel in the 1970s, the Permanent Interstate 
Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (‘Comité permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte contre 
la Sécheresse dans le Sahel’, CILSS) was founded in 1973. It comprises thirteen member 
states including a large number of ECOWAS countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte 
d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo) plus Mauritania 
and Chad.  
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Its mission is to invest in research for food security and the fight against the effects of 
drought and desertification.84 CILSS is involved in a number of activities to achieve this 
mission, including the formulation, harmonization and implementation of (national and 
regional) strategies/ policies/ programmes, capacity building & training, and research & 
analysis, particularly in the areas of food security, fight against desertification, management 
of natural resources, regional market access for agriculture/ food products and  population/ 
demography issues. It has been increasingly recognized as the technical branch responsible 
for implementation for policies initiated by ECOWAS and UEMOA in the area of agriculture/ 
food security, such as within the framework of ECOWAP and PAU.   
CILSS is involved in a number of major regional initiatives. One example is the Regional 
Support Programme  for Market Access (‘Programme Régional d’Appui Accès aux Marchés’, 
PRA/ Accès aux Marchés) that aims to strengthen intraregional trade in agriculture/ food 
products.85 Made possible by the financial support provided by USAID, this programme aims 
to redress (non-)tariff barriers to trade, amongst others, by collecting and disseminating 
(market) information (data on trade flows along corridors; surveys on road harassment), 
facilitating implementation of (regional) trade policies, capacity building to enhance national 
(market) information systems and helping to enhance local marketing and (health) standards 
compliance. Although the programme was already launched in 2005, it is an ongoing CILSS 
initiative.  
A second example is the Regional Support Programme for Pastoralism in the Sahel 
(‘Programme Régional d’Appui du Pastoralisme au Sahel, PRAPS), launched in 2015 and will 
run until 2021.86 CILSS coordinates the programme implementation at the regional level 
under the political leadership of the ECOWAS and UEMOA Commissions. Funded by the 
World Bank, this programme seeks to improve the access to agricultural inputs and services 
for (agro-)pastoralist in the six Sahelian countries Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, 
Senegal and Chad. It builds on four particular pillars: 1) animal health; 2) natural resource 
management; 3) market access; and 4) pastoral crisis management.   
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INITIATIVES BY OTHER DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS  
 
This sub-section discusses the initiatives taken by the international development community 
aimed at supporting regional integration in West Africa. With regard to current efforts, it is 
generally recognized that there are many development partners operating in West Africa and 
that there is a complex and dense network of initiatives in a wide range of sectors, including 
agriculture, infrastructure, trade and peace & security.87 As an indication, Appendix 5A 
provides an overview of donor interventions aimed at regional integration that was compiled 
by the African Development Bank as part of its Regional integration Strategy Paper 2011-
2015.  
Drawing on a recent donor mapping prepared as part of a scoping study conducted by 
consultancy agency Saana in support of the Accelerating Trade in West Africa (ATWA) 
initiative by DANIDA (more recently joined by The Netherlands),88 the most engaged bilateral 
and multilateral development partners around the promotion of regional integration in West 
Africa identified are: African Development Bank; World Bank; European Commission; 
Germany/ GIZ; United Kingdom/ DfID; United States/ USAID; Japan/JICA; and The 
Netherlands.89 Based on their proven track record in spurring regionalism in West Africa, it 
was decided to add Spain/ AECID and France/ AFD to this selection.90   
This section discusses each of these development partners and their profile in regional 
integration in West, together with a brief description of some of their major initiatives. The 
role of The Netherlands has already been touched upon in a previous section. The remainder 
of this section zooms in on a few examples where development partners have made an 
attempt to coordinate their engagement in West Africa and highlights a number of multi-
donor initiatives aimed at regional integration that have been launched in recent years.  
Based on the author’s assessment, the next page presents a matrix that attempts to capture 
these development partners’ engagement around regional integration in West Africa 
according to specific focus areas (See Table 5.2).  
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Table 5.2 Development partners matrix: regional integration focus areas  
DEVELOPMENT 
PARTNER 
 
Institutional 
development 
Governance/ 
peace & 
security 
Monetary 
integration 
Infrastructure 
development  
(‘hard infrastructure’) 
Transport & 
Trade facilitation  
(‘soft 
infrastructure’) 
Cross-border 
agriculture & 
food security 
issues 
Key (ongoing) initiatives 
 
African 
Development 
Bank 
 
++ + 0 ++ ++ ++ 
- Côte d’Ivoire-Liberia-Sierra Leone-Guinee (CLSG)   
Electricity Networks Interconnection Project  
- Multinational assistance Ebola project to 
strengthen  West Africa’s public Health systems 
 
World Bank 
 
++ 0 0 ++ ++ + 
 
- Abidjan-Lagos Trade and Transport Facilitation 
project (ALTTFP) 
- Regional Sahel Pastoralism Support project 
 
European 
Commission 
 
++ 
 
++ 
 
0 
 
++ 
 
++ 
 
++ 
 
- Regional Transport Facilitation project 
- Support to Regional Economic Integration and 
Trade 
 
Germany: GIZ 
 
++ 
 
++ 
0 + ++ ++ 
 
- Support programme to the ECOWAS Commission  
- Promoting West Africa Trade Integration  
Programme (WATIP) 
 
United 
Kingdom: DfID 
+  ++ 0 ++ ++ ++ 
 
- West Africa Food Markets (WAFM) Pilot 
Programme 
- Support to West Africa Regional Integration 
Programme (SWARIP) 
 
United States: 
USAID 
 
++ ++ 0 + ++ ++ 
- Food Across Border Programme (ProFab) 
- West Africa Trade and Investment Hub (WATIH) 
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 ++  Key focus area  
  + Focus area  
  0 No focus area 
 
 
Japan: JICA 
 
+  + 0 ++ ++ + - West Africa Growth Ring 
 
Spain: AECID 
 
++ + O ++ + ++  
France: AFD ++ + + ++ + ++ 
 
-  Programme to support food and nutritional 
security in West Africa- Réserve regionale de 
sécurité alimentaire CEDEAO 
 
The 
Netherlands 
+ + 0 + ++ ++ 
 
-   Le Programme d'Appui à la Sécurité Alimentaire 
et Nutritionnelle en Afrique de l'Ouest (PASANAO) 
-  Approche Communal pour le Marché Agricole au 
Benin 
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DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS’ ENGAGEMENT WITH REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN WEST AFRICA 
 
AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (AFDB) 
The African Development Bank (AfDB) has identified promotion of regional integration in 
Africa as one of its key operational priorities as part of its mandate to enhance socio-
economic development and contribute to poverty reduction in Africa.91 Since its 
establishment it has been at the forefront of providing assistance to its regional member 
countries through different forms of support (e.g. technical assistance, policy advice, 
investments).92 Since 2006 it has a separate department responsible for regional 
integration.93 In 2011 the AfDB drafted its first regional policy for West Africa, the Regional 
Integration Strategy Paper for West Africa 2011-2015.94 This document also includes AfDB’s 
indicative programme of regional projects as was planned for in the period 2011-2015 
The Bank’s Strategy for supporting regional integration in West Africa aims to link up with the 
strategic priorities of ECOWAS, for example as laid down in its Vision 2020 and its Regional 
Strategic Plan. It rests on two main pillars, namely 1) linking regional markets and 2) capacity 
building.  
 
Through the first pillar the AfDB will support investments in regional transport infrastructure, 
transport and trade facilitation measures and regional energy and markets integration. With 
regard to transport infrastructure development, the Bank is involved in a number of multi-
country initiatives. This includes flagship projects such as the Trans-Sahelian highway and 
Trans-West African (coastal) highway and its missing links (road construction & rehabilitation, 
bridges, border posts), which are prioritized under the ECOWAS Regional Road Transport and 
Transit Facilitation Program for West Africa. In the area of energy, the Bank aims to link up 
with key regional initiatives such as the West Africa Power Pool (WAPP) and seeks to 
collaborate with the ECOWAS Regional Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency 
(ECREEE).  
 
In the second pillar, the AfDB builds on three key areas: 1) strengthen the capacity of 
ECOWAS, UEMOA, other regional organizations and national entities for effective policy 
and project implementation in key integration areas, infrastructure in particular; 2) 
financial sector integration to promote cross-border trade and investment, and to 
enhance access to finance, by providing assistance to financial institutions, making 
investments in the integration of payment systems and facilitating feasibility studies and 
dialogue between financial regulators; and 3) support for regional research and 
knowledge centers that are relevant for the region’s integration agenda.  
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 Please note that the African Development Bank is discussed for its role as knowledge institute in 
section 1 of this report.  
92
 African Development Bank – Regional Integration:  
http://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/topics/regional-integration/ 
93
 Although the time span that this Strategy covers has already expired, it seems that there is not yet a 
new version (or update) (digitally) available, judged on AfDB’s website section on West Africa: 
http://www.afdb.org/en/countries/west-africa/ AfDB did publish in 2014 its Bank Group Regional 
Integration Policy and Strategy 2014-2023, which describes its longer-term continental approach to 
supporting economic integration.  
94
 AfDB (2011), Regional Integration Strategy Paper for West Africa 2011-2015: 
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-
Documents/RISP%20for%20West%20Africa%20-%20REV%202.pdf 
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WORLD BANK 
The World Bank has been a champion of regional integration in Africa for a number of years, 
both through lending as well as non-lending programmes (e.g. capacity building, technical 
assistance, knowledge support).95 It has a dedicated Africa Regional Integration Department 
since 2004. In 2008 the World Bank launched its first Regional Integration Assistance Strategy 
for Sub-Saharan Africa, with the objective of providing a coherent and focused framework to 
guide the Bank’s support to regional integration.96 The Strategy builds on a specific focus on 
West Africa as one of four regions differentiated within Sub-Saharan Africa (in addition to 
East Africa, Central Africa and Southern Africa).97  
 
The Strategy is organized around three main pillars of assistance: 1) regional infrastructure; 
2) institutional cooperation for economic integration; and 3) coordinated interventions to 
provide regional public goods. The first pillar includes both support for physical infrastructure 
linked to key trade corridors, energy and (tele)communications as well as assistance to 
enable effective use of physical infrastructure through harmonization of (common) 
regulations, procedures and standards. West African examples of initiatives  backed by the 
World Bank that fall in this category are the Abidjan-Lagos Trade and Transport Facilitation 
Project (ALTTFP) and its support to the West African Power Pool (WAPP).  
 
For the second pillar, the Bank’s assistance to institutional integration focuses on six main 
areas: reducing external tariffs to the rest of Africa and the rest of the world; (b) reducing 
tariff and nontariff barriers to intraregional trade; (c) implementing and harmonizing customs 
unions and free trade agreements, including ongoing WTO-led trade negotiations; (d) 
improving regional environments for business, investment and industrial cooperation; (e) 
strengthening regional financial markets and related institutions; and (f) assisting regional 
initiatives to improve governance.  
 
In the third pillar the World Bank provides support to the following regional solutions and 
regional public goods: a) improved management of shared water resources; b) raising 
agricultural productivity; c) (sub)regional programmes to address cross-border dimensions of 
malaria prevention and treatment; d) increasing access to HIV/AIDS prevention methods 
along main transport corridors, and improving preparedness to respond to transboundary 
pandemics, other infectious diseases, and pests; e) regional rationalization of research and 
tertiary education to strengthen regional knowledge assets and technical capacity. The 
Regional Sahel Pastoralism Support project is a major initiative funded by the World Bank 
under this pillar.  
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 World Bank – Regional Integration in Africa: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/EXTREGINI/EXTAFRREGINICOO/
0,,menuPK:1587597~pagePK:64168427~piPK:64168435~theSitePK:1587585,00.html 
96
 World Bank (2008), Regional Integration Assistance Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRREGINICOO/Resources/1587517-1271810608103/RIAS-
Paper-Final-Approved-Oct2010.pdf Despite the fact that a considerable number of years have passed 
since the RIAS launch, it does seem to be the most recent one – that is digitally available – judged on 
the World Bank’s website section on regional integration in Africa. There is a RIAS Progress Report 
available, published in 2011: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRREGINICOO/Resources/1587517-1271810608103/RIAS-
Progress-Report-Final-Mar2011.pdf  
97
 However, although the Strategy refers to upcoming specific Regional Implementation Plans for these 
four regions, it is indicated in the 2011 Progress Report that its preparation has been delayed. 
Furthermore, while it is announced that the one for West Africa will be the first finalized and will 
follow shortly, this Implementation Plan does not seem to be digitally available.      
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In addition to these pillars, a cross-cutting issue addressed through World Bank assistance is 
strengthening regional strategic planning and connections with national development plans. 
This includes a focus on capacity development of pan-African institutions – African Union, 
NEPAD – and RECs including ECOWAS and UEMOA, particularly through strengthening the 
policy functionality of regional economic communities in trade policy, regional infrastructure 
and trade facilitation and by improving alignment and harmonization of regional 
programming.  
 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (EC) 
The European Commission (EC) identifies support for regional integration as one of its policy 
priorities in the area of international cooperation and development. West Africa is an 
important partner among the regions the EC collaborates with.98 Since many years it 
maintains a development relationship with West Africa. Furthermore, the European Union is 
for West Africa the primary trade partner and a major provider of development aid to the 
region. It supports for regional integration in West Africa is mainly shaped through three 
particular components: the Regional Indicative Programme (RIP), the Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA) and the West Africa’s Economic Partnership Agreement Development 
Programme (‘Programme de l’Accord de Partenarait Economique pour le Développement’, 
PAPED) as developed within EPA framework. 
The Regional Indicative Programme for West Africa describes the EC’s development strategy 
for the region and is funded under the European Development Fund (EDF).99 While initiatives 
funded as part of the previous 10th EDF RIP (2008-2013) are still ongoing, the EU also provides 
support as part of the current RIP (2014-2020)100 funded under the 11th EDF. In this RIP it 
focuses on three areas of cooperation: 1) peace, security & regional stability: including 
support to ECOWAS in its regional peace and security mandate and funding for peace and 
security initiatives, including the ones dealing with migration; 2) regional economic 
integration & trade: to strengthen trade, the private sector and regional integration and 
support infrastructure; and 3) sustainable development of natural resources & biodiversity: 
which covers support to resilience, food security and nutrition as well as environmental 
protection, biodiversity and climate change mitigation and adaptation. In addition, as fourth 
priority area – a so-called non-focal sector – the programme also entails institutional support 
to the regional organizations ECOWAS and UEMOA.  
In 2014 the European Union concluded the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with 16 
West African countries101 and both ECOWAS and UEMOA. The EPA is a development and a 
trade agreement. As to the trade dimension of the agreement, EPA aims to promote trade 
between West Africa and the European market through increasing reciprocal market access. 
Trade promotion between the two regions is not only targeted as an end in itself but is also 
regarded as a means to enhance socio-economic development in West Africa.102 The 
development assistance provided within the EPA framework is to facilitate trade promotion, 
for example through support for West African farmers to meet the EU’s sanitary and 
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 European Commission – West Africa: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/west-africa_en 
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 The EDF is the main EU financial instrument for development assistance to African, Caribbean and 
Pacific countries and sub-regions. 
100
 European Union/ ECOWAS/ UEMOA (2014), Regional Indicative Programme European Union – West 
Africa 2014-2020: 
 https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/eeas-2015-rip-west-africa_en.pdf  
101
 This group comprises all ECOWAS countries, together with Mauritania.    
102
 European Commission, ‘EU-West-Africa trade and development: a partnership that counts’: 
 https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/epa-brochure_en.pdf 
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phytosanitary (SPS) standards. Such support will be provided through EU member states’  
bilateral programmes and the EU level. As regards the latter, it is mainly channeled through 
the Regional Indicative Programme. 
At the same time, although this view is far from undisputed, the EPA has also been presented 
as an important building block of West African regional integration.103 This follows not least 
from the agreement process itself as it has spurred cooperation between the West African 
countries and the two regional economic communities to reach an agreement on the 
ECOWAS Common External Tariff. Furthermore, the EPA has also been put forward as a 
means to enhance intraregional trade, because efforts to enhance market access and 
promote trade between Europe and West Africa (e.g. easing customs procedures) would also 
benefit trade within the region.  
As developed by the ECOWAS and UEMOA within the framework of the Economic 
Partnership Agreement, the overall aim of PAPED is to facilitate the implementation of EPA. 
In particular, it aims to build a competitive regional economy by maximizing the opportunities 
offered by the Economic Partnership Agreement and minimizing its negative effects. In line 
with the current PAPED (2014-2020) the EU and its member states provides support to 
infrastructure (energy, transport), agriculture, regional economic integration, trade & private 
sector development and the civil society, by drawing on a number of bilateral and EU 
financial instruments, including the Regional Indicative Programme. 
Specific examples of ongoing initiatives (co-)funded by the European Union to support 
regional integration are the Support to Free Movement of Persons and Migration in West 
Africa (FMM West Africa, 2013-2018), Support to Regional Economic Integration and Trade 
programme (2014-2018), the Regional Transport Facilitation Project (I and II), the Support to 
ECOWAS Public Finance Management Reforms programme (2013-2018) and the West Africa 
Quality Programme (See Box 5.1) as part of the West Africa Competiveness Support 
Programme (2014-2018).  
 
Box 5.1: West Africa Quality Programme (WAQP)104 
Originally launched in 2001, the West Africa Quality Programme has the overall objective to strengthen 
regional economic integration and trade by creating an environment that facilitates compliance with 
international trade rules and technical regulations. It thereby builds on and supports the 
implementation of the regional quality policy of ECOWAS, ECOQUAL. The Programme is currently in its 
third phase (2014-2018) and has been largely funded by the EU. It initially focused on the eight UEMOA 
members in collaboration with UEMOA but since the second phase (2007-2013) it has included the 
remaining seven ECOWAS members and Mauritania as well. From phase 3 onwards the programme is 
officially referred to as the West Africa Quality System Programme and is implemented by the United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). 
In order to build the regional quality infrastructure, the programme in particular aims to achieve the 
following four objectives: 1) to enable relevant stakeholders in countries to make use of the regional 
quality infrastructure and harmonized legal framework; 2) to facilitate regional and international trade 
by providing the private sector access to strategically prioritized and harmonized standards; 3) to 
enable the private and public sectors gain access to a network of accredited and competitive 
conformity assessment services provided in the region; and 4) to entrench quality consciousness 
within the private sector. The main beneficiaries of the programme are the ECOWAS and UEMOA 
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 European Commission, ‘Economic Partnership Agreement with West Africa – Facts and Figures’: 
 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/july/tradoc_152694.pdf 
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 West Africa Quality Programme: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ghana/documents/press_corner/2015/20150625_waqp3_backgro
und_paper.pdf 
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Commissions, and a number of stakeholders at the national level including national authorities and 
trade and consumer associations.  
As some of the tangible outcomes of this initiative, the West Africa Quality Programme has resulted in 
the development and adoption of the regional quality policy ECOQUAL, the establishment of a regional 
quality infrastructure scheme and the initiation of a standards harmonization programme with the 
approval and adoption of a number of regional standards, for example in the area of food and 
agriculture. In the current third phase the emphasis is on further strengthening national quality 
infrastructure systems in order to improve intraregional market access for businesses in the ECOWAS 
region.   
 
GERMANY: GIZ 
The German Federal Enterprise for International Cooperation (‘German Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit’, GIZ) has been notably involved in the promotion of political 
and economic integration at the regional level throughout Africa.105 Its programmes are 
strongly aligned to the priorities set by the African Union, particularly focusing on peace & 
security, good governance, infrastructure and agriculture. Through its regional projects and 
programmes GIZ is further involved in a number of other areas, including social development, 
environment & climate change and economic development & employment.  
GIZ is particularly engaged in institutional capacity development and support for 
transnational (trade) policy dialogue. Examples include its ongoing support to the Niger Basin 
Authority106 and its involvement in regional resource governance in the extractive sector in 
partnership with public institutions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea. Other 
examples of regional initiatives by GIZ in West Africa are its project on the promotion of a 
climate-friendly interconnected power system in West Africa focusing on creating the 
conditions for sustainable energy generation and distribution across the region, and the 
African Cashew Initiative aimed at increasing the competitiveness and incomes of smallholder 
cashew farmers and other value chain actors in Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Benin and Ghana.   
One of GIZ’s key initiatives aimed at regional integration in West Africa concerns its Support 
Programme to the ECOWAS Commission, which focuses on strengthening its sector-specific 
expertise and management structures and capacities. German institutional support to the 
Commission dates back to 2006. This programme includes the Promoting West Africa Trade 
Integration Programme (WATIP), the component that targets trade and customs issues (See 
Box 5.2). Another key area of the Support Programme is peace & security, aimed at 
improving the Commission’s capacities for conflict prevention and peacekeeping in the 
region.  
 
Box 5.2: Promoting West Africa Trade Integration Programme (WATIP)107 
Initiated in 2010, the Promoting West Africa Trade Integration Programme (WATIP) is an initiative 
implemented by GIZ. It is officially part of the EU-funded programme ‘Support to Regional Economic 
Integration and Trade’ programme and is linked to GIZ’s overall institutional support programme to 
ECOWAS. The programme targets the capacities of the ECOWAS Commission to design and implement 
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 GIZ – Regional cooperation in Africa: https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/9984.html 
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 The Niger Basin Authority is an intergovernmental organization that aims to support cooperation in 
the resource management and development of the Niger River basin. Among its members are a large 
number of ECOWAS countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Nigeria), 
complemented with Chad and Cameroon.  
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 GIZ – Promoting West Africa Trade Integration Programme:  
https://www.giz.de/en/downloads/giz2015-en-watip-brochure-west-africa.pdf  
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its trade policy and to promote trade, both within West Africa as well as with the rest of the world. It is 
expected to run until 2019.  
Through WATIP, GIZ supports the ECOWAS Commission – more particularly its Directorates of Trade 
and Customs – as well as the UEMOA Commission to build their capacity to accelerate the process of 
achieving an effective customs union, in order to increase intra- and interregional trade. The 
programme acts in the following areas of intervention: a) implementation of the ECOWAS CET & 
Customs procedures; b) dismantling of non-tariff barriers to trade; c) common trade & policy statistics; 
d) support to structures: Joint Technical Secretariat
108
 & Trade Information System; and e) fiscal 
reform programme.  
In each of these areas GIZ provides support through competence building, organizational 
development, development of cooperation partnerships and of enabling frameworks. As a result, the 
programme has helped to raise awareness around the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS), to 
finalize the Common External Tariff (CET) and contributed to its implementation and monitoring. 
 
UNITED KINGDOM: DFID 
Since a number of years the UK Department for International Development (DfID) is notably 
committed to regional integration across Africa, including the West African region. It 
collaborates at both the pan-African and regional level with a wide range of partners to 
further regional integration in Africa, including regional organizations such as ECOWAS. It 
works across a number of areas, including regional health, peace & security, transboundary 
water management, climate change issues and agriculture & food security. In West Africa an 
example of a key initiative by DfiD in this last area is its West Africa Food Markets (WAFM) 
Pilot Programme (See Box 5.3). 
 
Box: 5.3: West Africa Food Markets (WAFM) 109 
Instigated in 2014, the West Africa Food Market (WAFM) is a five-year pilot programme funded by DfID 
that seeks to increase the availability of staple foods and purchasing power of farmers and consumers 
in food-insecure regions of the Sahel as well as to increase their resilience to hunger and malnutrition 
during the regular hungry seasons and periodic shocks. It aims to increase food production and cross-
border trade in maize, millet, sorghum and cassava/ gari along the Ghana-Burkina Faso and Niger-
Nigeria trade corridors as a means to lower seasonal price volatility.  
 
WAFM operates as a broker and facilitator of staple food markets by building on two main pillars. 
Through its Challenge Fund the programme aims to invest in business models that will help to 
strengthen national and regional trade in the targeted staple foods. The Policy Facility focuses on 
improving the enabling environment by funding analysis and advocacy linked to policy, and to 
regulatory and market constraints that impede regional trade. These constraints are to be identified 
through political economy analysis and stakeholder interest mapping, and will be addressed through 
interventions dependent on the feasibility given the programme’s life span, potential to generate 
incremental positive change and likeliness to gain support and buy-in from key stakeholders. While in 
the case of the Fund only (for-profit) businesses are eligible, the Facility is open to a wide range of 
organizations.  
 
DfID is particularly involved in regional economic integration by focusing on trade facilitation 
through regional programmes that aim to further infrastructural development, simplify 
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export/ import procedures and develop customs institutions and processes.110 DfID’s 
interventions in this area are designed to complement its bilateral and global programmes, 
and aim to enhance progress on a number of issues such as removing barriers to intra-
regional trade by building required infrastructure, reforming cross-border management, and 
improving the business and investment climate. To support the African Union in its plan to 
set up a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) by 2017, DfID introduced in 2011 the Africa Free 
Trade Initiative (AFTi).  This Initiative helps to shape its regional programming across the 
continent and particularly focuses on harmonizing trade policies and lifting trade barriers 
between African countries. As one of its key regional programmes focusing on trade 
facilitation in Africa, the Support to West Africa Regional Integration Program (SWARIP) forms 
an integral part of DfID’s AFTi (See Box 5.4). 
 
Box 5.4: Support to West Africa Regional Integration Program (SWARIP)111 
Launched in 2010 by DfID in conjunction with ECOWAS, the Support to West Africa Regional 
Integration Program (SWARIP) has the objective to support the development of knowledge and 
analysis on regional and pan-African integration that should result in better informed policy making in 
the region. Building on a five-year time-frame, the program aims to improve West Africa’s regional 
trade performance and competiveness and to contribute to the finalization of establishing an ECOWAS 
Free Trade Area (FTA) by 2015, as building block for the broader Continental Free Trade Area.       
Following its redesign in 2012, SWARIP initially rested on three components. First, the World Bank 
SWARIP window of the Umbrella Trade and Development Facility. This is a multi-donor trust fund 
launched in early 2013 with the objective to generate and disseminate new evidence on the impact of 
current trade and investment policies to inform and support (policy) dialogue between policymakers 
and stakeholders in West Africa and to influence programs of the World Bank and other donors. 
Through the Facility, SWARIP has resulted in a wide range of analytical activities covering a broad 
range of issues, including regional trade in food staples, trade and transport facilitation, regional 
cooperation in higher education and the impact of regional integration on poverty.
112
 Evidence has 
been brought forward that rapid analytical support provided through this Fund has played a significant 
role in persuading Nigeria not to withdraw from the EU EPA negotiations. 
The two other SWARIP components proved to be short-lived initiatives or never came into operation at 
all. The Regional Policy Fund was put in place in 2014 as a quick response mechanism aimed at 
providing small grants to the ECOWAS Commission, West African governments, civil society and private 
sector actors to enable their engagement in integration processes, for example with regard to the 
Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA). Short of a year in operation DfID suspended new grant 
applications due a lack of confidence in the additionality of support and the significance of expected 
benefits. The third component initially consisted of a scoping study that was to identify three large-
scale trade facilitation projects that could be funded by DfID. However, DfID decided not to proceed 
with this study at all due to the Ebola outbreak and uncertainty whether it could support large-scale 
trade facilitation interventions. 
In 2010, part of SWARIP funding was used to contribute to capacity building for the ECOWAS 
Commission, as part of joint donor Pool Fund. However, there was no follow-up due to concerns about 
the fund’s  management by ECOWAS.  
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As of August 2015, SWARIP is in the process of being closed early, ahead of its official closure in 
December 2015. In fact, the only component that is currently still operational is the one managed by 
the World Bank but which is in the process of being terminated. Apart from disappointing results, an 
important argument put forward by DfID in support of this decision has been the strained relationship 
with ECOWAS as key partner, following from persistent failure to meet its financial reporting 
commitments. 
 
UNITED STATES: USAID 
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is regarded as a long-time 
supporter of regional integration in West Africa.113 Since 2001 it has a regional office in West 
Africa, initially located in Bamako (Mali) and from 2003 onwards in Accra (Ghana). In 2015 
USAID’s regional office in West Africa issued its regional policy towards West Africa, the 
Regional Development Cooperation Strategy 2015-2019. It focuses on transnational issues in 
the region in a number of areas: a) agriculture & food security; b) clean and efficient energy 
c) democracy, human rights & governance; d) economic growth & trade; e) environment; f) 
global health; and g) promoting peaceful political transitions.  
 
Under this Strategy USAID initiates and supports a number of regional initiatives in the 
region, by directly engaging with regional partners such as ECOWAS and its sub-agencies (e.g. 
West African Power Pool (WAPP), West African Health Organization (WAHO), ECOWAS Center 
for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (ECREEE)) and with UEMOA. These interventions 
are to provide regional solutions for shared West African challenges, to complement and 
enhance USAID’s country-specific interventions and to cover the countries where there is no 
USAID mission.  
 
USAID has been particularly engaged in the area of agriculture and food security. As part of 
its global Feed the Future initiative, USAID has developed a regional Feed the Future strategy 
for West Africa which focuses on three core areas: increased agriculture productivity, 
improved regional trade and enhanced institutional capacity. Regarding agricultural 
productivity, USAID has supported programmes such as the West Africa Seed Programme and 
the West Africa Fertilizer Programme. In the area of improved regional trade, USAID has 
funded large projects such as the Agribusiness and Trade Promotion (ATP/ E-ATP) and the 
West African Trade Hub. One of USAID’s major current initiatives in the area of regional trade 
promotion is the West Africa Trade and Investment Hub (See Box 5.5). Concerning 
institutional capacity building, USAID has been notably involved in strengthening regional 
institutions that play a key role in West Africa’s agricultural development, such as the 
Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control (‘Comité permanent Inter-Etats de 
Lutte contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel’, CILSS) and the West and Central African Council for 
Agricultural Research and Development (‘Conseil Ouest et Centre Africain pour la Recherche 
et le Développement Agricoles’, CORAF).  
 
Box 5.5: - West Africa Trade and Investment Hub (WATIH)114 
Launched in 2014 by USAID, the West Africa Trade and Investment Hub (or: West Africa Trade Hub and 
African Partners Network, ‘Trade Hub’) aims to enhance food security and reduce poverty by 
expanding trade through value-added exports (e.g. cashews, mango, shea, apparel) and regional trade 
in key agricultural commodities (e.g. maize, livestock and rice).  
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Being the successor to the West Africa Trade Hub (WATH I and II, 2004-2013), Trade Hub builds on a 
decade of USAID’s trade-related assistance and complements the work of trade hubs in East and 
Southern Africa. It works throughout West Africa in 12 West African countries and has physical 
presence in Accra (Ghana) with satellite offices in Dakar (Senegal) and Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso). It 
is projected to run until 2019 (including two option years).  
The project targets West African farmers and businesses to enable them to become more competitive, 
to attract investment and to boost their regional and global trade. It works through and in close 
coordination with a network of West African advocacy groups and industry partners like the Borderless 
Alliance and the African Cashew Alliance (regional private sector platforms that were born out of the 
West Africa Trade Hub), and regional organizations such as ECOWAS, UEMOA and CILSS.  
The Trade Hub applies a multi-tiered approach, by working on several fronts to assist farmers and 
businesses: a) improving value chain performance by enabling them to meet product quality 
standards, by connecting producers to value chain leaders and by improving access to market 
information systems; b) access to finance and investment, by increasing agriculture investment and 
trade finance transactions through strategic partnerships with financial institutions; and c) trade and 
transport enabling environment, by supporting transport efficiency particularly in five major regional 
corridors (See Figure 5.7) and by addressing key trade barriers. Furthermore, the project provides 
financial support and helps to build the capacity of its regional partners across a wide range of 
competency areas, with a particular focus on so-called gender-forward programming.  
 
Figure 5.6: Key regional corridors targeted through the Trade Hub  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JAPAN: JICA 
The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has been a long-time supporter of 
regional organizations in West Africa, UEMOA in particular. It has a dedicated Regional 
Strategy Unit for Africa, located in Nairobi, Kenya. Since 2007 JICA has been extending 
assistance in West Africa in areas such as the establishment of regional large-scale 
infrastructure both through physical infrastructure development (transportation, energy) as 
well as capacity building (maintenance management, operations), streamlining customs 
source: USAID, 2014 
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administration, training of custom officials and promotion of One Stop Border Posts (OSBP) 
across Africa.115 For example, JICA provides technical support to the OSBP at the Cinkansé 
border between Burkina Faso and Togo. Customs development has been in particular an 
issue on which JICA has been engaged through its collaboration with UEMOA.116  
Figure 5.7: JICA Corridor Development for West Africa Growth Ring  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to facilitate regional infrastructure development, more recently JICA has identified 
the development of growth corridors as one of its priority activities in Africa, as part of its 
Fifth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD V, 2013-2017).117 It has 
selected the West Africa Growth Ring (See Figure 5.8) as one of the five major growth 
corridors in Africa for which it will provide support.118 For each of these growth corridors JICA 
draws up a master plan outlining a long-term policy (20-30 years) and identifying short-term 
projects aimed at linking corridor (infrastructure) development with comprehensive and 
inclusive economic development and investment promotion.  
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Spain: AECID 
Support for regional integration has been an important component of Spain development 
cooperation and its Agency for International Cooperation and Development (‘Agencia 
Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo’, AECID) for a number of years.  
In its current Spanish Development Cooperation Master Plan (2013-2016) used by AECID to 
redesign its development approach, it indicates that its attention for regional cooperation 
and integration will get even more emphasis in future years, particularly in its geographical 
focus areas, which includes West Africa.119 AECID points out that the regional level and its 
support to regional organizations (including ECOWAS) is crucial to achieve its objectives in the 
key thematic areas in which it operates, such as agriculture & food security, renewable 
energy & power connectivity and infrastructure. As part of its renewed profile, it is further 
mentioned that Spain plans to shut down a number of country offices, whereby in some 
cases these are merged into regional offices, such as in the case of West Africa. One of the 
main tasks of these offices are managing its support programmes for regional cooperation.  
The West African region has been a geographical focus area for a number of years for Spain, 
as laid down in both its previous Master Plan (2009-2012)120 as well as in the current one. 
The collaboration between Spain and ECOWAS dates back to 2005 when the two signed a 
memorandum of understanding. Since then the cooperation has been further consolidated 
through a number of regional programmes in different sectors, the creation of the Spain-
ECOWAS Fund for Migration & Development in 2007121 and Spain’s decision in 2008 to open a 
satellite office at its embassy in Abuja, Nigeria to facilitation collaboration with ECOWAS.122  
In 2009 Spain signed a Joint Declaration with ECOWAS after which their cooperation 
intensified.  In this agreement they identified the following priority areas: 1) democratic 
governance and institutional development; 2) public policies to reach the MDGs (including 
support to the regional agricultural policy, gender equality and public health); 3) 
infrastructure & energy; and 4) investment, trade & tourism.  
In recent years Spain has been particularly committed to the area of agricultural & food 
security, by aligning its bilateral efforts with regional initiatives and working through 
multilateral channels (e.g. World Bank, FAO). For example, it has provided much support to 
the ECOWAS Agricultural Policy (ECOWAP), the Regional Offensive for Food Production and 
Against Hunger and the ECOWAS Regional Agency for Agriculture and Food Security (RAAF). 
In addition, in the area of infrastructure it has provided support to the ECOWAS Project 
Planning and Development Unit (PPDU) and the ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and 
Energy Efficiency (ECREEE).  
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FRANCE: AFD 
France has a strong presence in West Africa and maintains extensive ties with several 
countries in the region. It has traditionally played an important role in spurring regionalism in 
West Africa, dating back to its historical role as colonizer. Many of the countries in the region 
are former French colonies and were member of the ‘Afrique-Occidentale Française’ (AOF).123 
The creation of UEMOA can be traced back to AOF as historical regional grouping under 
French guardianship. In addition to its strong engagement with individual UEMOA members, 
France is also particularly involved with UEMOA as regional organization.   
In 2014, the French Development Agency (‘Agence Française de Développement’, AFD) issued 
its Africa Regional Intervention Framework 2014-2016 (‘Le Cadre d’Intervention Afrique’).124 
In this framework, AFD sets out its strategy for its operations in Sub-Saharan Africa to 
promote sustainable development and reduce poverty.125 Although this strategic framework 
lacks a specific (sub-)regional focus including for West Africa, there are a few priority areas 
identified in which AFD refers to regional integration as an important means and outcome of 
its operations. This applies to the areas of (transport) infrastructure and food security & rural 
development, which are also the two most important sectors for AFD in terms of allocation of 
its financial resources for the period 2014-2016. Concerning its engagement in West Africa, 
AFD further indicates in this strategic document that in the past period it has strengthened its 
action in favor of working with regional organizations, whereby the majority of its activities 
were directed at West Africa, UEMOA, BOAD and a number of intergovernmental basin 
agencies in particular. However, at the same time it is mentioned that AFD has worked 
towards rebalancing this approach by focusing more on collaboration with ECOWAS and its 
sub-agencies, particularly in the area of agriculture and food security.126      
AFD has initiated a number of (ongoing) regional initiatives in West Africa across a number of 
thematic areas.127 A major regional initiative in the area of food security & rural development 
is its programme to support food and nutritional security in West Africa (‘Le projet entend 
contribuer à améliorer les capacités des dispositifs nationaux et régionaux à assurer la 
sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle des populations ouest-africaines’, See Box 5.6).   
 
Box 5.6: Programme to support food and nutritional security in West Africa128 
Launched in 2010, the Programme to support food and nutritional security in West Africa (‘Le 
Programme d'Appui à la Sécurité Alimentaire et Nutritionnelle en Afrique de l'Ouest’, PASANAO) is 
an initiative funded by AFD. Its main objective is to contribute to improving the capacities of national 
and regional systems to ensure food and nutritional security for the West African population. It is 
implemented by ECOWAS in conjunction with CILSS across three sub-areas in West Africa: the West 
(Guinea, Senegal and neighbouring countries); Centre (Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Mali) and 
East (Benin, Niger, Nigeria). The selection of these focus areas is mainly shaped by the countries’ 
trade linkages but also their interdependencies in terms of the labour market and incomes. The main 
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focus is on the Centre sub-area and the East sub-area to a lesser extent. However, certain activities – 
studies, capacity building – will benefit all ECOWAS member countries. 
In particular, the programmes seeks to achieve the following objectives: 1) strengthen and accelerate 
the development of information systems on food security in order to take better account of the 
aspects relating to markets, household incomes and nutrition, in the context of a regional approach; 
2) support the definition and implementation of the public intervention instruments of States and 
ECOWAS to reduce food insecurity and respond to crises; and 3) implement innovative operations 
that improve the food and nutritional situation of the most vulnerable populations in the region.  
In order to achieve these objectives, it builds on the three pillars: a) support for the implementation 
of a new approach to food security; b) support for the definition and implementation of the public 
intervention instruments of member states and ECOWAS; and c) promotion of innovative operations 
in response to the different forms of food security. Alongside these three support components, the 
programme also entails assistance to capacity building for ECOWAS, its Department for Agriculture, 
Environment and Water Resources in particular.  
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DONOR COORDINATION EFFORTS AND MULTI-DONOR INITIATIVES 
 
It has been put forward that when looking at the initiatives aimed at regional integration 
undertaken by development partners operating in West Africa, one could recognize some 
sort of de facto division of labour between these actors.129 At the same time it is generally 
concluded that actual coordination between development partners in West Africa at the 
regional level has been deficient.130 Recent years has however seen the creation of a number 
of institutional frameworks to improve dialogue and coordinate efforts between 
development partners. A prime example are the several thematic donor coordination 
working groups created within the framework of ECOWAS to discuss regional integration and 
development issues between the ECOWAS Commission and the development partners. 
Among the thematic donor coordination working groups that have been created (e.g. 
Agriculture, Regional Economic Integration and Capacity Development), one of the more 
celebrated examples is the ECOWAP Technical and Financial Partners Coordination Group 
(See Box 5.7). Another example of an initiative aimed at enhancing donor coordination but in 
a different framework is the Global Alliance for Resilience (AGIR) in the Sahel and West Africa 
(See Box 5.8). It seems however that many of these frameworks struggle to overcome 
(generic) challenges to donor coordination and are far from reaching their full potential. 
 
Box 5.7: ECOWAP Technical and Financial Partners Coordination Group131 
The ECOWAP Technical and Financial Partners Coordination Group (‘ECOWAP Group’) is an 
institutional coordination platform created within the framework of ECOWAS. It consists of more than 
twenty development partners. Spain chaired the group for a number of years, but handed over this 
role in November 2015 to USAID. Its main purpose is to coordinate support to the implementation of 
the ECOWAS Agricultural Policy and achieve the related objectives. It became operational in 2010, five 
years after the adoption of ECOWAP.   
The ECOWAP Group has been celebrated by some – including the ECOWAS Commission and 
development partners – as an important step forward in terms of donor coordination with regard to 
the implementation of ECOWAP. This particularly relates to its achievements in terms of information 
exchange, for example through developing of a database featuring all the projects and programmes 
financed at the regional level in the agriculture, food security and nutrition sector. However, there are 
number of deficiencies and challenges identified, including the lack of participation of some 
development partners, both the traditional ones as well as the more non-traditional ones (e.g. China); 
lack of engagement by those who are among the participants; insufficient linkages between the 
ECOWAP Group and support provided by development partners outside the ECOWAS framework (also 
because this has in some cases generated parallel donor coordination structures combined with 
insufficient ECOWAS oversight).   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
129
 DANIDA (2015), p. 9.   
130
 Dalleau and Van Seters (2011), Operationalising the West African EPA Development Programme. 
Moving beyond the paperwork, ECDPM Discussion Paper No. 121, October 2011, p. 11. 
131
 This sub-section builds on: Van Seters, Sylla and Cisse (2014), EU support to the ECOWAP/ CAADP: 
Case Study for the joint progress report on the implementation of the EU food security policy 
framework, ECDPM, ROPPA and Landell Mills, Report commissioned by the European Commission.   
120 
 
Box 5.8: Global Alliance for Resilience (AGIR) in the Sahel and West Africa132 
Launched in 2012, the Global Alliance for Resilience (‘Alliance Globale pour la Résilience’, AGIR) in the 
Sahel and West Africa is a framework that aims to enhance coherence and effectiveness in support of 
resilience initiatives in West African and Sahelian countries.
133
 Referred to as a policy tool, the overall 
objective of the Alliance is to structurally reduce food and nutritional vulnerability in a sustainable 
manner by supporting the implementation of West African and Sahelian policies. The Alliance is 
expected to run until 2032 to reach the “Zero Hunger” target.   
The Alliance brings together (national) governments, regional organizations, the international donor 
community and local stakeholders (agricultural producers, civil society, the private sector). It is placed 
under the political and technical leadership of ECOWAS, UEMOA and CILSS. AGIR is further supported 
by the Platform of Technical and Financial Partners (PTFP), a coordination platform that is established 
by development partners with the goal to sustain the political commitment of these partners and to 
facilitate the dialogue between the international (donor) community and the policymakers in the 
target countries.
134
    
AGIR is structured around the following strategic objectives: 1) improve social protection for the most 
vulnerable households and communities in order to secure their livelihoods; 2) strengthen the 
nutrition of vulnerable households; 3) sustainably improve agricultural and food production, the 
incomes of vulnerable households and their access to food; and 4) strengthen governance in food and 
nutritional security. The Alliance aims to conduct complementary actions at three levels: at the local 
level: by supporting local communities and endogenous initiatives and mechanisms; at the national 
level: by supporting investment programmes and existing consensus-building mechanisms; and the 
regional level: by supporting regional plans and mechanisms put in place by the three regional 
organizations ECOWAS, UEMOA and CILSS. It particularly focuses on small-scale vulnerable agricultural 
households, agro-pastoralist and pastoralist households and poor workers in the informal sector. 
The Alliance has drawn up a Regional Roadmap (2013) that serves as a reference framework for its 
members. As part of this Roadmap, the target countries are in the process of developing their so-called 
national resilience priorities (NRPs) in consultation with a broad range of local stakeholders. This is 
considered to be a first step of an inclusive dialogue process needed to come to a regional, multi-
sector approach towards food and nutritional security. As of 2015, a number of countries have 
validated their NRPs. 
 
Furthermore, in addition to these institutional platforms for donor coordination and 
dialogue, there have been a number of multi-donor programmes launched in recent years. 
Some examples are summarized below. 
 
Box 5.9: Accelerating Trade in West Africa (ATWA)135 
Launched in 2015 by the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), the Accelerating Trade 
in West Africa (ATWA) is an initiative with the objective to create a multi-donor vehicle focusing on 
regional integration, trade expansion and cost reduction along the key trade routes in West Africa. Its 
aim to seek to collaboration with other development partners within this initiative has already borne 
fruit as more recently DANIDA has been joined by The Netherlands.    
ATWA builds on the recognition that current donor support aimed at regional trade and integration in 
the region is substantial but fragmented and calls for a more integrated approach. It takes its 
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inspiration from regional donor efforts to pool resources and coordinate action undertaken in East 
Africa. TradeMark East Africa (TMEA), a non-profit organization created by a group of bilateral donors 
to further the trade integration agenda in this region, acts as technical partner of ATWA. By drawing on 
the experience of TMEA, it has initially established the following strategic objectives: 1) reduction of 
trade costs on focus trade routes; 2) improvement of the trading environment; and 3) increased 
private sector competitiveness.  
The programme aims to address “soft” policies and trade facilitation issues as well as “hard” 
infrastructural constraints, in partnership with regional organizations, national governments and the 
private sector. In order to have meaningful in-country presence and impact, the intention is to initially 
focus on a maximum of 2-3 trade routes and 3-5 countries. The possible interventions that are 
considered by ATWA might be corridor or country-specific focus (e.g. development of Joint Border 
Posts, professionalization of the transport industry) but could also not necessarily be linked to a 
specified geographical area (e.g. development of a transport observatory, promotion of the ECOWAS 
CET). 
 
Box 5.10: - Regional programme on fruit flies control in West Africa (PLMF)136 
Initiated in 2013, the regional support programme on fruit flies control (‘Plan regional de Lutte et de 
contrôle des Mouches des Fruits, PLMF) in West Africa is an initiative of ECOWAS in partnership with 
UEMOA, and funded by European Union and the French Development Agency (‘Agence Française de 
Développement’, AFD). The programme aims to enhance food security and increase rural incomes by 
addressing the infestation by fruit flies of agricultural and food products that results in the loss of 
production and non-compliance with international phytosanitary standards, thereby curtailing exports. 
This affects producers in a number of West African countries, particularly in the mango sector. The 
programme is projected to operate for five years.  
The initiative comprises a number of activities including setting up of systems at the national and 
regional level to monitor fruit fly infestation, coordinating and assisting control actions, strengthening 
the capacity of public and private actors and supporting applied research (and its implementation) for 
the development of effective control mechanisms. 
 
Box 5.11: Food Across Borders Programme (ProFab)137 
Launched in 2015, the Food Across Border Programme (ProFab) is a programme that aims at increasing 
the volume and value of intraregional trade in agricultural and food products across the West African 
region. It is initiated by ECOWAS and UEMOA, with implementation led by the Permanent 
Intergovernmental Committee for Drought Control (CILSS) in cooperation with a large number of 
regional organizations including Le Hub Rural, ENDA/ CACID and the Borderless Alliance. The 
programme has been made possible through funding provided by USAID, later joined by the 
Government of Canada. More donors may follow. The programme is projected to run until 2020.   
More in particular, the programme seeks to improve the economic and regulatory environment for 
trade in agricultural and food products by building on the following three main objectives: 1) 
contribute to a better understanding of intraregional trade in agricultural and food products; 2) 
improve the effective implementation of agreements on the free movement of agricultural & food 
products and people; and 3) contribute to the formulation and implementation of regional policies and 
strategies for promoting trade in agricultural and food products. In order to achieve these objectives, a 
large number of activities targeted at a wide range of stakeholders are conducted and planned for, 
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including the creation of multi-stakeholder monitoring platforms, development of databases and 
border information centers, information/ data collection and dissemination and capacity building 
activities in a number of areas such as for policy formulation and advocacy.      
It notably emphasizes the need to draw on the experiences and lessons learnt of (ongoing) 
programmes and initiatives developed by regional actors and donors over the past years, and seeks to 
align with key regional trade and sectoral policies, such as the ETLS, ECOWAP and PAU.   
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SECTION 6: INVENTORY OF TRADE-RELATED POLICY OPTIONS IN REGIONAL TRADE AND 
INVESTMENT IN WEST AFRICA 
Marie-Luise Rau 
 
 
 
  
Section conclusions: 
- ECOWAS members are very heterogeneous. This may explain the difficulty in finding 
agreement on common policies in the first place as well as the lack of the 
implementation of what has eventually been agreed upon. National objectives 
dominate trade-related policy options. Commitments to the WTO have for example 
been used as a pretext for refusing or postponing the implementation of the 
common external tariff (CET). 
- Asymmetric effects across the ECOWAS members but also within a country have 
justified some kind of national support measures, e.g. infant industry protection for 
not yet established and/or vulnerable sectors from the increased competition 
following tariff liberalisation or other trade policy measures that open up markets. 
Support measures also comprise exceptions of exemptions from common policies, 
import and export bans implemented as “beggar thy neighbour” policies. The 
compensation, e.g. through income support or introduction of a “safety net”, of 
high food prices that particular hurt the poor in small ECOWAS member states is 
less often granted.  
- The enormous lack of implementation impinges on the creation of an economic 
union and has, amongst other factors, encouraged informal trade and smuggling, 
both of which benefit from different prices and business costs across borders. The 
focus of policy makers should be on the effective implementation and monitoring. 
Transposing the agreements to the local level, by making them practical and 
accessible for businesses and traders is paramount. This could involve dissemination 
of information/communication and training, but some degree of flexibility to allow a 
country’s  individual way of application, as this has proven to work best not only the 
African context but also in the EU for example. 
- In general, the ECOWAS member states follow the principle of harmonisation in 
order to align regulations, including tariffs and non-tariff measures. Given the 
difficulties of common agreement and the absence of unity in the region, the 
principle of mutual recognition may however be a promising means to foster intra-
ECOWAS trade (like in the EU integration process).  
- Trade-related policies should specifically tackle non-tariff measures that cause 
unnecessary trade costs and thereby hamper cross-border trade. Poor 
infrastructure, inefficient customs and other issues hamper trade flows within the 
region, despite the positive impact of proximity of countries. The costs of trade 
clearly seem to be a significant obstacle not only for integration or rather 
participating in global trade but also for integration within the ECOWAS region. 
Trade facilitation measures could particularly target the aspects which cause the 
higher trade costs in the ECOWAS region. Complaints reported in business surveys 
or dispute could help identify the priority issues to be solved. 
-  Regional value chains appear to be key for promoting ECOWAS integration. This 
calls for adding value to unprocessed products through stronger value chains. Note 
that creating value chains goes beyond adding value. For example value chains 
require the functioning of infrastructure, i.e. hard and soft infrastructure, the latter 
including standards, quality control and conformity assessment. A way forward in 
ECOWAS integration could thus be building regional value chains, committed to 
West African product quality at prices affordable to those with increased incomes, 
likely being expanding urban population in the cities of the ECOWAS countries. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Regional integration is widely known to foster competitiveness, access to wider markets (via 
trade), larger and diversified investment and production as well as to encourage socio-
economic stability and security through cooperation and economic prosperity. Despite these 
positive outcomes associated with regional integration, the gains of regional integration are 
diverse and do not evenly occur for all partners of agreements or treaties of regional 
integration. In the light of losses of some partner countries or drawbacks for specific entities, 
such as small and medium size (SME) firms that may be left out from the benefits of regional 
integration, in some partner countries the real gains have been questioned. Disputes of the 
losing and winning partners take place in order to achieve agreement on sharing the benefits 
and possibly compensation to those who will lose out from regional integration. Overall, 
regional integration requires full commitment, with partner countries losing national 
sovereignty.  
In West Africa, national sovereignty seems to be paramount. National policy objectives have 
dominated the integration process, making it difficult to find agreements and compromise on 
common policies and decisions. National policy objectives are seemingly more important 
than agreements made with ECOWAS members. This underlines the difficulties of 
communality, or lack thereof, and limited commitment of the members. It could also explain 
the low level and incomplete implementation of the ECOWAS agreements. The ratification of 
the ECOWAS agreement by its members has been lagging behind.  
Given the theory of change applied to trade corridors in West Africa, the focus of the trade 
policy options considered in the inventory are 1) the ECOWAS common external tariff while 
free trade under the ETLS amongst the members,  2) trade facilitation and 3) standards and 
regulations, commonly referred to as non-tariff measures which constitute behind-the-
border measures. The latter relate to trade-related policies, such as the alignment of 
standards and regulations in order to overcome obstacles due to regulatory heterogeneity. 
The three aforementioned trade-related policy options are elaborated in this section by 
making the link to the ECOWAS region. In Appendix 6-A1 a list of selected studies dealing 
with these trade-related policy options is provided, which is a selection from the literature 
search undertaken within the scoping study. 
 
ECOWAS COMMON EXTERNAL TARIFF (CET)  
In January 2015, the ECOWAS members adopted a common external tariff (CET) in the region, 
thereby forming a customs union. With the CET, the same duties, import quotas, preferences 
or other import requirements apply to all goods entering ECOWAS member countries, while 
free trade is established amongst the members. The CET will be implemented in phases, with 
the first phase stretching over five years from 2015 to 2019. The CET aims to establish a 
system where once an importer brings goods into the ECOWAS region the tariff is paid at the 
country of entry into the region.  Furthermore, importers face the same import requirements 
for supplying their products in any of the ECOWAS members and hence there would not be 
any incentives of entering ECOWAS through other countries, which may have had more 
lenient requirements or lower tariffs without the CET. 
The introduction of a CET affects trade, i.e. creating and diverting trade of members. Trade 
creation means better regional integration, and specifically with the introduction of the CET, 
leads to an efficiency gain since in addition to the reduction of the prices of the products 
traded across the respective members (due to tariff liberalisation across members) new trade 
flows occur in the region. At the same time, the CET can divert trade from more efficient 
exporters outside the region towards less efficient local exporters in the region. Trade 
diversion refers to the inhibition of imports from countries outside the customs union. As 
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such the consumer choices as well as the product variety or quality are potentially reduced 
and industries in the member states are supported since the production is protected against 
foreign imports that may not enter the region due to the CET. The trade creation effect is 
important for the members of a customs union since this common external trade policy 
allows for an increased specialization and economies of scale for those sectors or firms that 
have comparative advantages for the respective products.  
While benefiting some firms or sectors, the CET introduction has had negative effects on 
others. These asymmetric effects of the CET introduction call for some kind of support 
measures, e.g. infant industry protection that protects not yet established and/or vulnerable 
sectors from the increased competition within the customs union. Such support measures 
also comprise lists of exceptions for products that can be subject to tariff rates higher than 
the CET. In the ECOWAS region, the agreement of the CET includes the option of exceptions. 
De Melo and Laski (2015) report about an ECOWAS exceptions list, which contains about 300 
products eligible for being excluded from the CET. This list allows ECOWAS members to 
impose their own tariffs on imports from outside the region. Furthermore they also refer to a 
list of special protection measures. One of these measures is the import adjustment tax that 
allows ECOWAS members to impose a tax on imports from outside the region, thereby 
adding to the CET.  
The ECOWAS CET is described in more detail in section 5 of this report. In the cases where the 
CET rates are higher than the previous tariff rates of the respective ECOWAS member, the 
CET rates could not conform to their WTO commitments. De Roquefeuil et al. (2014) 
elaborate on this issue. Indeed it turned out that some ECOWAS members have had to 
compensate for breaching their WTO commitment on tariffs. Unless they are granted a 
special waiver by the WTO, ECOWAS members should not use the CET as a pretext to exceed 
their bound commitments made. This example of the CET points towards the difficulty of 
establishing coherent policy options for the entire ECOWAS region together. The trade-
related policy options for the ECOWAS region should somehow fit the very different 
situations of the members, or allow for flexibility in the implementation. With regard to the 
CET, the exceptions help the individual member to commit to the agreement but of course it 
impinges on the creation of a strong economic union.  
The effects of the CET crucially depend on the level of tariff rates that the ECOWAS member 
previously applied. De Roquefeuil et al. (2014) provide a detailed analysis about the CET 
structure in comparison to the earlier average tariff structure of the ECOWAS members. In 
summary, for agricultural products the tariffs of the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union (UEMOA) used to be relatively low and thus they increased with the implementation of 
the CET. This potentially resulted in much higher tariffs for these ECOWAS members, with the 
consequence of breaching the WTO commitments already mentioned. As an indication, with 
CET importers were expected to pay about 12 % more than  without the CET  (according to 
the simple weighted average rate) (Echenin, 2015).  
In particular, for agri-food products, ECOWAS members generally had higher WTO bound 
rates, and thus the CET meant a reduction of tariffs. This was not true for Senegal and Côte 
d’Ivoire where CET led to higher tariffs for agri-food products and thus consumers lose due to 
increased prices as a consequence of higher tariffs. World Bank (2015) provides a detailed 
analysis of the market for food staples in the context of the ECOWAS regional integration. De 
Melo et al. (2014 and 2015) find that in Liberia price changes due to CET are expected to 
make the cost of living of rural and urban households 6% and 3% more expensive, 
respectively. The difference between household costs reflects the greater share of non-
tradable expenses (like services) in urban household consumption. In a CGE simulation, 
Fiamohe et al (2016) conduct an in-depth analysis of the effects of the CET in the ECOWAS 
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region. Their results show that urban households seem more affected than rural households, 
especially in Nigeria and Guinea.  
For manufacturing industrial products, the ECOWAS members’ individual tariff rates were 
mainly lower, and thus tariff rates have increased due to the introduction of the CET. Given 
the CET bound for the specific product groups, CET overall meant an increase of tariffs for 
Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, Burkina Faso, Liberia, Guinea, Mali and Mauritania (on average bound 
rates between 9 and 15.5 percent) as well as Senegal (30 percent) and Ghana (34.7 percent) 
(Echenin, 2015). 
According to most studies, applying the CET (and in fact also the Economic Partnership 
agreements, EPAs with the EU) will lead to a significant decline of government revenue. In 
general, tariff reductions leads to revenue losses for the government. This is known to be 
problematic for developing countries since their government budget relies on these tariff 
revenues. The loss of tariff revenue for governments is aggravated and in fact also pertains to 
increased tariffs since in an incomplete customs union importers are likely to enter a country 
through the ports with cheapest import duties or other taxes.138  
The CET aims to end re-exports and informal trade, tackling incentives for informal trade, if 
every member applies the CET in its full version. Less trade through informal channels would 
increase revenue-generating formal trade. The World Bank (2015) elaborates on the example 
of arbitrage imports of poultry meat to Nigeria, which imposed a ban on imports, but 
nevertheless markets supply imported poultry meat. The poultry meat enters in the 
neighbouring countries, specifically Ghana, where the imports are trans-shipped to Nigeria. 
These imports do not appear in the trade statistics of Nigeria.  
The effects of the CET hit some countries more than others and consumers are sometimes 
affected more than producers or vice versa. In general, smaller ECOWAS members are 
expected to be affected more than others since they tend to import more manufacturing 
products, mainly from outside the region. Given the CET bounds, tariffs for manufacturing 
and for raw materials are higher for example. This will lead to trade diversion. Channeling 
products previously imported from outside the region to members, and with the 
manufacturing not necessarily being cheaper or of equal quality, small ECOWAS members 
lose out.  As mentioned for the case of Liberia above, higher prices due to the CET could 
result in a large negative effect on welfare, especially for small countries and there especially 
for the poor when the products they consume are subject to the higher tariff rates of the 
customs union.  
In contrast, Kareem (2015) found a positive effect of the CET on households in Nigeria. He 
considers that households on the one hand are consumers but are on the other hand also 
producers. The CET effect is caused by the transmission or pass-through of changes in the 
tariff rates to domestic prices. The estimation results by Kareem (2015) show that domestic 
prices declined in Nigeria due to the higher tariff pass-through, whereby the decline was 
geographically unevenly distributed. The CET has had an overall positive effect on the welfare 
of households; with the lower prices outweighing the losses incurred due to a lower 
purchasing power through lower incomes. Based on these results domestic policies (like tax 
exemption or support payments) or a social safety net may be considered to compensate 
                                                          
138
 In Ghana, for example, one is aware of the fact that importers are likely to clear their goods through 
neighbouring countries rather than through Ghana in case of the higher import duty regime, higher 
costs of credits and so on. For this reason, Ghana has been refusing the CET which would increase 
Ghana’s import tariffs (new item on business news for Africa: http://footprint2africa.com/ghana-
refuses-ecowas-common-tariff/CITA, 2016).  
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small producers, in particular households in rural areas or SMEs for the income forgone due 
to the lower prices caused by the CET. 
 
TRADE FACILITATION POLICIES IN THE ECOWAS REGION 
Trade facilitation has been widely discussed, officially catching momentum at the WTO Bali 
Ministerial Conference in 2013.139 Policy measures that fall under trade facilitation in the 
wider sense aim to improve procedures and controls that govern trade across national 
borders so as to reduce the trade costs associated and maximise efficiency while 
safeguarding legitimate regulatory objectives. OECD provides a comprehensive list of 
indicators that measure trade facilitation, as listed below; for details see OECD (2015). Figure 
6-A1.1 in Appendix 6-A1 shows the OECD evaluation of trade facilitation performance for the 
ECOWAS region. 
Categories of OECD trade facilitation indicators: 
a. Information availability 
b. Involvement of the trade community 
c. Advance rulings 
d. Appeal procedures 
e. Fees and charges 
f. Formalities, Documents 
g. Formalities, Automation 
h. Formalities, Procedures 
i. Border agency cooperation - internal 
j. Border agency cooperation - external 
k. Governance and impartiality 
 
Trade facilitation comprises a large number of measures and reforms, ranging from customs 
and border procedures to road network and quality infrastructure such as laboratories, 
storage facilities and so on. Due to the potential gain for trade and increasing inclusion in 
trade agreements, trade facilitation is of upmost importance for successful regional 
integration, which aims to promote trade amongst members and foster economic 
development.  
However, trade theory differentiates between two different situations, as the gains from 
regional integration occur by trade creation and trade diversion, and thus in essence through 
discrimination against countries outside the region. Trade facilitation in contrast stipulates 
improved market access and procedures for all. Improving customs and border procedures, 
for example simplifying and/or modernizing them or making them more transparent, will lead 
to lower trade costs for all importers and exporters that engage in the respective cross-
border trade. Note that achievements of trade facilitation often exhibit characteristics of 
public goods, i.e. once provided all trading partners benefit.  
                                                          
139
 In December 2013, WTO members concluded the Trade Facilitation Agreement at the Bali 
Ministerial Conference, as part of the so-called Bali package. Hence, trade facilitation has gained 
considerable momentum and is currently being implemented in developing countries, in cooperation 
with international institutions and donors. As defined by the WTO: “The Trade Facilitation Agreement 
contains provisions for expediting the movement, release and clearance of goods, including goods in 
transit. It also sets out measures for effective cooperation between customs and other appropriate 
authorities on trade facilitation and customs compliance issues. It further contains provisions for 
technical assistance and capacity building in this area”. 
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Trade facilitation fosters competition, improves the business environment and, due to 
resulting reduction of trade costs, trade can be expected to increase. Trade costs not only 
comprise tangible costs such as fees, costs for transport and freight but also refer to aspects 
that are usually not measured in monetary terms. For measuring the benefit of trade 
facilitation, trade costs are expressed as ad valorem tariff equivalents, which present trade 
costs as a percentage of the value of the products cleared through customs. The reduction of 
trade costs is estimated econometrically (estimation of the ad valorem tariff equivalent) and 
subsequently used in models in order to gauge the possible quantitative impact.  
The impact of trade facilitation is two-fold: price effects and efficiency effects. The price 
effects comprise the direct costs, such as fees at customs, ports or rents for corrupt officials, 
and the indirect costs of time delays and unreliable customs clearance for example. 
Removing these trade costs lower the price of products, thereby increasing trade. Efficiency 
effects are gains since the market distortions are released, leading to an efficient allocation of 
resources with countries/firms producing and trading the products for which they have a 
comparative competitive advantage.  
It is beyond the scope of this section to evaluate the ECOWAS trade facilitation measures. 
Some highlights should however be given. The indicator “trading across borders”, for 
example, essentially counts the document requirements, time and monetary costs associated 
with exporting/importing a standardized cargo of goods from a country’s largest business city 
to the closest port, regardless of their final destination. Trade facilitation indicators generally 
focus on the performance in the region, rather than at the border or elsewhere.  
To provide an indication about the current situation, figure 6.1 presents the overall doing 
business indicator, calculated by the World Bank data (http://www.doingbusiness.org/). As 
shown, in all years covered Guinea-Bissau scored highest in the doing business environment, 
also being more successful than the average. Nigeria achieved the second highest score, 
closely followed by Mauritania and Guinea. 
In Appendix 6-A3, information about the underlying components of the Ease of Doing 
Business indicator are provided. With regard to the component of trade across borders, for 
which the detailed information is provided in the appendix, Nigeria also has the highest 
score, followed by Ghana and Sierra Leone. Mali and Burkina Faso score lowest with regard 
to trading across borders. This may not be surprising as they are land-locked countries with 
potential difficulties in logistics and long ways to the next port. 
Using the World Bank Trade Costs Database, Valensisi et al. (2015) calculated trade costs in 
terms of ad valorem equivalents for the ECOWAS members (figure 6.2). As shown, the trade 
costs imply a varying performance of trading across borders. For Côte d‘Ivoire and Ghana 
costs of trading within the ECOWAS region appear lowest whereas they are the highest in The 
Gambia and Cape Verde. For Cape Verde, for example, trade costs amounted to about 4.5 
times the value of the products traded. For Côte d’Ivoire, the trade costs were about double 
the value of the products traded. Ackah et al. (2013) also calculate trade costs, which are in 
the same range as those by Valensisi et al. (2015). Ackah et al. (2013) report that on average 
ECOWAS members traded with their trading partners at a tariff equivalent trade cost of 268.2 
percent. This is about twice as high as the trade costs of high-income OECD countries.  
Interestingly, for all ECOWAS members the costs for trading within Africa tend to be higher 
than the costs for trading with other regions worldwide. This is very surprising and serious, 
given the proximity of neighbouring countries in the ECOWAS region and African countries, 
which are located further way but closer than the rest of the world.  
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Figure 6.1: Doing Business indicators for the ECOWAS members by the World Bank, 2016 
 
source: Own complication using the World Bank doing business database.
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Figure 6.2: Costs of trading within the ECOWAS region, Africa and the rest of the world 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   source: Valensisi et al. (2015) 
 
In an econometric analysis, Freud et al. (2010) focus on transit delays in Sub‐ Saharan Africa 
which according to their results have the most significant effect on exports: a one percent 
reduction in transit delays leads to 1.5% more trade and reducing inland travel by one day 
increases exports by 7%. Furthermore, Coulibaly et al. (2005) find for UEMOA trade that if all 
interstate roads would be paved, the countries would trade 2.87 times more, implying a great 
potential for road pavement projects. Using 1998-2011 panel data for eight ECOWAS 
members (the other seven ECOWAS members had to be skipped from the panel due to lack 
of data) Shuaibu (2015) investigates the impact of improved governance and institutions on 
ECOWAS trade, in addition to infrastructure. The gravity estimation conducted reveals that 
better institutional quality has a significant and positive effect on intra-ECOWAS trade.  
Overall, the evidence reviewed in this section points towards the trade costs for intra-
ECOWAS trade and the so‐called “proximity gap”. In the literature, the “proximity gap” 
means that poor infrastructure, inefficient customs and other issues hamper trade flows 
within the region, despite the positive impact of proximity of countries. The costs of trade 
clearly seem to be a significant obstacle not only for integration or rather participating in 
global trade but also for integration within the ECOWAS region. Trade facilitation measures 
can particularly target the aspects which cause the higher trade costs in the ECOWAS region, 
thereby fostering intra-ECOWAS and extra-ECOWAS trade. 
 
PRODUCT STANDARDS AND TECHNICAL REGULATIONS IN THE ECOWAS REGION 
Standards and technical regulations are one category of non-tariff measures (NTMs) that 
have been widely discussed in the context of international trade between developing and 
developed countries, but also in the context of trade amongst developing countries (South-
South trade). For the international classification of NTMs see Appendix 6-A2.  
NTMs are special in the sense that some of them, specifically sanitary and phytosanitary 
standards (SPS) and technical barriers to trade (TBT) measures are related to the provision of 
public goods. They are used for legitimate goals of public policy, although they have also 
been used for protectionist reasons. SPS measures target animal, plant and human health, 
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whereas TBT measures are about technical specification, compatibility, quality and consumer 
information. As such, SPS and TBT measures have benefits, in addition to costs, and there is 
common agreement that international trade would not be possible without such measures in 
place.  
Differences in standards and regulations cause obstacles (due to trade costs) and therefore 
have a bearing on trade. In order to overcome the trade obstacles, regulatory differences are 
usually covered in regional trade agreements or agreements on economic integration. On the 
one hand, agreements comprise the alignment of regulations, thereby harmonizing 
regulations across the respective partners in order to establish common standards. On the 
other hand, the principle of mutual recognition can be applied so that products produced by 
one member are accepted by the other member without demanding that products meet own 
requirements. The underlying principle says that if food for example is safe for consumption 
in one country it would also be safe for consumption in another country. While some basic 
minimum requirements and a basic understand of each other’s regulatory system is needed, 
mutual recognition allows for greater flexibility for countries and businesses to adapt to 
requirements in the most suitable and efficient way.  
Acknowledging the heterogeneity across and within the ECOWAS countries, mutual 
recognition (as opposed to harmonisation) may be a promising way forward to accelerate 
trade. However, a common understanding of appropriate business practices and procedures 
and most importantly functioning institutions, which are able to reliably and trustworthily 
verify compliance with the minimum requirements, are a prerequisite for mutual recognition. 
This minimum could be achieved by agreement on common trade-related rules and 
regulations as well as cooperation that ECOWAS members may agree upon in their own 
interest to benefit from market access, despite or in fact because of their diverse production 
possibilities. 
Although prominent in the discussion, sound empirical evidence on the effects of NTMs in 
ECOWAS is scarce. Most studies are scattered, looking at specific interesting cases and 
applying different methodologies. Often the main analysis relies on anecdotal evidence. Due 
to the case study work with the different methodologies and different levels of rigour, 
general conclusions and syntheses are difficult to draw. In general, it can be differentiated 
between the effects of the measure, i.e. the introduction of a new measure on the one hand 
and the abolishment of the measure on the other hand. Both effects are relevant in the 
context of regional integration.  
As mentioned, studies on NTMs take various methodological approaches. One approach is 
the application of surveys in order to directly ask businesses about their difficulties due to the 
respective measures. International Trade Centre (ITC) conducted NTM surveys in many 
developing countries, amongst them some of the ECOWAS members; for a summary see ITC 
(2015). Using the detailed results of the ITC NTM surveys, in combination with complaint 
registers by the ECOWAS Commission, for example, would be useful to provide insights on 
the NTM issues at hand. Documentation on complaints or disputes would help to concentrate 
on those measures that seem to matter. With this kind of information, the scope and 
magnitude of the effect of the respective measure could be revealed in an analysis. Note that 
since there are often specific interests behind measures, explaining why they cause problems 
for some but not for other for example, the interpretation of NTMs has to include a 
qualitative approach to better understand the measures under review. Thus a combination of 
a quantitative and qualitative analyses would be most suited for analysing NTMs in the 
context of West African integration.  
In addition to the measures themselves, procedural obstacles have received much attention 
in the trade-related policy debate. For example, although the ECOWAS trade liberalisation 
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scheme does not demand a certificate of origin (found under Chapter 0 of the NTM 
classification, see Appendix A-6.2) for some products, e.g. for staple food, asking for such a 
certificate remains common practice at the border (World Bank, 2015). Similarly, some trade-
related documents, e.g. veterinary or other certificates, may not be accepted for many 
reasons. Customs procedures or other services, including information services, are not always 
up-to-date. Note that in these cases the respective measure is not the problem but the 
border procedure. Procedural obstacles have been frequently reported by traders since they 
cause costs of paper work, costs in terms of time to issue certificates and costs of custom 
clearance; in the extreme case they may lead to customs not clearing a product at all. 
Procedural obstacles could be resolved by training and capacity building to make the 
necessary procedures as efficient as possible.  
According to the World Bank (2015), nearly every country in West Africa fails to respect the 
equivalence of the national certificate of the exporting country. Cooperation between 
national technical institutions, which for example issue certificates, are responsible for 
texting and inspections of compliance but also engage in standard setting, is crucial for 
building trust between partner countries. As mentioned, if the system of the partner is 
trustworthy and reliable, leading to the same product qualities as desired, mutual recognition 
can be applied, which would contribute to establishing a common market and to regional 
integration.140  
Furthermore, cooperation and collaboration between national technical institutions in the 
ECOWAS region would also help to operationalize common practices and metrology, 
standardized and testing methods approved as good practices, as well as quality standards. 
Documents and guidelines for the practical application that would be common in the region 
could be developed, too. These aspects are part of the quality infrastructure and play an 
important role in regional integration. However, it should be noted that the quality 
infrastructure needs to be decentralized and spread into the region as well as embrace 
informal institutions at the local level. As such, they may deliver their service to businesses 
and in fact ensure the implementation on agreed standards and regulations, which is not the 
case in the current situation. However, some flexibility, rather than top-down bureaucracy, 
should be granted. The World Bank (2015) gives a nice example of a practical way of building 
capacity: Graduate students studying topics like chemistry, biology and other relevant 
subjects have become engaged in certification in Nigeria.  
Looking at intra and extra-ECOWAS trade, ECOWAS members do not export the same 
products to their neighbours and the rest of the world. Furthermore, it seems that high 
quality, high value-added products are usually imported, while less processed products are 
exported to neighbours. The latter indicates issues in value chains in the ECOWAS region. In 
fact, a successful regional integration calls for value-added for unprocessed products through 
stronger value chains. Standards and technical regulations that govern the value chains will 
have to emerge as a prerequisite in the coordination of the chain. That is, common quality 
definitions, product specification as well as improved production and processing strategies 
will follow suit, next to quality controls and conformity assessment. The importance of the 
links between improved/localized value chains and regional integration has been showcased 
in Asia and elsewhere. For the ECOWAS members, it could be the key to bring forward the 
regional integration across the members, while promoting intra-ECOWAS trade to the benefit 
of the region.  
                                                          
140
 Note that in the European process of integration, it was only after the famous case of “Cassis de 
Dijon” that mutual recognition became common practice amongst the EU members. Thanks to 
applying the principle of mutual recognition, the common EU market could eventually be achieved. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The trade-related policy options to foster trade in the ECOWAS region are diverse. Some of 
them are already in place but not implemented. Implementation should thus be a priority in 
the region since without implementing the policies agreed upon the desired regional 
integration, which will be beneficial for the region as a whole, cannot be achieved. Trade will 
help achieve the economic integration but also goes beyond economic goals, since trade also 
involves, for instance, cultural and social exchange.  
The benefit of regional integration in the ECOWAS region crucially depends on the ECOWAS 
members’ ability to look beyond their national interests while tapping into their potentials, 
developing business and trade relations within the region and also with third countries.  
This calls for the focus on trade facilitation, improving the business and trading environment, 
including infrastructure. However, improvement in the quality of infrastructure should go 
further than roads and customs and encompasses institutions.  At the same token, building 
regional value chains would integrate the region, as they would commit to West African 
product quality at prices affordable, particular for those with increased incomes, likely being 
the new urban population in the cities of the ECOWAS countries.  
Trade policy in the ECOWAS region does not take place in isolation but in the international 
sphere. Therefore, policies of other countries and regions may impact the outcomes for the 
ECOWAS region. Thus any analysis on trade-related policies needs to take other factors 
outside the ECOWAS region into account. Of course, the changes in the ECOWAS region itself 
for example are to be covered in scenarios that consider drivers such as population growth, 
the movement of people (urbanization), changes in diets due to changes in lifestyle and 
different products offered and so on.  
The analysis of trade-related options for the ECOWAS region should involve both qualitative 
and quantitative approaches in order to provide insights on the effects of the trade-related 
policy option. The quantitative analysis could make use of the computable general 
equilibrium model “Modular Applied GeNeral Equilibrium Tool (MAGNET), which has been 
developed at LEI. The general aim of a CGE analysis is to provide indications of effects in a 
consistent, economically sound framework by taking into account linkages across countries as 
well as sectors, while allowing for specific features such as nutrition and food security, types 
of households, financial transfers (international aid, remittances) and trade costs.  
Clearly, the debate is not only economic but exhibits political economy dynamics, with 
different stakeholders’ capacity to defend their interests. The political economy angle could 
provide the understanding of the realities, which is necessary for evaluating policies and 
finding solutions that mitigate the trade-offs between those that lose and those that gain 
from policy reform. 
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APPENDIX 6-A1: OECD TRADE FACILITATION INDICATORS 
Figure 6-A1.1a: OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators – results for the ECOWAS region 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
source: OECD - http://compareyourcountry.org/trade-facilitation 
 
Figure 6-A1.1b: OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators – details for Burkina Faso and Benin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
source: OECD - http://compareyourcountry.org/trade-facilitation 
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APPENDIX 6-A2: DEFINITION OF NTMS ACCORDING TO THE MAST CLASSIFICATION (MULTI-
AGENCY SUPPORT TEAM) 
Technical 
measures 
Chapter A, on sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), refers to laws, decrees, 
regulations, requirements, standards and procedures to protect human, animal or plant 
life or health from certain risks such as the establishment or spread of pests, diseases, 
disease-carrying organisms or disease-causing organisms; risks from additives, 
contaminants, toxins, disease causing organisms in foods, beverages or feedstuffs. 
Hygienic requirements, fumigation requirements or quarantine are examples. The 
chapter is also known as SPS. 
Chapter B, on technical barriers to trade (TBT), contains measures referring to the 
technical specification of products or production processes and conformity assessment 
systems thereof. They exclude SPS, but a TBT measure may be applied to food products, 
if the measure is not for food safety. Product identity or quality requirements are 
examples. 
Chapter C, on pre-shipment inspection and other formalities, refers to the practice of 
checking, consigning, monitoring and controlling the shipment of goods before or at 
entry into the destination country. 
Non-technical 
measures 
 
Chapter D, on price control measures, implemented to control the prices of imported 
articles in order to: support the domestic price of certain products when the import price 
of these goods is lower; establish the domestic price of certain products because of price 
fluctuation in domestic markets or price instability in a foreign market; and counteract 
the damage resulting from the occurrence of ‘unfair’ foreign trade practices. 
Chapter E, on licences, quotas, prohibitions and other quantity control measures, 
measures that restrain the quantity of goods that can be imported, regardless of 
whether they come from different sources or from one specific supplier. These measures 
can take the form of restrictive licensing, fixing of a predetermined quota or through 
prohibitions. 
Chapter F, on charges, taxes and other para-tariff measures, refers to measures other 
than tariffs that increase the cost of imports in a similar manner, i.e. by a fixed 
percentage or by a fixed amount. They are also known as para-tariff measures. Customs 
surcharges and general sales taxes are examples. 
Chapter G, on finance measures, refers to measures that are intended to regulate the 
access to and cost of foreign exchange for imports and define the terms of payment. 
They may increase import costs in the same manner as tariff measures 
Chapter H, on anti-competitive measures, intended to grant exclusive or special 
preferences or privileges to one or more limited groups of economic operators. 
Chapter I, on trade-related investment measures, by requesting local content or 
requesting that investment be related to export to balance imports. 
Chapter J, on distribution restrictions, related to the internal distribution of imports. 
Chapter K, on restrictions on post-sales services, measures restricting the provision of 
post-sales services in the importing country by producers of exported goods.  
Chapter L, on subsidies, includes measures related to financial contributions by a 
government or government body to a production structure, be it a particular industry or 
company, such as direct or potential transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, equity 
infusions), payments to a funding mechanism and income or price support. 
Chapter M, on government procurement restrictions, refers to measures controlling the 
purchase of goods by government agencies, generally by preferring national providers. 
Chapter N, on intellectual property, measures related to intellectual property rights in 
trade. Intellectual property legislation covers patents, trademarks, industrial designs, 
layout designs of integrated circuits, copyright, geographical indications and trade 
secrets 
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Chapter O, on rules of origin, covers laws, regulations and administrative determinations 
of general application applied by the governments of importing countries. 
Exports Chapter P, on export-related measures, encompasses all measures that countries apply 
to their exports. It includes export taxes, export quotas or export prohibitions. 
source: UNCTAD (2013) 
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APPENDIX 6-A3: COMPONENTS OF THE WORLD BANK DOING BUSINESS INDICATORS FOR THE ECOWAS MEMBERS, 2016 (SOURCE: WORLD BANK) 
 
Overall 
Indicator 
Starting 
Business 
Construction 
Permits 
Getting 
Electricity 
Registering 
Property 
Getting 
Credit 
Protecting 
Minority 
Investors 
Paying 
Taxes 
Trading 
Across 
Borders 
Enforcing 
Contracts 
Resolving 
Insolvency 
 
Average 
 
 
153 
 
121 
 
153 
 
156 
 
137 
 
126 
 
133 
 
162 
 
142 
 
127 
 
126 
Benin 158 115 82 179 172 133 150 179 116 168 112 
Burkina Faso 143 78 76 183 149 133 144 153 103 163 112 
Côte d'Ivoire 142 46 180 146 109 133 155 176 142 120 76 
Gambia, The 151 169 117 153 124 162 163 177 104 110 111 
Ghana 114 102 132 121 77 42 66 106 171 116 161 
Guinea 165 126 166 159 146 133 166 184 161 118 108 
Guinea-Bissau 178 179 163 184 150 133 155 152 148 162 189 
Mali 143 172 152 151 140 133 166 149 82 149 100 
Mauritania 168 70 112 152 100 162 134 187 160 71 189 
Niger 160 134 178 169 126 133 166 156 158 154 121 
Nigeria 169 139 175 182 181 59 20 181 182 143 143 
Senegal 153 85 148 170 152 133 155 183 113 145 88 
Sierra Leone 147 99 142 178 159 152 88 129 164 105 142 
Togo 150 133 179 109 182 133 155 163 126 125 93 
142 
 
2016 
 
Trading Across 
Borders Rank 
Distance 
to the 
rank of  
other 
countries 
Time to 
export: 
Border 
compliance 
(hours) 
Cost to 
export: 
Border 
compliance 
(USD) 
Time to 
export: 
Documentary 
compliance 
(hours) 
Cost to 
export: 
Documentary 
compliance 
(USD) 
Time to 
import: 
Border 
compliance 
(hours) 
Cost to 
import: 
Border 
compliance 
(USD) 
Time to 
import: 
Documentary 
compliance 
(hours) 
Cost to 
import: 
Documentary 
compliance 
(USD) 
 
Average 138 51.4 78 466 79 169 136 644 121 408 
Benin 116 61.5 72 387 57 80 72 579 59 529 
Burkina Faso 103 65.3 75 111 108 86 102 265 120 197 
Côte d'Ivoire 142 54.4 110 364 120 136 125 456 89 267 
Gambia, The 104 65.3 109 381 61 183 87 326 32 152 
Ghana 171 36.5 108 490 89 155 282 725 282 302 
Guinea 161 43.0 72 778 152 178 91 709 168 300 
Guinea-Bissau 148 50.6 91 710 60 316 72 755 36 384 
Mali 82 74.0 48 17 48 33 86 298 77 375 
Mauritania 160 43.1 72 749 59 392 84 582 72 700 
Niger 158 44.4 48 543 51 204 114 762 192 757 
Nigeria 182 18.1 159 786 131 250 298 1077 173 564 
Senegal 113 62.1 41 486 26 96 56 885 54 545 
Sierra Leone 164 42.1 55 552 134 227 182 782 137 387 
Togo 126 59.3 26 163 15 25 256 820 203 252 
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CONCLUSIONS & (POLICY) RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Paul Lange, Ton Dietz (both ASCL) Marie-Luise Rau (LEI-WUR), Jeske van Seters and Carmen 
Torres (both ECDPM) 
With input from Ruerd Ruben (LEI-WUR) 
 
CONCLUSIONS – SCOPING REPORT 
SECTION 1: 
- Far from being exhaustive, this inventory of regional organizations already shows that 
there are several that are well recognized within the region and have a proven track 
record as knowledge institute, through a number of knowledge generation and 
dissemination activities and across a wide range of thematic areas, including 
agriculture & food security. 
- Furthermore, it also points at the possibility of considering collaboration with 
organizations that are traditionally not regarded as knowledge institutes, such as 
financial institutions like (development) banks. 
- The inventory further demonstrates that there is considerable potential added value 
of working with regional knowledge institutes, for example in terms of their 
expertise, networks and linkages to policy-processes.  
- It also indicates that there are a number of significant differences in comparative 
strengths between these institutes that need to take into consideration when 
assessing the potential for collaboration and identifying best placed partners, such as 
main geographical focus (regional versus more country/ continental-based focus), 
core thematic foci and primary knowledge activities. Additional parameters could 
help to further determine their potential and suitability for collaboration.     
- The mapping however also reveals that desk research as method for assessing the 
potential for collaboration has limitations in terms of exposing the particular 
strengths and weaknesses of these knowledge institutes. 
 
SECTION 2: 
- The analysis of the relevant literature shows a growing dominance of English-
language sources, and a limited involvement of African knowledge agencies. The 
literature shows four major domains, with twelve subdomains: 
- History, governance and policy options: Studies about the history of West African 
integration; studies about legal and governance aspects of West African regional 
integration; and studies with policy options, about foreign (donor) support, and 
comparative studies.  
- Economics: studies about trade and actual analysis of trade statistics in the 
ECOWAS region, and about the economics and political economy of regional 
integration in West Africa, including methodological studies; and studies about 
investment analyses and monetary issues.  
- Geography and sociology: studies about migration and remittances; about 
geography and physical infrastructure; about the reality of cross-border relations, 
and borderland studies; and sociological studies of cross-border linkages and 
gender dimensions; and 
- Cross-border food trade, and food and nutrition security; regional trade in specific 
food products; and regional trade and food and nutrition security. 
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- In an intermezzo it was suggested to position the Dutch involvement in regional 
integration in West Africa in a perspective of expected rapid overall population 
growth towards 2050, and even more rapid urbanization processes.  
- Based on the literature survey and the long-term analysis it was suggested to take 
the strengthening of regional food sovereignty very serious. 
 
SECTION 3: 
 
- The share of intra-ECOWAS trade (in terms of trade value) has been much lower 
than extra-ECOWAS trade, with extra-ECOWAS trade increasing rapidly.  
- ECOWAS trade has been biased towards a few countries. Nigeria has certainly been a 
dominant exporter in both intra and extra-ECOWAS trade. Côte d’Ivoire and Benin 
with large ports follow suit, but with much lower numbers than Nigeria.  
- Focusing on intra-ECOWAS trade, Benin, Senegal and Togo are important exporters 
in the region supplying products to other ECOWAS members.  Burkina Faso, Mali  (in 
particular agri-food products) and Sierra Leone much depend on supplies from 
ECOWAS members, with the highest share of their imports coming from the 
aforementioned countries.  
- Overall, almost 70% of the recorded value of intra-ECOWAS trade is attributed to 
trade in minerals (mainly oil trade). Manufacturing accounted for about 20% and 
agricultural products (edible and non-edible) made up for only about 10%, according 
to official statistics. For many West African countries, much trade of agri-food 
products has taken place with other trade partners outside the region and a large 
proportion of agri-food trade is believed to be informal unregistered trade.  
- Official trade statistics are considered to only capture a small proportion of intra-
regional trade in West Africa. For agri-food products, for example, up to 75% could 
be informal trade (World Bank, 2015). It would be interesting to look into options to 
better account for informal trade and combining such information with an analysis 
about who engages in informal trade and why.  
- Trade diagnostic indicators are best used for evaluating trade flows within the region 
and other countries. Here the exports and import shares as well as the net trade 
position are presented for the countries in West Africa; in a second step other 
indicators based on economic theory of international trade could be calculated in 
order to derive insights about possible priorities for trade. Examples could be 
indicators of trade complementarity, comparative advantages and trade-related 
competitiveness. Note that one important task related to the trade analysis is the 
improvement of the trade data available, accounting for unregistered and informal 
trade.  
 
SECTION 4: 
- The (new) strategic policy agenda of The Netherlands aims to provide a response to 
key developments in the global economy by linking aid, trade and investment.  
- One of the key elements of this agenda is the reorganization of its bilateral relations 
with other countries in the world. For West Africa, this means that there are three 
types of relationships with the 4 (partner + focus) countries in the region, working 
through a network of Embassies in 5 countries (and a sixth forthcoming).   
- The strategic agenda puts much value on trade promotion and facilitation. It 
considers the regional level as the most appropriate and logical framework for its 
interventions aimed at trade facilitation. West Africa is one of two regions (the other 
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being East Africa) on the African continent where The Netherlands targets its trade 
facilitation efforts 
- The added value of supporting regional initiatives and/ or applying a regional 
approach in West Africa is generally recognized at the Embassy level, and particularly 
through trade promotion & facilitation and in the area of agriculture & food security.  
- Despite this general acknowledgement, in practice many of the interventions in 
which the Embassies have been involved in recent years are country-based with little 
regional/ cross-border linkages and often little coordinated with other Embassies in 
the region.   
- Ghana and to a lesser extent Benin and Senegal seems to be the cases in which a 
regional approach has been most developed and consistently applied by the Dutch 
Embassy and has resulted in supporting a number of concrete regional/ cross-border 
initiatives. 
- Promising but only recently introduced instruments to give shape to a more 
coordinated Dutch regional approach in West Africa – i.e. the appointment of an 
ECOWAS permanent representative and the creation of the position of regional 
economy envoy – have yet to prove their (full) potential.   
  
SECTION 5: 
- ECOWAS and UEMOA are generally recognized as the two key regional organizations 
in West Africa that have moved the regional integration agenda in West Africa 
forward. 
- Both have developed many (policy) initiatives in a wide range of sectors and areas to 
further regional (economic) integration and cooperation, including around trade, 
agriculture, industrial development and infrastructure.   
- Looking at these particular (policy) initiatives, the overall level of progress on regional 
integration in West Africa has been below expectations. The gap between regional 
agreement and implementation/ enforcement on the ground is a major concern for 
many of these initiatives. 
- West Africa is a region of particular concern to the international development 
community. The most engaged bilateral and multilateral development partners 
around the promotion of regional integration in West Africa are the African 
Development Bank, World Bank, European Commission, Germany/ GIZ, United 
Kingdom/ DfID, United States/ USAID, Japan/JICA, The Netherlands, Spain/ AECID and 
France/ AFD.   
- There is a multitude of (policy) initiatives undertaken by a wide range of development 
partners aimed at regional (economic) integration in West Africa. Many of these 
initiatives target trade promotion & facilitation, what appears to be an important 
dimension of regional integration for various development partners. In addition, a 
major area of attention for several of them is agriculture & food security.  
- Despite the rise of institutional frameworks to coordinate their interventions and 
increasing multi-donor programmes in the region, the engagement of development 
partners in West Africa is still to a large extent fragmented and donor coordination in 
the region is generally regarded as insufficient. 
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SECTION 6: 
- ECOWAS members are very heterogeneous. This may explain the difficulty in finding 
agreement on common policies in the first place as well as the lack of the 
implementation of what has eventually been agreed upon. National objectives 
dominate trade-related policy options. Commitments to the WTO have for example 
been used as a pretext for refusing or postponing the implementation of the 
common external tariff (CET). 
- Asymmetric effects across the ECOWAS members but also within a country have 
justified some kind of national support measures, e.g. infant industry protection for 
not yet established and/or vulnerable sectors from the increased competition 
following tariff liberalisation or other trade policy measures that open up markets. 
Support measures also comprise exceptions of exemptions from common policies, 
import and export bans implemented as “beggar thy neighbour” policies. The 
compensation, e.g. through income support or introduction of a “safety net”, of high 
food prices that particular hurt the poor in small ECOWAS member states is less often 
granted.  
- The enormous lack of implementation impinges on the creation of an economic 
union and has, amongst other factors, encouraged informal trade and smuggling, 
both of which benefit from different prices and business costs across borders. The 
focus of policy makers should be on the effective implementation and monitoring. 
Transposing the agreements to the local level, by making them practical and 
accessible for businesses and traders is paramount. This could involve dissemination 
of information/communication and training, but some degree of flexibility to allow a 
country’s  individual way of application, as this has proven to work best not only the 
African context but also in the EU for example. 
- In general, the ECOWAS member states follow the principle of harmonisation in order 
to align regulations, including tariffs and non-tariff measures. Given the difficulties of 
common agreement and the absence of unity in the region, the principle of mutual 
recognition may however be a promising means to foster intra-ECOWAS trade (like in 
the EU integration process).  
- Trade-related policies should specifically tackle non-tariff measures that cause 
unnecessary trade costs and thereby hamper cross-border trade. Poor infrastructure, 
inefficient customs and other issues hamper trade flows within the region, despite 
the positive impact of proximity of countries. The costs of trade clearly seem to be a 
significant obstacle not only for integration or rather participating in global trade but 
also for integration within the ECOWAS region. Trade facilitation measures could 
particularly target the aspects which cause the higher trade costs in the ECOWAS 
region. Complaints reported in business surveys or dispute could help identify the 
priority issues to be solved. 
- Regional value chains appear to be key for promoting ECOWAS integration. This calls 
for adding value to unprocessed products through stronger value chains. Note that 
creating value chains goes beyond adding value. For example value chains require the 
functioning of infrastructure, i.e. hard and soft infrastructure, the latter including 
standards, quality control and conformity assessment. A way forward in ECOWAS 
integration could thus be building regional value chains, committed to West African 
product quality at prices affordable to those with increased incomes, likely being 
expanding urban population in the cities of the ECOWAS countries. 
  
148 
 
CONCLUSIONS – ECDPM DISCUSSION PAPER141 
ECOWAS exports show little product diversity, with a heavy reliance on extractive products 
(petroleum, natural gas) and a few agricultural commodities (cocoa, rubber, cotton). 
ECOWAS imports are more diversified, with a high share of industrialised products (refined 
petroleum, vehicles, ships, telecommunications equipment) and food products (e.g. rice, 
wheat), with a fast deteriorating food trade balance. Food demand in West Africa is expected 
to continue to grow dramatically in the coming decades, with a great risk of further 
deteriorating the food trade balance. This is particularly problematic in light of the collapse of 
international oil prices that affect the region’s purchasing power, in particular in Nigeria (by 
far the main economy in the region).   
Intra-regional trade in ECOWAS represents 8 to 11% of total ECOWAS trade according to 
official data, but it is estimated that approximately 75% of intra-regional trade is not 
accounted for in official statistics, as it takes place on an informal basis. Informal intra-
regional trade mainly concerns food staples. Evidence further suggests that intra-regional 
trade has considerable room to grow further. This fits the ambitions of the region to step up 
intra-regional trade and value chain development (through increased production and value 
addition), with particular emphasis on agricultural and food products, for wealth creation and 
food security.  
It is impossible to get a comprehensive overview of spatial dimensions of intra-regional trade 
from existing statistics and literature, not least because of its informality, but a limited set of 
studies indicate that part of intra-regional trade flows through main regional corridors. 
However, studies also indicate that considerable intra-regional trade flows outside these 
main regional corridors. This applies to trade that occurs around border areas. Furthermore, 
production basins of intra-regionally traded goods are not always in the direct vicinity of a 
corridor, as corridors were conceived to connect port cities with the hinterland (and not 
production basins with cities/markets). Therefore, policies and programmes seeking to 
support intra-regional trade and food value chain development will need to take that broader 
perspective into account, in order to achieve objectives related to poverty reduction, food 
security and inclusive development. 
This overview paper provided insights in key dynamics, drivers and obstacles of this intra-
regional trade in West Africa, particularly in agriculture and food products. Political economy 
considerations that were brought forward included the following, structured in table 7.1., 
according to the ‘five political economy lenses’ presented earlier. 
Such political economy factors will need to be taken into account when designing and 
implementing policies to promote intra-regional trade and value chain development. 
However, they necessarily remain quite general at this level, since regional trade differs 
considerably depending on the value chain concerned, with regard to the direction and size 
of flows, actors involved and incentives, potential impact of policy change and/or 
formalization of the value chain for different value chain actors etc. Therefore, a deeper 
understanding of strategic/relevant value chains would be important to inform policy 
dialogue and guide effective policy interventions. 
  
                                                          
141
 These findings are drawn from: C. Torres and J. van Seters (2016),  Overview of trade and barriers to 
trade in West Africa:  insights in political economy dynamics, with particular focus on agricultural and 
food trade, ECDPM Discussion Paper No. 195: www.ecdpm.org/dp195 (forthcoming).  
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Table 7.1: Overview of political economy factors affecting intra-regional trade 
 
To contribute to this, ECDPM together with its partners will conduct further value-chain 
specific analytical work and facilitate multi-stakeholder policy dialogue, with due attention 
for political economy factors. Through this work, we seek to contribute to on-going policy 
processes and vast array of initiatives. We specifically aim to assist West African key (state 
and non-state) actors and development partners to enhance synergies across sectors (e.g. 
trade, agriculture, corridor development, and industrialization) and design and implement 
political economy-sensitive interventions.  
Political Economy Lenses Examples of key issues at play 
1. Structural or foundational 
factors 
- Different agro-climatic conditions between and within countries 
- Fast population growth, urbanization trend and growing middle 
class, dealing to increased food demand and changing consumption 
patters 
- Economic heterogeneity of ECOWAS, with Nigeria being the 
hegemon (large consumer base; relatively well developed agro-
industry) 
- Cross-border historical, cultural, ethnic and linguistic ties (e.g. 
Anglophone versus Francophone members of ECOWAS; informal 
trade driven by social networks based on shared ethnicity, 
geographical origin etc)  
2. Formal and informal rules  
of the game 
- Strong regional ambitions and policy frameworks to facilitate intra-
regional trade and strengthen regional value chains, including 
processing for value addition (e.g. ETLS, CET, ECOWAP, WACIP) 
- Implementation of regional commitments at national level lags 
behind, so that many tariff and non-tariff barriers remain, including 
both formal and informal trade restrictive methods 
- Lack of ECOWAS enforcement mechanisms for the application of 
regional commitments by member states 
3. Actors, agency and 
incentives 
- Ruling elites pursue short-term national interests seeking to obtain 
or maintain votes, rather than implementing regional commitments 
(e.g. install export bans, import quotas, etc.) 
- Powerful private sector actors block key reforms and regional 
initiatives (e.g. extra-regional food importers of for example rice; 
trucking cartels)  
- Rent-seeking by officials (e.g. custom officers, police) through 
roadblocks and border bribes, leading to long and costly delays; 
- Weakest actors in the value chain stay in the informal sector due to 
high costs of formalization (e.g. smallholders, SMEs, traders, many 
of whom are women) 
- Public and private stakeholders lack information about regional 
policies, customs and trade 
4. Subsector specific technical  
and political characteristics 
- Development of specific value chains constrained by issues such as 
poor access to key inputs, land tenure, weak production 
technologies, fragmentation of smallholder producers and limited 
credit and markets access 
- Value chain-specific trade routes, as well as infrastructure and 
transport needs (e.g. cold chains)  
- Value chain-specific actors, with different characteristics and 
interests  
5. Exogenous factors - Climate change 
- Price fluctuations of commodities (e.g. petroleum) 
- Diseases outbreaks (e.g. Ebola) 
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For this purpose, value chains to be selected for a deeper analysis of trade and political 
economy factors in West Africa, and subsequent discussions on what interventions/policies 
are required, should have the following characteristics: i) together form a diverse set of value 
chains in terms of trade flows, by including food products currently mostly imported from 
outside the region, mostly exported out of the region and considerably traded within the 
region; (ii) be critical for wealth creation and food security; (iii) have been identified as 
strategic value chains in ECOWAS policies; and (iv) represent different types of food products, 
with distinct trade challenges (e.g. perishable versus non-perishable products). 
Therefore, based on the overview presented in this paper, the following selection is proposed 
for further analysis, as presented in Table 7.2 
 
Table 7.2: Preliminary selection of value chains for further work of ECDPM and its partners 
 Rice Livestock Horticulture 
Trade flow Mainly imported 
 
 
Mainly traded intra-
regionally 
 
 
Mainly exported, while 
others imported and/or 
traded intra-regionally 
(major differences 
between horticultural 
products)
a
  
Importance for  
wealth creation  
and food 
security 
Widely consumed 
throughout the region and 
demand is spurring; many 
smallholder farmers 
involved, women 
particularly involved in 
rice processing and 
marketing; many new PPP 
initiatives in the region 
(Senegal, Ivory Coast, etc.) 
Widely consumed 
throughout the region and 
demand is spurring; 
vulnerable group of 
pastoralists; high potential 
for value addition in 
livestock-derived products 
(milk, milk products, etc.); 
key source of animal protein 
for the region (nutrition 
security); key for resilience 
of nomad population 
(“cattle stock is the money 
in the bank for pastoralists”) 
High vitamins, minerals 
and fiber content 
(nutrition security); 
many women involved 
in production and 
processing; production 
in combination with 
other crops; 
export/income 
potential still under-
exploited; high 
potential for processing 
(dried fruits, juices etc) 
Regional 
priority 
Prioritized in ECOWAP 
(and regional rice 
offensive adopted in the 
region) 
Prioritized in ECOWAP & 
WACIP (meat) and foreseen 
‘milk offensive’ and 
‘livestock plan’ in ECOWAP 
Prioritized in ECOWAP
b  
and WACIP (mango) 
Type of food 
product 
Staple food 
(carbohydrates) 
Can be traded in 
bulk/simple storage 
Relatively short value 
chain 
Staple food (protein/animal 
products) 
Relatively simple logistics 
for live animal trade, versus 
technology/cooling storage 
for processed goods (see 
horticulture)  
“Medium” long value chain 
Perishable product 
Very complex post 
harvest 
logistics/technology 
required for proper 
storage 
Medium to long value 
chain 
 
a. Some horticultural products are being increasingly exported internationally (e.g. pineapples, 
mangoes) and others being imported from outside of the region in certain periods and 
countries (e.g. onions, tomato products). 
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b. While not among the ‘priority value chains’ for immediate action listed in the ECOWAP/RAIP, 
horticulture features in the ECOWAP Compact as a key regional value chain to be 
strengthened, including for employment generation purposes. 
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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NETHERLANDS’ MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
 
1. DO NOT OVERSTRETCH AND FOCUS 
A small country like The Netherlands is recommended not to overstretch its abilities to 
support regional integration of trade and investments in West Africa as a whole; it should 
focus on areas and domains where The Netherlands have a clear added value, and an 
acknowledged track record of past performance and proven innovative abilities, like in agro-
logistics. 
 
2. ALIGN WITH EXISTING COMMITMENTS 
West Africa currently shows growing regional commitment to further regional integration. It 
is recommended that the Netherlands aligns to these regional commitments, taking them as 
a starting point and supporting their implementation.  
 
3. STRENGTHEN SYNERGIES BETWEEN DIFFERENT POLICY ARENAS AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS 
The Netherlands is well placed to strengthen the synergies between different policy 
areas/actors to effectively support regional trade and investments for inclusive and 
sustainable development in West Africa: trade and customs, private sector development and 
(agro) industrialisation, agricultural support services, infrastructure development, agro-
logistics, etcetera, to which the Netherlands could (and already does) contribute, with public 
and private agencies, as well as public-private partnerships. 
 
4. REGIONAL FOCUS: THE CENTRAL REGION 
It is recommended that The Netherlands focus their own aid and trade support to West 
Africa's regionalization agenda initially on the Central Region, targeting trade in  food 
products (imported and regionally produced), with a focus on North-South and South-North 
linkages between Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Burkina Faso. The so-called Central Corridor also 
connects Togo with Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire with (Eastern) Mali, and Ghana/Togo/Benin 
with Niamey in Niger142. The choice of the Central Region would acknowledge the growing 
economic importance of Côte d’Ivoire; and would make proper use of the new Netherlands’ 
Embassy there. It crosses the English-French divide and the South-North divide and 
reconnects the Netherlands and Burkina Faso. It can make use of an extensive network of 
Dutch expertise in the private sector and in knowledge agencies, and their (former) partners 
in the region. The Netherlands can build on the preliminary work being done for ATWA. 
 
5. THEMATIC FOCUS: FOOD VALUE CHAINS TO THE MAJOR CITIES 
The Netherlands could give special attention to the provision of food the major food markets 
in the area, and particularly of Ouagadougou and Bobo Dioulasso as the major inland cities in 
the Central Region. In addition, the trade in animals and livestock products (mainly North-
                                                          
142
 The focus on the Central Region means that the Netherlands does not focus on the Western Region 
[Senegal/South-West/Western Mali], where there is less past experience, and where the political 
situation for the time being puts an emphasis on political stability and security; and also not on the 
Eastern Region [Benin/Nigeria/Niger] due to the sheer dominance of internal trade in Nigeria there, 
and the lack of security in the northern border areas.  However, it is of course important to monitor 
the situation in Nigeria closely, as the region’s hegemon.  
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South) to the major cities in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire [and maybe Togo and Benin] deserves 
attention, as well as cross-border food linkages between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, including 
trade in fish. Also the provision of food to Niamey via the Central Corridor may get attention, 
as well as the provision of cities in Mali, as far as they are [partly] connected to the Central 
Corridor. The Netherlands could support value addition and quality enhancement of food 
products in the region (agro-food industrialization). 
 
6. FOCUS ON THE MAJOR FORMAL AND INFORMAL ACTORS AND USE A POLITICAL ECONOMY 
PERSPECTIVE WITH HISTORICAL DEPTH 
Attention for trade routes and transport and other trade barriers along those routes 
(including the major ports, and border posts) should include attention for formal and 
informal transactions and value chains. A vital area for further research consists of looking 
more carefully into the major actors within chosen agro-food value chains, and the political 
economy of those actors (also in historical perspective) as an important prerequisite for 
understanding opportunities and threats, risks and chances, both for local/regional 
entrepreneurs and for foreign (including Dutch) businesses .  
 
7. INCLUDE A FOCUS ON WOMEN PRODUCERS AND TRADERS 
The importance of informal food trade and its linkages to food security in the region calls for 
a focus on women producers and traders, and The Netherlands should go beyond corridor 
development and formal trade (with mainly men involved).  
 
8. FOCUS ON A SELECTIVE GROUP OF AGRO-FOOD PRODUCTS: HORTICULTURE, 
LIVESTOCK/DAIRY AND RICE. AND DO SO IN CONSULTATION WITH ECOWAS, THE AfDB, AND 
OTHER PARTNERS.  
If the Netherlands indeed decides to focus on cross-border food trade and investments to 
stimulate regional trade and regional value-chain development in the years to come, it would 
be wise to further concentrate the major areas of intervention (in consultation with the 
ECOWAS Commission and Member States, and the African Development Bank, and with 
other selected development partners) to a selection of agricultural products. Given the 
growing importance for the urban consumers, we recommend that the Netherlands will focus 
on horticulture and livestock/dairy as niches where West African countries have competitive 
advantages, and also that the Netherlands explores ways to further assist rice production and 
cross-border rice trade in the region. To further add to these niches’ competitiveness The 
Netherlands could stimulate local sourcing by private agro-industries and facilitate different 
forms of agro-support.  
 
9. BUT DO NOT FORGET TO LOOK AT FOOD SECURITY CONSEQUENCES AND BE A CATALYST 
OF IMPROVING STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT AND BETTER DATA COLLECTION 
A focus on the big metropolitan areas should however go together with supporting ‘vigilance 
systems’ for food security in the more marginal areas and secondary and tertiary cities, by 
continuing to involve and support CILSS and the Sahel and West Africa Club, and work 
together with the USAID systems in place.  
In the area of agriculture/food security there are a few areas in particular where The 
Netherlands could act as a broker to bring relevant actors together. For example, we suggest 
that it would be good if The Netherlands would stimulate the FAO, the African Development 
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Bank, the ECOWAS Commission, and CILSS/Club du Sahel, to join hands in developing a more 
integrated and more dependable dataset on food production, trade, and investment.  
10. YES, TRADEMARK EAST AFRICA CAN BE A SOURCE OF INSPIRATION, BUT: WEST AFRICA IS 
DIFFERENT! 
It is recommended that The Netherlands formulates as its ambition to be a catalyst of (donor) 
coordination efforts and multi-donor initiatives comparable to TradeMark East Africa. 
However, with regard to using TradeMark East Africa as an inspiration, one should not 
disregard the significant differences in conditions and circumstances between the two 
regions. Two of these aspects deserve notable attention and offer an opportunity to The 
Netherlands to play a particular role. One relates to the language barriers in West Africa. The 
Netherlands could help to bridge the language gap by stimulating the spread of bilingualism 
(English and French/Portuguese) in policy documents, and among local universities and other 
knowledge institutes. Second is the lower infrastructural development in the region. And of 
course a major difference is that TMEA only covers five countries so far, while the ECOWAS 
region covers fifteen countries, for us one of the reasons to suggest an initial focus on the 
Central Region only.  
 
11. GIVE THE REGIONAL ORGANISATIONAL MANDATE TO THE NETHERLANDS EMBASSY IN 
ABIDJAN 
It is recommended that the new Embassy of The Netherlands in Côte d’Ivoire gets the 
mandate to develop a sub-regional policy of sustainable diplomacy, and to include Burkina 
Faso in the Embassy's activities related to trade, investment and aid. Of course this should be 
done in close collaboration with the Netherlands Embassy in Accra, and also with The 
Netherlands Embassy in Abuja, with regard to connections with the overall ECOWAS 
approach (given that the ECOWAS Commission is headquartered in Abuja). It is also 
recommended that there will be regular meetings and exchanges about regional trade, aid 
and investment between the relevant Netherlands’ Embassies in the region. Promising but 
only recently introduced instruments to give shape to a more coordinated regional approach 
in West Africa by the Netherlands Government – i.e. the appointment of an ECOWAS 
permanent representative and the creation of the position of regional economic envoy – 
should be seized as an opportunity to (co-) drive this process. 
 
12. TAKE THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK AS THE CENTRAL KNOWLEDGE PARTNER AND 
LINK UP WITH ITS ‘HIGH FIVES FOR AFRICA STRATEGY’.  
We recommend to take the African Development Bank as a central knowledge partner for 
Dutch support for regional integration processes in West Africa, and to give them a role in 
engaging other knowledge partners in the region, and connect those to collaborating 
knowledge partners in the Netherlands. 
The African Development Bank has recently announced its ‘High Fives for Africa’ Strategy.  
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‘Integrate Africa’ is in the middle, but that goal is linked to ‘Feed Africa’, and ‘Industrialise 
Africa’ (linked to ‘Light up and Power Africa’) and to the ultimate goal ‘Improve the Quality of 
Life for the People of Africa’. By linking its regional integration support to these major goals, 
formulated by the leading African actor in the region, the Netherlands is demand driven, and 
integrates its approach with the actor that will probably make a difference in the years to 
come, both as a major investor, and as an important knowledge broker.  
 
13. BUT DO INVOLVE THE KNOWLEDGE CENTRES AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR FROM THE START 
It is recommended that The Netherlands’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the relevant 
Embassies in the region not only involve local policymakers and knowledge centres (and 
supporting institutions in the Netherlands), but also representatives of the private sector in 
the region (the Borderless Alliance can be a good example to follow; and a support agency 
like the Netherlands African Business Council, linking Dutch and local entrepreneurs, could 
play a role as well;) It is also recommended to connect to Dutch agencies with a long 
presence in the area, and with relevant expertise and networks, like SNV and AgriProFocus. A 
particular area of attention in this regard concerns the opportunities (and challenges) related 
to regional value-chains development and in particular to agro-industrial value addition, that 
needs to be further explored.  
 
14. AND BE BOLD; TRY TO CONNECT TO EMERGING PARTNERS 
In order to have a better understanding of the broader playing field, it is good to be more 
aware of the role of ‘non-traditional’ development partners such as emerging economies like 
China, Brazil, Turkey, and India. These kinds of players become increasingly important in West 
Africa but manifest themselves in other ways than the more traditional development 
partners. This has not yet been part of the scoping study. Therefore an interesting and 
important area for further research is to look into their specific role and impact in order to 
identify possible areas for cooperation and alignment.  
 
15. BUT ALSO: DON’T BE NAÏVE 
The literature and policy documents concerning regional integration in West Africa generally 
strongly assume that increased intra-regional trade will indeed result in regional economic 
development, better food security, increased resilience, and also better stability (also in a 
political and military sense). However, a more political economy approach questions some of 
the naïve assumptions that all is well with growing regional trade and integration if that could 
(and should) be stimulated. Lower cross-border transaction costs and lower transport costs, 
as well as a likely more powerful position of larger food traders, and the formal food industry, 
will mean that the people (and agencies) that currently profit from high transaction costs, 
expensive transport, and that currently organize the bulk of informal food trade (mainly 
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women), might lose their positions and part of their income. And within the food production 
and trade sectors the rewards of better integration at a much higher level of scale, might be 
very unequally divided between owners and workers, smallholders and large agricultural 
producers, etc. If ignored, these political economy aspects might result in more inequality, 
more instability, more food insecurity for relatively powerless people and areas, and threats 
to economic development in the region, instead of overall benefits. An additional impact of 
more integration should also not be ignored. More trade in seeds, livestock and food 
products over a larger region increases the risks of livestock and plant epidemics (and related 
human disease epidemics, plus human disease risks related to greater mobility), so the 
epidemiological, plant-health and veterinary services – which are first and foremost provided 
by public institutions – need special care, at the level of the Central Region or West Africa as 
a whole.  
 
 
 
